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     In this thesis I explore an alternative formulation of the circumstances of justice. 
The circumstances of justice are the circumstances that make human cooperation 
necessary and possible, and because human cooperation is necessary to justice, they 
make justice both necessary and possible. For constructivists, principles of justice 
respond to these circumstances.  
     Standard accounts of the circumstances of justice can be found in Hobbes, Hume, 
and Rawls, and many contemporary theorists rely on these accounts. My dissertation 
rejects these standard accounts of the circumstances of justice—on the grounds of 
exclusion and trust—and defends an alternative account. A core idea of my proposed 
alternative is that the circumstances of justice must be understood in terms of 
solidarity.    
     A proper understanding of the role of solidarity in an adequate characterization of 
the circumstances of justice requires a good grasp of the nature of solidarity itself. To 
that end I offer a novel account of solidarity which I argue improves existing theories 
of solidarity. In the first part of this project I explain the role and importance of the 
circumstances of justice. I then offer a full description of solidarity and its normative 
character. In the second half of the project I offer my new account of the 
circumstances of justice, including an explanation and examples of how broad the 
scope of this reformulation is. I conclude the project by applying my new account of 
the circumstances of justice to the problem of climate change, and ask whether we 
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     At a global justice conference in York, I heard a panel speaker from an NGO 
explain that one difference between a moral wrong and an injustice is that while we 
might reflect and then dispassionately conclude that something is morally wrong, 
injustice makes us angry. When we see injustices we take them personally; we take 
justice personally. I am uncertain to what extent her claim is true, but some degree of 
plausibility in her comments on justice and injustice certainly made me ask, why? 
Why do we take justice personally? The best response I have found to this question is 
that we take it personally because justice, adequately characterized, responds to us 
and to our situation. Justice, ideally, responds to the needs of individuals in societies. 
The role of principles of justice, then, is to respond to the needs that we have because 
of the particular human and worldly circumstances we find ourselves in. Those 
circumstances, the facts that justice ought to respond to, are the circumstances of 
justice. 
     This work defends a new account of the circumstances of justice. To better 
understand the circumstances of justice is to better understand the idea of justice for 
Constructivists. To particularize the circumstances of justice correctly is to explain 
the scope of justice—when its questions arise and when it has application. One 
significant aspect of my new account of the circumstances of justice offered here is a 
specification of the relationship between justice and trust, in which a particular kind 
of trust is a necessary condition for justice to have application. The formulation of the 
circumstances of justice which I argue for here is intended to be more of a 
complement to the earlier accounts of David Hume and John Rawls than it is a 
rejection of their positions. Hence, this project may be viewed as a refinement of their 
own considered views on the circumstances of justice. 
     Methodologically, this project is a political constructivist evaluation and 
reconstruction of the circumstances of distributive justice. The project is itself 
constructivist because it assumes (and to some extent argues) that the circumstances 
of justice have merit, and are important for our understanding of justice. If, however, 
one rejects political constructivism outright, chapters 2-6 of this project may still be of 
interest for, as long as any philosophers still engage with the circumstances of 
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justice—in particular, the standard account—this project will function as a critical 
assessment of, and counter-proposal to, that literature.  
     One fundamental role of the circumstances of justice is to outline the scope of 
justice. As a result, this project is an attempt to redefine the scope of justice. It aims 
for a better understanding of the facts in the world that give rise to obligations of 
justice. Though this project begins with heavy grounding in the literature that forms 
the standard accounts of the circumstances of justice, it moves far beyond this 
literature. My project attempts to carve out a list of facts that better fit with our 
intuitions and considered judgments on when justice obtains, and when it clearly 
should not. The hope is that if we can specify an account of the circumstances which 
meets most of our convictions and intuitions about justice, then we might use that 
account of the circumstances of justice to guide us when our intuitions and 
convictions are uncertain. While I cannot claim to have uncovered the circumstances 
of justice in this project, I do hope to have established that my account not only 
greatly improves on the former accounts of the circumstances of justice, but guides us 
more reliably when we reach difficult cases; cases in which it is unclear whether 
principles of justice should guide us at all—instead of, for instance, moral principles 
or principles of prudence. 
     This project involves four central tasks. The first is to establish the importance of 
the facts to which justice responds within political constructivism, and then to 
critically evaluate three central accounts of those facts. In chapter 1, I outline what 
constructivist theories of justice look like and show that an important framework, 
explicit in Rawls, highlights how obligations of justice are understood by many 
Constructivists to be binding. I then show how Hume’s and Hobbes’s theories of 
justice rely on this same framework to ground their own principles of justice. Simply 
put, they rely on facts about the world and human nature; they rely on the 
circumstances of justice. I demonstrate the shortcomings of these three accounts in 
the second chapter. In addition to some earlier criticisms of their views on the 
circumstances of justice, I argue that they all three fail to account for the challenge of 
trust. Hobbes himself raises this problem when he first explains the rampant mistrust 
of man in the state of nature, and then attempts to solve this by requiring an all-
powerful state (the Leviathan) within his conception of justice. I argue that Hume 
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and Rawls can, to some extent, be read as responding to this problem left over from 
Hobbes, but neither quite meet Hobbes’s challenge.  
     The second task of this project involves a description of solidarity. In chapter 3, I 
argue that despite the diverse accounts in the literature, which appear to be 
irreconcilable, solidarity can be reconciled under a single description that not only fits 
with many taxonomies of solidarity, but which reveals two normatively different 
species of solidarity. To this end I argue that solidarity is constituted by four jointly 
necessary features: a joint interest, identification with the group, a disposition to 
empathy, and mutual trust. When these features are bidirectional between the 
individual and the group, the solidarity is robust and strongly normative. When any 
of the four conditions is unidirectional it is weakly normative. 
     Once an account of solidarity is developed, the third part of this project is to 
situate solidarity within the circumstances of justice in such a way that it addresses 
the challenge of trust. Chapter 4 develops my own account of the circumstances of 
justice, which includes the fact of solidarity in the world, limited scarcity of resources, 
and limited human understanding. This chapter defends my account of the 
circumstances against the previous literature. Chapter 5 establishes that my view of 
the circumstances of justice fits better with our intuitions about when questions of 
justice arise than the earlier accounts of the circumstances of justice. 
     The final task of this thesis is to address the very real problem of intergenerational 
coordination. Chapter 6 situates the intergenerational resource coordination problem 
within justice and moral theory. After carefully evaluating whether the 
intergenerational problem fits with the previous accounts of the circumstances of 
justice, this possibility is rejected. I argue that the problem does not fit with any 
theory of distributive justice, and propose a better way to deal with the problem: 
imperfect moral duties. The chapter closes by suggesting a moral constructivist 
framework for working out our duties to future generations. I argue that such duties 
are legitimate juridical duties, and hence they can claim the efficacy which leads us to 









     A constructivist approach to political philosophy has played a dominant role in 
theories of justice since Hobbes’s Leviathan. It has been reinvented in a variety of 
forms. Only since Rawls, however, has constructivism become something of a 
standard methodology in political philosophy. This chapter has two aims. The first is 
to offer an account of the appeal of political constructivism. This will involve a 
description of the defining features of political constructivism, so that we might better 
understand with what this project is concerned. The second aim of this chapter is to 
show that constructivism, in all its forms, embraces a methodological distinction that 
constrains its normative scope. I will call this distinction Requirement N. Anyone 
writing in the constructivist tradition must justify their theory with reference to this 
requirement and the facts with which it is concerned. After establishing the 
importance of these facts in constructivist theories of justice in this chapter, the next 
chapter explores the standard accounts of these facts, which political Constructivists 
tend to rely upon, but rarely address. The task of defining the facts that inform this 
methodological requirement will be the focus of the remainder of this project.  
     The chapter proceeds by first giving an account of political constructivism, its 
appeal, and then addressing a methodological objection in the first section. It next 
discusses Rawls’s framework, which illustrates the importance of the relationship 
between the need for a solution to a recognized social problem, and the principles 
that respond to this need. Rawls locates the normative force of justice within this 
framework, which I call Requirement N. The chapter then moves on to locate this 
requirement and its role in Rawls, Hume, and Hobbes, before concluding with 
discussion of some objections to constructivist methodology in general. 
I. Political Constructivism and its Appeal 
     This project is concerned with political constructivism as distinct from meta-
ethical constructivism or ethical constructivism. Political constructivism is 
characterized by a few common features. The first is that the principles with which it 
is concerned are correct when they are the outcome of a particular kind of 
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deliberative procedure deemed appropriate because it incorporates certain relevant 
requirements.1 These requirements are meant to form an appropriate method for 
achieving the second standard feature: objectively correct principles. These 
characteristics capture another important feature of constructivism: the belief that 
objective principles are discernable by practical reason. Practical reason ultimately 
must identify some salient facts about a situation and judge that, in light of these 
facts, either certain normative principles are appropriate, or that a certain decision 
procedure is appropriate for determining suitable normative political principles. 
Whatever normative principles are generated by this procedure are valid as a result 
of the procedure that constructed them, not because of their accuracy in tracking 
independent moral facts.2 
     There are a number of reasons why constructivism is appealing to the political 
philosopher. First, political constructivism purports to yield normative principles based 
on certain relevant facts in the world. This allows Constructivists to remain largely 
agnostic toward meta-ethical theories and avoid commitment to independent moral 
facts. Depending on the account it may be agnostic toward normative moral theories 
as well.3 Hence, political constructivist methodology is compatible with a number of 
meta-ethical and ethical positions. This lack of commitment to independent 
principles yields a further attraction: political constructivism could yield a theory of 
justice that corresponds to a traditionally competing moral theory. For instance, if 
utilitarianism had come out of Rawls’s original position, then constructivism would 
have resulted in a utilitarian theory of justice. Similarly, if reflective equilibrium were 
                                                
     1 For identification of a similar uniting principle among constructivist positions 
see: John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 
p.102 and Samuel Freeman, "The Burdens of Public Justification: Constructivism, 
Contractualism, and Publicity," Politics, Philosophy & Economics 6 (2007), p.7. It is 
worth noting, however, that some Constructivists argue that this typical focus on 
procedure should be shifted to standpoints. 
     2 Objections to the fact-sensitive principle approach will be addressed in the final 
section. 
     3 For Hobbes and Gauthier, for instance, justice and morality are coextensive so 
their constructivist methodology cannot be compatible with other normative ethical 
theories. On a limited political constructivist theory that is concerned with justice as a 
subset of morality, however, such a constructed theory of justice is compatible with a 
variety of normative theories. 
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to yield a different initial position or decision procedure, an altogether different set of 
principles could be generated.  
     A second reason constructivism has the appeal it does is because prominent 
versions rely on the rational or reasonable endorsement of principles by all or most 
individuals. This public endorsement yields a system of rights and duties that meet 
with wide acceptance and are only minimally coercive. A third feature that makes 
political constructivism appealing is that it avoids some of the counterintuitive 
consequences of aggregative approaches to justice.4 The combination of these 
methodological benefits after a long history of analysis, rejection, and reformulation 
has contributed to political constructivism leading political philosophy discourse 
today.  
     Political constructivism can be divided into two dominant branches, the Rawlsian5 
and Hobbesian. The Hobbesian tradition is markedly wider in scope than the 
Rawlsian. It attempts to establish a set of principles of justice that are coextensive 
with morality. Gauthier, for instance, defends a full account of moral questions. He 
begins with the assumption of a moral error theory and attempts to replace morality 
(which he takes to have already failed to be useful) with a constructivist procedure for 
accepting moral-like constraints. Gauthier grounds morality in rationality, arguing 
that the right or good thing to do is what a fully rational agent would do. Hobbes’s 
theory is similarly extensive in scope, capturing all of morality. Gauthier and Hobbes 
are still properly considered political Constructivists (and thus relevant herein) because 
the moral and political are coextensive on their accounts.  
      The narrower Rawlsian constructivist procedure focuses on justice as a subset of 
morality. This approach arose in response to the divergent views of individuals 
participating in schemes of justice and the primacy of coordinating to solve political 
problems. Political problems require an approach that embraces this diversity and 
still allows individuals to justify their actions and normative judgments on political 
                                                
     4 It avoids aggregation in justifying reasons or principles. So, while a constructivist 
methodology may yield a utilitarian theory of justice, it would do so because this 
would be chosen by or justifiable to each individual. 
     5 Rawlsian constructivism is sometimes called Kantian Constructivism, but as the 
constructivist feature in Kant (the Categorical Imperative) is concerned with morality 
as a whole and not a narrower subset, I refer to this branch as Rawlsian and not 
Kantian Constructivism. 
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matters to one another. As Rawls explains, “Given the profound differences in belief 
and conceptions of the good”6 public agreement on basic philosophical questions, 
such as questions of religion or moral doctrines, cannot be obtained without the 
state’s violating basic liberties. He continues, “philosophy as the search for truth 
about an independent metaphysical and moral order cannot, I believe, provide a 
workable shared basis for a political conception of justice.”7 Rawls’s proposal is to 
apply a principle of tolerance to political philosophy itself.  
     The result is a species of constructivism that typically accepts the pluralist nature 
of moral values and reasons, as well as the value of disagreement, while still able to 
commit to an objective justification of a certain subset of moral issues. Two paradigm 
examples of this approach are John Rawls and T.M. Scanlon. Both theorists endorse 
constructivist methodology to ground a certain subset of moral principles. Rawls is 
concerned with political constructivism and how to establish principles for a system 
of justice.8 Scanlon is concerned with the subset of morality marked by what we owe 
to each other, of which justice is a part. A feature of the pluralist foundations of both 
theories is that they try to discover the basis for public justification acceptable to all 
reasonable citizens, independent of, but compatible with a wide range of reasonable 
nonpublic views. Here, reasonable is a moral concept. Rawls explains that reasonable 
persons are motivated by a desire for a social world in which they, as free and equal 
individuals, “can cooperate with others on terms they can accept.”9 Essentially, a 
limited constructivist approach allows the theorist to set aside questions about the 
origin of moral principles. Instead, the theorist is interested in identifying a 
conception of justice compatible with good political citizens rather than good moral 
individuals. 
                                                
     6 John Rawls, "Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical," Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 14 (1985):223-51, p.230. 
     7 Ibid. p.230. 
     8 Rawls shifted from Kantian constructivism in his earlier work, Kantian Constructivism in 
Moral Theory to political constructivism in his later work, Political Liberalism. For excellent 
exegesis on why this shift was necessary within Rawls’s work see Freeman, “The 
Burdens of Public Justification: Constructivism, Contractualism, and Publicity.”  
     9Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.50. Rawls then further explains that this concept of 
reasonable is nearly the same as Scanlon’s principle of moral motivation, which is a 
basic desire to justify ourselves to others on grounds they cannot reasonably reject. 
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     Scanlon’s contractualist formula is that “an act is wrong if it would be disallowed 
by a principle that no one could reasonably reject,” given the shared aim of finding 
principles with others, that they could not reasonably reject.10 Central to this idea is 
the shared aim of finding such principles. This does not mean that all individuals will 
agree or want to agree on all moral principles. It does mean, however, that when a 
group of people have the need for some principle to determine how they will act 
regarding each other in a certain circumstance, they will find such a principle by 
reflecting along the lines of Scanlon’s formula. It is the primacy of this need that 
assures that whatever principle has passed the non-rejectability test is justified. In 
some cases, Scanlon explains, there will be more than one principle that could pass 
the non-rejectability test. In such cases, whatever convention the society has been 
using will be the correct principle.11 On this formulation, individuals can be 
motivated to want principles to solve some problems that they are needed for, but not 
have the same motives or reasons for wanting this. So long as they agree on the need 
for some principles, whatever this decision procedure yields will be binding.12 Exactly 
which problems these principles are formed to adjudicate will be decided by the 
needs of the group in question. Many of these problems will be problems of 
distribution, that is: problems of justice.  
     Rawls offers a framework to illustrate the importance of the relationship between 
the need for a solution to a problem, and the principles that respond to this need, and 
he locates the normative force of justice within this framework.13 In the opening of A 
Theory of Justice (hereafter Theory), Rawls distinguishes between a concept and a 
conception of justice. A concept of justice is specified by the role different sets of 
principles, different conceptions of justice, share.14 A concept of justice will define the role 
of the principles of justice in assigning rights and duties; it will aim at a proper 
                                                
     10 Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998). 
     11 Ibid., ch.8. 
     12 See especially Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism p. 650. and What We Owe 
to Each Other ch. 8 for a full discussion on pluralism in Scanlon’s contractualism. 
     13 In this project, “normative” is to be understood as something one ought to do. 
     14 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of 
Harvard Univeristy Press, 1999) p.5. 
 9 
balance between the various conceptions of justice.15 It defines the problem of justice 
and what its task or role must be. A conception of justice, in contrast, is the 
application of a set of principles to this problem.16 It involves affirmation of a set of 
principles that are necessary to assign basic rights and duties for determining proper 
distribution of various types of goods within a society. Korsgaard explains Rawls’s 
framework this way: “The concept names the problem, the conception proposes a 
solution. The normative force of the conception is established in this way. If you 
recognize the problem to be yours and the solution to be the best one, then the 
solution is binding upon you.”17 This emphasizes that what is primary to 
understanding right actions within the scope of the constructivist approach is general 
agreement on the problem, and the importance of finding a solution to it. The 
correct solution will be whatever solution works best. This is exactly analogous to 
Scanlon’s explanation of why the principles his constructivist framework reveals are 
binding. So, if we want to identify what political constructivist principles aim to do, 
we must be able to identify their corresponding concept.  
     This concept/conception framework is necessary for the conception to be 
normative, that is, for the principles of justice, whatever they may be, to be binding 
for some people. Hence, some version of this method of justification of principles is 
found explicitly or implicitly in all political constructivism. We might extrapolate 
from this the following requirement for future reference: 
           REQUIREMENT N: For a constructivist principle to be normative it must 
offer a solution to a corresponding recognized problem, where the solution 
is a conception of X and the problem is named by concept X. 
Though this principle may have broader scope than political constructivism, what 
matters in this discussion is that it holds for political Constructivists, and that for 
Constructivists the concept and conceptions of justice are fact-sensitive. In other 
                                                
     15 Ibid.  p.9. 
     16 Rawls borrows this distinction from Hart, who defines the concept of justice as 
“Treating like cases alike (1961, p.155).” He describes this as the universal aspect that 
individuals can speak about and agree to, though they will argue over the shifting 
part of justice (its conception) which specifies what is relevant in determining which 
cases are alike or different. 
     17 Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge, [England]: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.114. 
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words, both the concept of justice and its ensuing principles respond to certain facts 
about human nature and society.18 The content of the concept and conception 
depends on certain features of the world and humanity that lead us to want solutions 
to coordination problems (i.e., rules of justice). 
     In Rescuing Justice and Equality, G.A. Cohen has objected to this constructivist 
framework of political philosophy, arguing that we are wrong to think that justice is 
fact-sensitive in this way. He argues that the error of fact-sensitive accounts of justice 
is that they confuse principles of justice with an optimal set of rules to live by.19 That 
is, they conflate fundamental principles of justice and rules of regulation. This rules of 
regulation approach to justice results in principles of justice that are only applied 
principles involving justice and other empirical facts or values. Cohen thinks that 
applied principles cannot be fundamental principles of justice. He argues that when 
Constructivists aim to ask, What is justice? they are actually asking, What general 
rules of society would one chose from a “particular condition of knowledge and 
ignorance?”20 His position is that the answer to the first question cannot provide an 
answer to the second question. Rules of regulation will be revealed by answering the 
first question, while answering the second question will reveal fundamental principles 
of justice, which are fact-insensitive. Cohen contends that this conflation of principles 
of justice and rules of regulation is evidence that Constructivists have the wrong 
concept of justice in mind. His aim is to rescue the concept of justice.21 
     Constructivists define principles of justice as those rules which respond to the 
concept of justice, where the concept of justice is sensitive to facts about the world that 
generate some need for coordination. The constructivist concept of justice articulates 
the kinds of problems that principles of justice are needed to solve, and it is responsive 
to real world facts, without which people would neither need nor endorse these 
principles. According to Cohen, this approach is a fundamental error. Justice is not 
                                                
     18 The content of these facts will be the focus of the remainder of this project so I 
leave it aside here and focus instead on the methodology. 
     19 G. A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), p.278. I will return to separate arguments Cohen makes 
against fact-sensitive reasons in the final section of this chapter. Here I focus on his 
rejection of the constructivist concept of justice. 
     20 Ibid., p.277. 
     21 Ibid., p.2, p.270. 
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about finding optimal rules for social regulation. Rather, justice involves fundamental 
fact-insensitive principles of justice. Cohen’s argument however, is problematic for a 
number of reasons. I will address his concept of justice argument here and return to 
his closely connected fact-sensitivity argument at the end of this chapter, after 
illustrating the role of fact-sensitive principles for Constructivists.  
     In his attempt to rescue the concept of justice, Cohen, explicitly aligns himself with 
Plato, agreeing “that you need to have a view of what justice itself is to recognize that 
justice dictates P when F is true.” He concludes, “justice transcends facts of the 
world.”22 He further supports Plato in the belief that “justice is the self-same thing 
across, and independently of, history.”23 Pogge summarizes Cohen on these points, 
“[h]e holds that we should seek to justify all our moral judgments by the ‘ultimate 
warrant’ of fact-free principles that cover all possible combinations of facts and hence 
all possible worlds.”24 Cohen states that for a principle to be an ultimate, fact-
insensitive principle it must have “intelligible meaning” regardless of what the facts 
are.25 He gives examples of beings internally provided with everything they need to 
achieve their life plans and beings that only live for 24 hours, both of which are 
subject to the same concept of justice as ourselves.26 As Pogge points out, however, it 
is difficult to identify a principle that could have meaning in all possible worlds, as 
other worlds could be radically different from our own.27 There may not be 
“sufficiently separable individuals,” the length of lives may be “dramatically unequal,” 
and “conceptions of the good may be so radically diverse that it seems ludicrous to 
affirm what Cohen’s egalitarianism requires: that the relational predicate ‘is better off 
than’ can meaningfully be applied.”28 The pertinent point for this discussion is that it 
does seem impossible to identify a fundamental principle that could apply in all 
possible worlds. This moral realism alone would certainly be defensible, but Cohen 
takes his Platonism a step further when he argues that, 
                                                
     22 Ibid., p.291. 
     23 Ibid.  
     24 Thomas Pogge, "Cohen to the Rescue!," Ratio 21 (2008): 454-475, p.469. 
     25 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p.231 fn.2. 
     26 Ibid., p.246, p.293. 
     27 Pogge, “Cohen to the Rescue!,” p.462 fn.8. 
     28 Poggee, “Cohen to the Rescue!” p.462 fn.8.  
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 [u]ntil we unearth the fact-free moral principle that governs our fact-
loaded particular judgments about justice, we don’t know why we think 
what we think just is just. And we have to retreat to (what we consider to 
be) justice in its purity to figure out how to institute as much justice as 
possible inside the cave.29  
This last statement indicates that to some degree Cohen held the position that we—
like the prisoners in Plato’s cave—can only ever understand the concept of justice to 
the extent that the shadows of the puppets show it to us. Whatever else may or may 
not be true about justice, however, it must be the case that we can comprehend it. 
Not only do we make judgments about justice on a regular basis, we can identify 
considered convictions about principles of justice. We are even able to see errors in 
our judgments and our considered convictions about justice and correct them. We 
could not do this if we had an insufficient understanding of what justice is.30 Further, 
if we consider the role justice plays in holding people accountable, it becomes clear 
that we must have some accessible, functional concept of justice. It would be 
unreasonable to blame and punish people for norms they cannot access or reliably 
discern.31 It seems then, that we do have a comprehensible concept of justice and that 
Cohen is wrong to think that the concept of justice is supposed to be—at least in 
part—beyond our understanding. 
    Cohen gives little explanation as to why the concept of justice should be a 
transcendent concept rather than optimal principles for social regulation. His 
argument appeals primarily to his own intuition and the claim that the right way to 
choose rules of regulation is to “take into account both justice and other 
considerations.”32 It is unclear though why Cohen thinks that allowing particular facts 
and values to shape our concept of justice—and thus our conception of justice—rules 
out the possibility of trade-offs with other virtues, or why this should matter. Cohen 
does not address this. 
                                                
     29 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p.291. 
     30 This argument may sound similar to Rawls’s reflective equilibrium, but the 
claim I am making is that we could not engage in such thought experiments if we did 
not have a concept of justice that we understand, even though we may not be aware 
of having such a concept. I am indebted to conversations with Alex Lantham for this 
point. 
     31 I am grateful to Mike Ridge for this point. 
     32 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p.303. 
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     Cohen may here respond that the reason we should seek such ultimate principles, 
whether we can know them or not, is because understanding justice both when there 
are circumstances such that it could apply, and understanding justice when it has no 
application but is still a fundamental principle, will reveal some better understanding of 
the concept of justice. But Cohen never tells us why this wider understanding of a 
concept of justice is better than understanding a concept of justice when it has 
application. Why do we need or want a concept of justice that goes beyond this world 
and our societies? This is the crux of the problem for Cohen; he never tells us why a 
concept of justice qua ultimate principles (regardless of whether they are applicable or 
not) is better than a concept of justice qua rules of regulation for current societal 
needs. He explains that he agrees with Plato that you must have a transcendent 
notion of justice before you can identify its instantiations. But it is left undefended why 
a concept that applies in our societies now is insufficient to meet Cohen’s and Plato’s 
concern that we must understand a concept of justice to understand which principles 
to apply and when to apply it. 
     Constructivists identify concepts of justice that aim to solve practical problems that 
guide us in our choice of principles of justice (qua rules of regulation). Cohen has 
shown that there is an alternative concept of justice, one grounded on ultimate fact-
insensitive principles. Cohen has given us reason to wonder whether the constructivist 
commitment to agnosticism about moral facts results in the best concept of justice. He 
has not, however, shown us that a realist position on moral facts is better for our 
concept of justice, nor whether such a concept is ever attainable or useful for 
discovering the rules of regulation type principles of justice that a particular society 
needs on both his and the Constructivists’ account. I will return to this particular 
point in the final section of this chapter. 
     What this discussion reveals is that, for Constructivists, the principles of justice 
must not only meet Requirement N, but the concept of justice must be practical. It 
must respond to facts in humanity and the world so that its conception of justice is 
relevant—and binding—for those it aims to guide (those who see the problem of the 
concept of justice as their own). The remainder of this chapter attempts not only to 
locate Requirement N and practical concepts of justice in the work of Rawls, Hume, 
and Hobbes but also to highlight the importance of identifying which facts in the 
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world generate the concept and ensuing conceptions of justice. Of the three accounts 
of justice that will be considered here, the constructivist methodology is most 
consciously applied in Rawls. Hence, I will attempt to thematize its essential features 
in Rawls before trying to locate it in the historical works of Hume and Hobbes, whom 
I understand to be Constructivists, but with slightly different characteristics.  
II. Rawls’s Constructivism      
     Rawls’s conception of justice involves his two principles of justice: (1) “Each 
person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which 
scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all” and (2) “Social and economic 
inequalities are to satisfy two conditions (a) they are to be attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and (b) they are 
to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference 
principle).”33 The principles, for Rawls, are what should ultimately guide the rules that 
shape the major social institutions in a well-ordered society. Rawls’s task or concept 
of justice then, is to assign rights and duties and determine the appropriate division of 
social advantages. The principles of justice arrived at by his fair decision procedure of 
the original position, which is in turn arrived at by engaging in reflective equilibrium, 
are what accomplish this in a well-ordered society. It is clear then, that Rawls’s concept 
and conception of justice are practical and action guiding. 
     Another important feature of Rawls’s theory is that “the primary subject of justice 
is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which major social 
institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division and 
advantages of social cooperation.”34 These social institutions consist of the political 
constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements. In his article, 
“Justice as Reciprocity,” Rawls explains that justice is a virtue of social institutions or 
practices, “meaning any form of activity specified by a system of rules which defines 
offices, roles, rights and duties, penalties and defenses and so on.”35 On the surface 
this seems like Rawls is arguing that justice applies only to such social institutions. 
However, Rawls clarifies that his exploration is limited to one instance of the 
                                                
     33 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp.5-6. 
     34 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.6. 
     35 John Rawls, "Justice as Reciprocity," in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel  Freeman 
(London: Harvard University Press, 1999), p.190 fn.1. 
 15 
application of justice, its basic structure, and not to the justice of social practices or 
conventions in general.36 Thus, the conception of justice that Rawls endorses may 
not be the best conception of justice if applied to other practices. This highlights a 
characteristic of Rawlsian political constructivism that will be important to this 
project: different coordination problems call for separate investigations. Rawls is 
concerned with social justice in the basic structure of society and its problems and 
solutions. If, however, Rawls wanted to apply his constructivist methodology to issues 
in medical ethics, he would have to identify a separate concept and different possible 
solutions or principles (conceptions) to adjudicate answers to the problem. This might 
involve a different decision procedure than the original position, as different concepts 
will call for different treatment. Rawls focuses on the basic structure because the 
concept of justice he identifies is that we need to find a fair way of assigning rights 
and duties in the basic institutions of society because justice is the first virtue of social 
institutions. His apparatus of reflective equilibrium and then the original position is 
designed to guide us toward the best possible conception of justice in response to his 
concept of justice. What matters here is that Rawls’s proposed theory of justice fulfills 
Requirement N above and it does so by recommending practical guidance for the 
best rules to regulate social coordination. This means that his conception of justice, 
that is his theory of justice, is a plausible normative conception if he has identified the 
correct concept of justice by identifying the correct facts that generate this concept of 
justice. 
III. Hume’s Political Constructivism 
     To better understand the importance of the facts that inform the concept and 
conception of justice, we now turn to Hume’s political constructivism. The aim of 
this section is to sketch a political constructivist reading of Hume’s theory of justice 
and to further demonstrate how important the role of these facts is for a theory of 
justice. I do so by first explaining Hume’s theory of justice, then arguing that it is in 
fact constructivist, it both fulfills Requirement N, and endorses an action guiding, 
practical (opposed to transcendent) concept of justice. 
     Hume treats justice as a character trait a person may possess. Specifically, justice 
is a disposition to follow a set of rules. We approve of this disposition from a general 
                                                
     36 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.7. 
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point of view.37 In the Treatise of Human Nature (hereafter Treatise) Book III, Hume has 
two aims: a descriptive aim, to account for how individuals come to adopt the 
principles of justice they do, and a justificatory aim, to discover why the rules of 
justice (as established) are virtuous. As a consequence of his broader moral theory 
that virtues cannot be discovered through reason, but only through sentiments, 
Hume is not seeking to establish ideal rules of justice. Rather, Hume wants to explain 
how we arrive at the rules we have via moral sentiments and the general point of 
view, and then explain how this procedure justifies those rules. Hume observes that 
no sentiment explains our approval or disapproval of justice, nor our motive to be 
just: benevolence is too limited and self-interest displays partiality toward ourselves 
and our families and friends. Hence, Hume concludes that justice, unlike other 
virtues, is not a natural disposition, but an artificial disposition. He posits that our 
moral estimation of justice must depend on conventions of property and their public 
utility. For Hume, public utility refers to public usefulness.  
     For Hume, justice is bound to property conventions, though property and justice 
are not equivalent. The rules of justice are conventions that establish property; the 
virtue of justice consists of respecting these rules. Hume is clear that property is not 
natural and neither are individuals' rights to it. Rather, the ideas of justice and 
property are interdependent. Hume states, “Property is nothing but those goods 
whose constant possession is established by the laws of society; that is, the laws of 
justice.”38 Without rules of justice, individuals can claim no property, no rights, and 
no obligations. Hence, Hume concludes in the Enquiries of Human Understanding and 
Concerning the Principles of Morals (Hereafter Enquiry), that convention is the sole origin of 
justice.39  
      Hume explains the process that justice arises from as the use of judgment and 
understanding making it natural that as we watch families grow, we see that society 
                                                
     37 It is important in my later treatment of Hume that I take Hume’s general point 
of view to be limited and not universal for arguments developed in Geoffrey Sayre-
McCord, "On Why Hume's General Point of View Isn't Ideal and Shouldn't Be," 
Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (1994): 202-228. 
     38 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Repr. from the 
original ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), p.491. 
     39 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the 
Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, 3rd ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975), p.183. 
 17 
could grow in a similar way. Individuals observe that if they stabilize the possession of 
goods, it will be in everyone’s interest, because those individuals will be able to form a 
society. This stabilization cannot be a promise, but a gradually arising convention 
which is “a general sense of common interest; which sense all the members of a 
society express to one another.”40 So, men enter into a convention to abstain from 
the property of others. This convention is “the most necessary to the establishment of 
society.”41 It grants peace and stability and ensures an initial framework in which 
cooperation and social intercourse are possible.  
      Individuals comply with the conventions of property (and its ensuing rules) 
because others do. Each individual ought to comply, because she assumes that others 
will comply only if she does, so the beneficial outcome of others’ compliance is the 
consequence of one’s own compliance.42 Because these interactions ground all social 
relations, “the social role of property is to underwrite and structure all social relations, 
positions, and conditions. Given this social function of property, justice must be 
construed more broadly to embrace all basic social relations . . . at bottom, property 
rights are personal rights.”43 They define a broad set of relations between individuals 
and individuals and their societies. Justice defines a social constitution, not merely a 
political or economic constitution. From the initial convention, which establishes 
present possession, the other rules of justice create a society, and then rules dealing 
with other aspects of justice follow (e.g., criminal justice). It is reflection on the 
usefulness of these conventions in stabilizing civil society that gives rise to our 
approbation of justice and, for Hume, there is no stronger foundation for a duty. 
Individuals reflect on the consequences of general failure to conform to conventions of 
justice and this gives rise to the judgment that conformity is obligatory, “which checks 
the inclination not to be just.”44 Hume’s position is that reflecting on justice from the 
general point of view will lead individuals to favor societal interest over individual 
                                                
     40 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p.490. 
     41 Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, p.186. 
     42 Stephen Darwall, "Motive and Obligation in Hume's Ethics," Nous 27 (1993): 
415-448. 
     43 Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, Clarendon Law Series 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p.102. 
     44 David Gauthier, "David Hume, Contractarian," Philosophical Review 88 (1979): 
3-38. 
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interests.45 Additionally sympathy with the public utility of justice leads to our 
approbation and the ensuing obligation.46  
     Somewhat controversially, Hume maintains that rules of justice—whatever they 
may be—must be followed, as the utility of justice does not depend on the particular 
convention but on the convention’s existence. He discusses the contingent nature of 
property conventions and their great divergence within and between societies, but 
argues that any change in these conventions would have such marginal utility over 
the current conventions that it is not worth the risk of undermining these 
conventions. In this way, Hume limits the possibilities of his conception of justice. 
Justice is respect for rights of others as established by the conventions of property; he 
never asks whether the conventions and rules are themselves just. He instead relies on 
the notion of custom by which people are primarily governed and, as “nothing has a 
greater effect both to increase and diminish our passions,”47 it is essential that custom 
be preserved. Given that these conventions arise as the result of a historical tradition 
of coordination of interests while generating approval from a general point of view, 
these customs are particularly weighty reasons to conform, and are a just influence 
on passions and behavior. That is not to say, however, that he could not criticize 
many conventions from the standpoint of justice. If a convention does not garner our 
approbation because of its usefulness, then it still would not be a convention of 
justice.  
     In order to determine whether Hume’s theory of justice contains a constructivist 
methodology, we begin by asking: Does Hume meet Requirement N and is his 
concept of justice practical or transcendent? First, we must identify his concept.48 I 
propose the following: to define the rules in stabilizing a system of property that 
assigns rights and obligations appropriately, in order to constitute a society. Next, we 
                                                
     45 Ibid.  
     46 NB “sympathy” in Hume is much closer in meaning to the modern “empathy.” 
     47 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p.422. 
     48 It is worth noting that the reconstruction of Rawls’s machinery in Hume’s (and 
later Hobbes’s) project does risk danger of anachronism. That is, how far Hume 
endorses the structure of Requirement N is not immediately evident, a number of 
different frameworks could be acceptable interpretations of Hume’s account of 
justice. Because of this, nothing in my project hinges on this formulation of the 
concept of justice, its purpose is simply to help bring out the constructivist nature of 
Hume’s project. 
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ask, what is Hume’s corresponding conception of justice? The answer, given his 
conservative stance toward conventions of justice, is whatever the current system is, 
so long as it meets a proviso of stability.49 It seems not only that Hume meets 
Requirement N, but he does so using a concept of justice that responds to facts in the 
world (e.g., the need for stabilizing property and the need for society), not 
transcendent principles of justice. This lends plausibility to my position that Hume is 
indeed a constructivist about justice.  
     In the discussion of Rawls above, we can see how one moves from a concept to a 
conception of justice, which is, by taking up the standpoint of a liberal citizen and 
asking what principles a reasonable citizen has reason to adopt. And “insofar as we 
regard ourselves as such citizens, those are laws which we have reason to accept.”50 It 
is because each individual has a need for some rules or principles of justice, in order 
to solve the task of justice, that the rules will be binding. In Hume, we find a 
framework sufficiently analogous to model Rawls’s procedure. Hume ultimately 
recommends that we take up the standpoint of the general point of view to ask what 
principles are just and agreeable. Those will happen to be ones that came about 
through a certain process of conventions over time. Insofar as we have sympathy with 
the society in question, we have reason to want everyone to be bound by property 
rules.  
     Despite a number of substantial differences in the theories of Rawls and Hume, 
the preceding discussions bring out a number of shared structural features in addition 
to their fact-sensitive concepts of justice. They both endorse frameworks for 
discovering their conceptions of justice that are not committed to a particular ideal or 
goal (e.g., maximizing utility or equal distribution of resources). Their theories are 
primarily concerned with the process of determining the best procedure to yield the 
best conception of justice. The accounts are concerned with constructing, or in 
Hume’s case justifying, the construction of a conception of justice that is the right 
conception because of the procedure that brought it about. For Rawls this is the 
function of the original position; for Hume it lies in the general point of view.  
                                                
     49 It is important to note that given the restricted reading of the general point of 
view that I endorse, there will be different conceptions of justice for each society. 
     50 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, p.115. 
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     Hume’s theory of justice is a constructivist theory of justice.51 His theory of 
artificial virtues is a construction that yields what Hume takes to be just because of 
the process that brings the principles about. While Hume may not be motivated to be 
constructivist because of pluralism (as Rawls and Scanlon are), tolerance is a key 
theme and pluralism is still plausibly incorporated into his account by the general 
point of view. Hume’s general point of view, from which individuals reflect on 
whether something is useful and agreeable, is not motivated by a single ideal or 
reason. People enter this reflective position and evaluate virtues, even justice, without 
necessarily having similar accounts of where the concern or desire to do so comes 
from. Hume’s virtue ethics merely require that we have similar sentiments, not that 
the reasons we have them be the same. Hence, something very much like Rawls’s 
reasonable pluralism could be captured by the general point of view approach. 
Hume does speak of different cultures having different rules for the same tasks (e.g., 
defining property succession) in a way that sounds remarkably similar to Scanlon’s 
explanation of the diversity between cultures, and Rawls’s advocacy of tolerance 
throughout his work. So, while Hume does not endorse any specific pluralism or 
tolerance within political cultures taking up the general point of view, neither is his 
theory incompatible with such values. Furthermore, there is no reason that 
constructivism must yield liberal theories of justice; that is simply the aim of most of 
its modern proponents. 
     Another shared feature of Rawls and Hume in their broader theories is the role of 
reciprocity. Rawls, in his essay, “Justice as Reciprocity,” gives a full account of what 
this role is. Ultimately, for Rawls, justice is not best characterized as a relation of 
mutual advantage or as impartiality, though his decision procedure for arriving at 
principles of justice does concern aspects of these. Rather, the relation of justice is 
characterized by a principle of reciprocity. He explains that the concept of 
reciprocity occurs when autonomous individuals, “are engaging in or find themselves 
participating in a joint activity, are among themselves settling upon or acknowledging 
                                                
     51 NB his entire moral theory is sometimes read this way. While it is true that the 
general point of view is relevant to his theory of moral sentiments, without the 
conventions and practices of his artificial virtues, that is, without some objective rules 
coming out of the general point of view, it seems more adequately defined as an 
epistemic device, which does not construct the “right” or “good,” but instead merely 
informs us of it.  
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the rules which define it and which determine their respective shares in its benefits 
and burdens.”52 The principle of reciprocity requires that practices satisfy the 
principles, which people who participate in justice could reasonably propose when in 
the circumstances of justice.53 Rawls insists that his principles of justice as fairness, 
outlined above, are also marked by reciprocity. For instance, Rawls justifies the 
allowance of inequalities in distribution for the benefit of the worst-off as motivated 
by reciprocity.54 Rawls himself observes that in Hume’s discussion of utility and 
mutual advantage, it is frequently noted that every man must benefit. He quotes a 
passage from Hume, “every individual person must find himself a gainer in balancing 
the account . . . Every member of society is sensible of this interest: Every one 
expresses this sense to his fellows, along with the resolution he has taken of squaring 
his actions by it, on the condition that others will do the same.”55 Rawls then explains 
that this taken together with the fact that he also draws from Hume the logical 
importance of general rules, means “the conception of justice I set out . . . is perhaps 
closer to Hume’s than any other.”56 He later compares this reciprocity to Kant’s 
second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, which he believes captures the 
same idea of reciprocity.57  
IV. Hobbes’s Account of Justice and Methodology 
     Having addressed Rawls’s and Hume’s theories of justice and the constructivist 
framework of Requirement N in both of their accounts, I now turn to Hobbes’s 
account and ask how he fulfills this requirement. We look to Hobbes, because his 
project, while similar in structure to Rawls and Hume, takes as foundational a 
completely different set of circumstances and facts in the world. The contrast will 
highlight the importance for constructivist political philosophy of beginning with the 
right set of facts to develop the concept and range of plausible principles (or 
                                                
     52 Rawls, "Justice as Reciprocity,"  p.208. 
     53 Ibid.  
     54 Ibid., p.195-96. 
     55 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p.498. 
     56 Rawls, "Justice as Reciprocity,"  p.196 fn.4. 
     57 The second formulation of the Categorical Imperative is “Act in such a way 
that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in any other person, always 
at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.” From: Immanuel Kant, 
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Pub. Co., 1993), p.230. 
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conceptions) of justice. To emphasize this, I first seek to establish his fulfillment of 
Requirement N—with a concept of justice that is fact-sensitive—in his own project of 
establishing political legitimacy and principles of justice.  
     Hobbes’s use of the idea of the state of nature in his political theory, as one of the 
best-known pieces of political philosophy, hardly requires recounting here. A few 
salient points will suffice to make the arguments needed for this project. He argues 
that the fact of every man’s right to everything combined with his psychological 
egoism lead to a state of nature that is a state of war. Individuals are not constantly 
fighting, but they are constantly ready to fight because there is no way to secure what 
little they can claim against the claims of their fellows. Even within such a state of 
nature, however, there are certain universal precepts of reason or laws of nature. The 
following are the three most important:  (1) “That every man, ought to endeavour 
Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he 
may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre.” from this is derived (2) “That 
a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of 
himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be 
contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men 
against himselfe.”58 these lead to (3) “That men performe their Covenants made.” 59 
Hobbes adds to this that injustice is simply “not Performance of Covenant.”60 As 
precepts of reason every person may desire to follow the laws of nature, but they 
cannot as the state of war they are in is such that there is no reason to trust that other 
men will do so. Hobbes argues that we can only expect everyone to follow these laws 
of nature if there is an enforcer of covenants. Hobbes prefers a government led by a 
single power for this role and calls this government the Leviathan. These three laws 
in addition to another sixteen make up the laws of justice, which for Hobbes are also 
the rules of morality. These precepts of reason are the laws of justice only when a 
government exists to enforce the third law. 
                                                
     58 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck, Rev. student ed., Cambridge 
Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p.92. 
     59 Ibid., p.100. 
     60 Ibid.  
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      At present, we are concerned with how the structure of Hobbes’s social contract 
models the constructivist project. In Rawls, the procedure for the move from concept 
to conception is possible by taking up the standpoint of a liberal citizen and asking 
what principles a reasonable citizen would adopt. Because Hobbes begins with an 
initial position not already marked by society or any cooperation, we must imagine 
taking up the point of view of an individual who lives in continuous fear, and in 
danger of violent death, plagued by the life “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and 
short.”61 Even so, this individual desires peace and knows that every other individual 
does as well. This is the perspective of an instrumentally rational individual who 
knows that she will benefit from cooperation, but that it would be unwise to be the 
first to cooperate in such a state. Taking up this point of view, Hobbes’s concept of 
justice seems to be: to guarantee promise making and trust so that individuals are 
secure and enjoy the benefits of mutual cooperation.  
     Hobbes’s solution to this problem, his conception of justice, is a Leviathan 
government, preferably with a single leader who enforces contracts by whatever 
means necessary short of breaching the security and possibility of mutual benefit that 
he is supposed to provide. This will include, but not be limited to, the rest of the laws 
of nature. On Hobbes’s account then, individuals are obligated to be just because it is 
in their interest and they cannot receive the benefits of cooperation or security if they 
are not.  
     We can now see that Hobbes has used a methodology similar to Rawls’s 
constructivist approach of first identifying that which makes justice needed (the 
problem identified by the concept) and then choosing a solution (a conception) which 
responds to the concept. He has identified a problem so severe that some solution is 
needed and desired by all individuals; hence it is responsive to facts about human 
nature and society. His concept of justice is fact-sensitive. And, given the way he 
conceives individuals to be motivated, an all-powerful Leviathan government is a 
legitimate solution to the task of achieving some security and cooperation. It is worth 
noting, however, that Hobbes actually does discuss alternative forms of government 
after the initial contract, but suggests a single monarch would be more successful at 
enforcing covenants. This indicates that he had other conceptions of justice in mind 
                                                
     61 Ibid., p.89. 
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and illustrates that Hobbes’s account of justice meets Requirement N with a fact-
sensitive concept of justice. 
     Though Hobbes differs in a number of important ways from Hume and Rawls, 
not the least of which include his somewhat bleak account of justice and human 
nature, there is a striking similarity. Like Hume and Rawls, it is the procedure of 
identifying the task of justice followed by the advocacy of a possible solution that 
dominates his discourse. Rather than focusing on a specific outcome for justice (e.g., 
maximizing utility or equality), Hobbes focuses on certain features of the world to 
tease out relevant intuitions and garner agreement on the need for an enforcer of 
contracts as well as what is necessary to achieve this.  
      Here one might reasonably ask whether Hobbes’s austere conception of justice is 
really justice. Even understanding the concept at which his project is aiming, there is 
something decidedly unjust about a government defined by an all-powerful 
sovereign. So where then did Hobbes diverge from his fellow Constructivists?  I 
would suggest that Hobbes relies upon the wrong set of facts in the world from which 
to construct both his concept and conception of justice.62 Hobbes starts from 
assumptions of egoism, greed, and limited resources. By comparison, Rawls begins 
with a preexisting society, limited resources, a plurality of interests, and a baseline of 
equality. The facts Hume identifies as relevant are similar to Rawls. The next 
chapter will explore these facts in depth; here what is relevant is their importance. 
Constructivists motivate their concepts of justice by identifying certain facts in the 
world that they understand to give rise to a need for justice, and the facts that make a 
solution possible. This constrains the range of possible principles of justice. If the facts 
a concept and ensuing conceptions of justice respond to are not the right facts, then 
the corresponding theory/conceptions of justice will not be relevant or binding. This 
is because the concept of justice will not respond to the actual circumstances in the 
world that make any rules or conception of justice needed.  
 V. Methodological Concerns 
    Before exploring which facts these should be, I’ll here briefly address two more 
concerns that may arise from the nature of constructivism itself. The first concerns 
                                                
     62 I will defend this suggestion further in the following chapter, at present I merely 
try to emphasize its possibility. 
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the fact-principle relationship I have been advocating herein; the second, the strong 
role of reciprocity that marks any constructivist project. 
    Closely related to his rejection of the constructivist concept of justice is G.A. 
Cohen’s argument against the relationship between facts and principles that I have 
been supporting, and that Rawlsian constructivism explicitly endorses. In Rescuing 
Justice and Equality, Cohen argues that if there are any fact-sensitive principles in the 
world, then this principle is normative only in light of its invoking some more 
ultimate fact-insensitive principle. 
     Cohen gives little explanation of what exactly he understands a fact-insensitive 
principle to be, though he does give us two examples. The first example is in the 
context of his argument for fact-insensitive principles of justice. As Cohen explains his 
position, an agent observes a fact and then infers a principle from the observation. For 
example, only when promises are kept can individuals succeed at their projects. The 
agent then infers: we should keep our promises. But then, the agent might always ask, 
“Why should we do this?” The answer seems to be a further principle: we should help 
people pursue their projects. The same question might be asked of this principle until 
eventually we reach a fact-insensitive principle.63 In this case Cohen identifies the 
foundational, fact-insensitive principle: “One ought to respect beings, human or 
otherwise, with certain relevant characteristics.”64 As Pogge points out, however, this 
ultimate principle, “directs its addressees to consider certain facts, namely whether 
beings they encounter do or do not possess the relevant characteristics.”65 This 
renders these ultimate principles what Pogge explains as internally fact-sensitive. The 
idea is that any externally fact-insensitive principle can be restated so that “external 
fact-sensitivities are internalized.”66 We can see the same holds when we examine 
Cohen’s other example of a foundational principle of justice, his egalitarian: one 
ought not, “modulo a personal prerogative . . . take more wages than the worst off save 
where such wages are required to compensate for special burdens.”67 This principle, 
Pogge points out, refers to facts about “those other welfare-capable beings.” Thus, 
                                                
     63 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality . 
     64 Ibid.  
     65 Pogge, “Cohen to the Rescue!,” p.461. 
     66 Pogge, “Cohen to the Rescue!”  
     67 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p.401. 
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reference to the facts is once again built in to Cohen’s fact-insensitive principles. 
There is no reason to suppose Constructivists might not word their principles similarly 
to appease Cohen. In fact, given the Constructivists explicit commitment to meta-
ethical agnosticism and Cohen’s lack of clarity regarding what a fact-insensitive 
principle of justice is, Cohen’s position on the concept of justice does not clearly 
contradict the Rawlsian Constructivist’s position.  
     Rawls himself cites moral reasons to engage in his project. He argues for a natural 
duty to uphold just institutions and the promotion of civilization.68 His natural duties 
have the structure of imperfect moral duties. Further, the principles or considered 
moral judgments that Rawls identifies within the reflective equilibrium that guide us 
in how we structure the original position are derived from fact and reflection in 
exactly the same way that Cohen claims we come to know our ultimate principles. 
That is by asking: Why Principle X? then referring to facts in the world to find better, 
more ultimate principles. In fact, in section ten of his project Cohen explains that 
affirmation of fact-sensitive principles are only logically prior to fact-insensitive ones, 
and certainly not temporally or epistemically so. Hence he summarizes, “That is why 
I do not deny (in fact, I would assert) that asking what we think we should do, given 
these or those factual circumstances, is a fruitful way of determining what our 
principles are.” 69 This gets at the actual crux of the conflict between Cohen and 
Rawls. The impetus of Cohen’s critique is that he believes principles of justice should 
be ultimate, objective principles that we try to discover in part by looking at rules of 
regulation type principles of justice. By contrast, Rawlsian Constructivists want to 
identify the best principles of justice to regulate actual societies. Hence, Rawls 
explains his project in the following way. 
The search for reasonable grounds for reaching agreement rooted in our 
conception of ourselves and in our relation to society replaces the search for 
moral truth. . . . The task is to articulate a public conception of justice that 
all can live with . . . although doing this may involve settling theoretical 
difficulties, the practical social task is primary.70 
      
                                                
     68 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 258. 
     69 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p.247. 
     70 John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," The Journal of 
Philosophy 77 (1980), p.519. 
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 Rawls’s goal is not to identify moral truth, but a practical conception of justice. 
Hence, while Rawls’s concept of justice (identified above) is to assign rights and duties 
and determine the appropriate division of social advantages, Cohen’s concept of 
justice might be: to identify the ultimate principles of justice which apply in all 
possible worlds. For this concept of justice to be of any use Cohen himself thinks it 
will need to make trade-offs with other virtues like efficacy of distribution, and base-
line sustenance for all individuals. The Constructivists, however, are happy to build 
these virtues into their principles of justice in the first place. 
    The fundamental disagreement reduces to the following question: Should justice 
aim to guide practical tasks or should it aim to comprehend higher principles? In 
other words, what kind of concept of justice should we identify? This question strikes 
me as somewhat unfruitful in the current debate given that we come to know those 
higher principles, by Cohen’s own admission, by reference to facts that set out the 
scope of what justice needs to solve in our societies. In short, the Rawlsian 
Constructivist may respond to Cohen that a constructivist procedure is still the best 
method for discovering what our moral principles are, and for justifying those 
principles to one another.  
     In conclusion, Cohen may have given us reason to doubt that the concept of 
justice should be quite the practical endeavor that Constructivists (Hobbes, Hume, 
and Scanlon included) take it to be, but that does not amount to a reason to prefer 
his account. Even if one is unconvinced by my (admittedly brief) dismissal of Cohen’s 
claims, as long as some political Constructivists continue to hold that principles of 
justice can be founded on facts about circumstances of the world, then my project, 
which is concerned with what those facts should be, will be relevant for them.  
     I move now to a final, general objection to constructivist methodology, which 
places reciprocity at the center of the justice relationship. Reciprocity is a feature of 
most Rawlsian constructivist accounts of justice.71 It is a feature of Humean and 
Hobbesian constructivism as well. This feature has invited the objection that 
constructivism requires that one be already disposed to take up a reciprocal 
                                                
     71 The source of moral motivation in Scanlon’s contractualism is the desire to 
justify our actions to one another, both this and his formula of reasonable rejection, 
which he compares to taking up another’s view point are both grounded in the 
notion of reciprocity.  
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viewpoint. If one is not so disposed, a contractualist justification for moral reasons 
and constraints on behavior will have no reason-giving force for the individual. 
Whatever moral rules or principles result from the constructivist procedure would 
not be accepted as sufficient justification if individuals do not take up this attitude of 
reciprocity. A committed Utilitarian for instance would have no reason to act 
according to principles yielded by constructivist procedures, but could plausibly be 
assumed to be a reasonable person.  
     A line of defense open to the Rawlsian Constructivist is that the primacy of justice 
in any society makes some set of rules and principles necessary for the stability of that 
society. Following Scanlon, the fact of the need for stability and adherence to some 
principles of justice is so strong that fellow political citizens do justify themselves to 
others by appeal to shared principles, rather than by appeal to the foundation of 
these principles.72 In justifying themselves to one another, by appealing to their own 
interests, political citizens rely on reciprocity to work out publicly acceptable practical 
rules of justice. 
      For constructivist principles of justice to be appealing, we need look no deeper 
than the shared need for principles that refer only to the shared values and standards 
that ground a concept of justice. Judgments about which political principles are 
needed or possible respond to truths about facts in the world. In short, the 
Constructivist claims that facts ground principles, which in turn prescribe rules for 
dealing with those facts. Just which facts should be relevant is the subject of this 
thesis.  
Conclusion 
     I hope to have shown herein that constructivism is an appealing method of 
political philosophy and that it is characterized by, among other things, Requirement 
N, which states: for a constructivist principle to be normative it must offer a solution 
to a corresponding recognized problem, where the solution is a conception of X and 
the problem is named by concept X. Further, Constructivists derive these principles 
from certain relevant facts about the world and human nature. Since the 
                                                
     72 Scanlon has an even stronger defense: if some set of principles cannot be 
reasonably rejected this means that utilitarian (or any different justificatory system) 
considerations will also have been taken into account and so would be compatible 
with principles that come out of this equation.  
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constructivist conception is derived from the concept, the facts that shape the concept 
directly determine the range of possible conceptions. This means a theory of justice is 
constrained by the facts that make its principles appropriate. These facts—whatever 
precisely they may be—are called the circumstances of justice. The remainder of this 
project is concerned with these facts and the primary role they play for 






























 The Circumstances of Justice 
 
     The circumstances of justice are the necessary conditions for justice or injustice to 
be applicable. These conditions result in the conflict that renders human cooperation 
necessary and likewise makes human cooperation possible, and this in turn makes 
justice possible. The circumstances demark the range of possible instances in which 
questions of distributive justice arise. The circumstances of justice delineate the scope 
of justice. Without the circumstances there is no justice. In John Rawls’s terms, this 
would mean there is no need for or possibility of human cooperation. On David 
Hume’s view, justice would have no merit as a virtue. In view of the social contract 
theorists, man would have never left a state of nature. Most constructivist political 
philosophy requires an account of the circumstances of justice or, minimally, relies 
implicitly on one. 
     In this chapter, I will pursue two questions. The first asks what it means for some 
circumstance to be a circumstance of justice. The second asks how successfully 
theorists have construed them in the past. In the first section of this chapter I will 
explain exactly what I interpret the role of the circumstances of justice to be, and in 
light of this explanation offer up a brief methodology for assessing them. Section II 
identifies the Hobbesian explanation of the circumstances of justice and discusses 
some problems with it. The following section explains Hume’s thorough discussion of 
the circumstances of justice and then deals with objections to it. The final section 
offers the same treatment to Rawls’s account of the circumstances of justice. In the 
discussions on Hobbes, Hume, and Rawls I will underscore the challenge of trust and 
attempt to underwrite its importance, as it will motivate my own account of the 
circumstances of justice in chapter 4.  
I. The Circumstances of Justice 
     In Theory, Rawls explains that the circumstances of justice are the normal 
conditions that make human cooperation both necessary and possible. Rawls then 
goes on to describe what has become known as the standard account of the 
circumstances of justice, which consists of limited scarcity of resources, limited benevolence, 
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and equality.1 Rawls claims that his discussion “adds nothing essential to [Hume’s] 
much fuller discussion,”2 but he also claims to follow Hart and Lucas. This standard 
account, however, is not the first theory of the circumstances of justice. Hobbes, in 
Leviathan, implicitly offers a full explanation, as do many theorists writing in the 
common law tradition. Even in Plato’s Republic, Glaucon gives an account of “the 
popular view of the nature of justice and of the conditions under which it develops.”3  
Glaucon argues that in actual humanity, people advance their interests most 
effectively by cooperating with other individuals rather than through conflict. To 
engage with questions of constructivist justice at all, one must either take a position 
on the circumstances of justice or, minimally, suppose some set of circumstances to 
exist. In a constructivist theory of justice, the circumstances also explain both why 
and when justice has moral merit. This is because the circumstances of justice are the 
set of facts in the world to which Constructivists appeal in order to show that some 
system of justice is needed and that such a system is possible. The circumstances 
allow Constructivists to appeal to features in individuals and the world rather than 
fundamental principles to justify the constraints and content of justice.  
     G.A. Cohen, in “Rescuing Justice and Equality,” argues that there are certain 
questions that proponents of the circumstances of justice fail to differentiate between. 
These are: “(1) Under what circumstances is (the achievement of) justice possible 
and/or necessary? (2) Under what circumstances do questions of justice arise? When 
are judgments of justice (and injustice) appropriate, or in what place? (3) What is 
justice?”4 He goes on to inquire whether the answer to question (3) depends on the 
answers to (1) and (2). Cohen is wrong to think that the function of the circumstances 
can be divided this way. The circumstances of justice are the facts about the human 
condition by virtue of which we need principles of justice. If these facts were 
different, establishing principles of justice would be unnecessary. These circumstances 
                                                
     1 Similar attribution of this as the standard account occurs in Hubin, Clayton 
(1997) The Scope of Justice, Philosophy and Public Affairs, p.6-7; Barry, Brian Theories 
of Justice p.152-193 and Vanderschraaf, Peter (2006) ‘The Circumstances of Justice’ 
Politics Philosophy Economics, p.322-323. And of Hume’s account being the most 
thorough all of the above and Rawls’s Theory p.109. 
     2 Rawls, A Theory of Justice , pp.109-10. 
     3 Plato, The Republic, trans. Raymond Larson (Wheeling IL: Harlan Davidson Inc, 
1986), p.32. 
     4 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p.109, p.331. 
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do not determine the content of principles of justice, rather they make certain 
principles relevant. According to this understanding of the circumstances, which I 
will locate in the work of Rawls and Hume presently, Cohen is wrong to think that 
question sets (1) and (2) are different questions for the Constructivist.5 To identify 
under what circumstances questions of justice arise is to ask, When is the 
achievement of justice possible and necessary? And though responses to these two 
question sets may not be the only way to identify what justice is (question 3), for a 
Constructivist, to identify the circumstances, in light of which the achievement of 
justice is necessary and possible, and when questions of just arise, is a way of 
explaining just what justice is. This is because responses to these questions tell us 
what justice should and can do.  
     To defend my interpretation of the circumstances of justice, I turn first to Rawls. 
Rawls identifies the circumstances of justice as those facts under which questions of 
justice arise.6 He includes the circumstances of justice with the information that the 
parties of the original position know their society is subject to. This is because without 
the circumstances of justice, there would not be a need to choose among principles of 
justice, that is, no need to engage in reflective equilibrium or to enter the original 
position (there would be no problem to be named by the concept of justice). And 
without the circumstances, solutions to the problem of choosing principles would be 
impossible (no conceptions of justice). The parties of the original position know that 
they are in a society where the circumstances obtain. If the circumstances were to 
change, the concept and conceptions that they ground would need to change as well. 
The circumstances of justice are the facts in the world that establish the problem 
named by the concept of distributive justice and these (usually with other facts and 
values) set the scope and task for ensuing conceptions of justice. Because the 
circumstances of justice define the problem named by the concept of distributive 
justice, only principles that respond to the problem as delimited by these facts will be 
principles of justice. 
                                                
     5 Cohen as an egalitarian with a Platonic-like idea of principles of justice can 
certainly locate a difference in question (3) from the other two. But for fact-sensitive 
theorists concerned with justice qua rules of regulation, (1), (2) and (3) do not separate 
in the same way as (1) and (2) do for Cohen. 
     6 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.109. 
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      Hume’s view reinforces this normative reading of the circumstances of justice. 
Hume opens section III of the Enquiry claiming that “public utility is the sole origin of 
justice, and that its reflections on the beneficial consequences of this virtue are the sole 
foundation of its merit.”7 From this, Hume continues his heuristic in support of the 
necessity of these conditions by imagining conditions under which justice would not 
exist. He explains: 
Thus, the rules of equity or justice depend entirely on the particular state and 
condition in which men are placed, and owe their origin and existence to that 
utility, which results to the public from their strict and regular observance. 
Reverse, in any considerable circumstance, the condition of men: Produce 
extreme abundance or extreme necessity: Implant in the human breast perfect 
moderation and humanity, or perfect rapaciousness and malice: By rendering 
justice totally useless, you thereby totally destroy its essence, and suspend its 
obligation upon mankind.8  
 
Hume, in the Treatise, offers a slightly different, and earlier view of the origin of 
justice:  “[J]ustice takes its rise from human conventions;” He explains that,   
[Human conventions] are intended as a remedy to some inconveniences, which 
proceed from the concurrence of certain qualities of the human mind with the 
situation of external objects. The qualities of the mind are selfishness and limited 
generosity: And the situation of external objects is their easy change, join’d to their 
scarcity in comparison of the wants and desires of men.9 
 
These two passages, taken together, indicate that the circumstances of justice make 
justice possible insofar as they provide the possibility for human coordination, which 
is necessary for principles of justice to be possible. They contribute directly to the 
inconveniences that need some solution, that need to be worked out, the usefulness of 
which renders justice a virtue and not simply human coordination. Hence, in Hume 
and Rawls, the circumstances delimit both the problem and the solution of justice. 
Justice is a virtue that carries certain duties and obligations with it only when the 
particular circumstances obtain.  
     In Hobbes, the circumstances are the circumstances that lead to justice and the 
possibility of a civil society. Without the circumstances of justice, neither justice nor 
morality would arise and society could not be formed. In the work of Hobbes, Hume, 
Rawls, and other Constructivists, the function of the circumstances of justice is to 
                                                
     7 Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, p.183. 
     8 Ibid., p.188. 
     9 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p.494. 
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delimit the range of facts about human nature and the world by virtue of which we need principles of 
distributive justice and which make such principles possible via human cooperation. For 
Constructivists, the first step to finding a theory of justice is to identify the 
circumstances that make it necessary and then ask what kind of principles are needed 
in light of these facts in the world. Possible constructivist conceptions of justice will 
involve principles that respond appropriately to these facts and meet Requirement N. 
To be clear, the move from identifying the circumstances of justice to the formulation 
of ensuing principles of justice will usually involve a number of other facts about the 
world and values, due to the constructivist procedure that identifies actual principles 
of justice. The circumstances of justice alone are not sufficient to yield constructivist 
principles of justice. Instead, the circumstances are facts which must be true for a 
coordination rule to be a principle of justice. Hence, proponents of this view can 
identify principles of justice, as opposed to other principles (e.g., of morality or 
prudence), by asking if they respond to the circumstances of justice. In this way the 
circumstances of justice determine the scope of justice. It naturally follows that it is 
very important to identify correctly the facts in the world to which justice must 
respond. 
     A number of criticisms have been launched against the standard account of the 
circumstances of justice as well as against Hume and Rawls individually. Many of 
these criticisms will be addressed in this and the following chapters. However, as we 
also must clarify what the facts in the world are to which justice should respond, my 
method is to proceed by considering the facts that are contenders for the 
circumstances of justice. These facts will be compared to the facts found in other 
accounts of the circumstances of justice, and evaluated in light of our intuitions about 
justice. The next section will consider Hobbes’s circumstances of justice and then 
turn to an important problem his account raises for theorizing about the conditions 
under which justice exists. 
II. Hobbes’s Circumstances of Justice 
     Hobbes’s view of the circumstances of justice is not directly addressed in his 
writing. It is clear, however, that in Leviathan his explanation of justice arising from 
the state of nature naturally includes a position on the circumstances of justice. 
Hobbes’s origins of justice project was intended (in part) to give his view not only of 
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the obligations and constraints of justice, but also of what is necessary for them to be 
legitimate obligations. Any constructivist conception of justice concerned with the 
origins of the duties it promotes involves a de facto explanation of the circumstances of 
justice.  
     Hobbes’s state of nature, as described in Leviathan, involves the following 
circumstances:  
      (1) Rough equality, where equality is of body and mind.  
      (2) Conflicting interests, which lead to a war of all against all. This is not  
           constant battle, but constant potential of battle where all men are enemies    
           with other men.  
      (3) Limited altruism such that each person values his or her own survival more     
           highly than the survival of others. There is some extremely limited    
           benevolence. Wives and children exist but these ties are not strong enough to     
           play any role in forming a larger society.  
      (4) Forward-lookingness marks the people in Hobbes’s state of nature.  
           They not only want to achieve their ends and adopt whatever necessary to  
           achieve them, but they are also capable of uniting forces for a short time with    
           others to conquer a common enemy.  
      (5) Death aversion motivates individuals to survive.  
      (6) Moderate scarcity of resources means there are not enough resources that   
           every individual can have what he/she wants and so they fight one another    
           because they cannot cooperate.  
       (7) Hope of attaining these resources.10  
     These features together comprise Hobbes’s circumstances of justice.  
     According to this formulation, the combination of a (1) rough equality of body 
and mind, with the limited altruism/possibilities for confederation of (3) means that 
no one person can dominate the rest, so there is a need for some set of rules to 
constrain behavior and avoid a state of war. (2) The conflict of interests, which is a 
desire for the same resources because of (6) a moderate scarcity of these resources 
and (7) their hope of attaining these resources. This means that individuals would be 
willing to fight for whatever resources are available; hence, there is a need for some 
                                                
     10 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp.86-89. 
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rules. All these conditions lead to a possibility of a solution (a conception of justice) 
particularly because of (4) the forward-lookingness of individuals in conjunction with 
their (7) hope of attaining resources and (5) individuals’ death aversion. These 
motivate individuals to desire peace and see that it is in their forward-looking self-
interest to lay down their weapons, covenant, and instate a sovereign with the power 
to create and enforce the rules of justice.11 A challenge is that, while a desire for 
goods and the hope of attaining them may lead individuals to see that cooperation 
would be good, it is unclear that a desire for more goods coupled with rough equality 
and man’s rational self interest (among the other conditions) would lead to human 
cooperation. There is no reason to believe others would cooperate in exchange for 
one restraining one’s own behavior. In terms of the rational choice model of the 
prisoner’s dilemma, in the state of nature it is unclear why any individual would 
choose the cooperative strategy over a non-cooperative strategy.12 This is the subject 
of much Hobbesian debate as Hobbes did little to clarify how cooperation gets 
started, and instead focuses on the all-powerful Leviathan needed to enforce that 
cooperation.  
    Interestingly, in his discussion of trust, Hobbes argues that it is irrational to rely 
on others to keep their covenants in a state of nature and that the person who 
promises first “does but betray himselfe to his enemy; contrary to the Right (he can 
never abandon) of defending his life.”13 The most that reason can do is show us that 
we would be better off if we could rely on others to constrain their behavior, 
especially if they did so in a sustained manner. As we cannot rely on this, Hobbes 
thinks a sovereign is necessary to enforce covenants. If we could ever trust others to 
keep their covenants, there would be no need for the (decidedly unjust) sovereign. 
Hobbes understands mistrust to be a hallmark of the human condition and his 
circumstances capture this. Hence, his preferred conception of justice is a sovereign 
powerful enough to respond to the problem this mistrust creates. This highlights an 
important idea. Trust, in particular mutual trust, is central to the possibility of 
                                                
     11 Ibid., p.90. 
     12 Nothing I say here hinges on the prisoner’s dilemma model of the state of 
nature. I only use this example from Gauthier’s reading of Hobbes to make clear 
where my concern lies, not to endorse his exegesis of Hobbes.  
     13 Hobbes, Leviathan, p.96. 
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justice. The danger that Hobbes speaks of in being the first to trust or promise 
illustrates that trust puts us in a vulnerable position. This vulnerability gives rise to a 
need for human cooperation and justice.  
      If we momentarily lay aside Hobbes’s account of the circumstances of justice and 
consider what the Hobbesian Contractarian David Gauthier advocates as the 
circumstances of justice, we see that, even without the Leviathan, the same problem 
still exists. Gauthier’s circumstances of justice involve only equality, limited scarcity 
of resources, and rational self-interest.14 It is still unclear how, given such a model, 
cooperation could ever get started. In Gauthier’s work this problem is avoided 
precisely because he posits these circumstances with the background of a civil society 
already in place. Society demands cooperation and cooperation demands trust. 
Hence, Gauthier’s named circumstances actually exist in the context of an 
additional circumstance in which cooperation is already at work. Gauthier is 
unwittingly relying on a cooperative society to ground mutual trust, not, as he would 
have it, reliance on mutual self-interest. As Simon Blackburn rightly argues, without 
some trust, agents in a bargain procedure cannot get cooperation off the ground. 
Blackburn asks, When is it “reasonable to expect reciprocation, even with a small 
degree of confidence? How does a little bit of trust get into place, in order to kick-
start the process of socialization?”15 
      Hobbes thought there was no such force and attempted to make up for this 
dearth of trust with an absolute sovereign in order to assure mutual reliance. 
Hobbes’s argument for mistrust is comprised of a few examples of pervasive mistrust 
in humanity. Those examples include instances of people arming themselves when 
they travel, of people locking their doors when they sleep, and locking chests while 
in their houses, in spite of laws that punish for theft.16 He then points to two 
examples of such inherent mistrust in near state-of-nature conditions: the savage 
people in the Americas who have no government, and the relation between nations. 
Hobbes is largely wrong to think that these examples are evidence of humanity’s 
                                                
     14 David P. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), pp.115-117. 
     15 Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions : A Theory of Practical Reason (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998), p.192. 
     16 Hobbes, Leviathan  
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lack of trustfulness. While international relations, for instance, may seem marked by 
states of war and mistrust, it is equally true that they are marked by trust and 
benevolence. A modern example of mistrust in international relations would be the 
abundance of failed peace agreements in the Israel-Palestine conflict. These failures 
would support a Hobbesian attitude that trust would conflict with one’s self-interest 
as it gives the enemy the upper hand. However, treaties are typically honored 
between nations with a history of trust, for example treaty agreements between 
Norway and Iceland or the United States and United Kingdom. As Blackburn 
explains, there has never been a scenario “in which competitive or warring conflict 
of interest was the only relation between human beings. All kinds of kinship relations 
enable us to practice co-operation and learn to subordinate various of our own 
interests to other concerns.”17 It is these sorts of relations that allow trust to get 
started. An example which suggests that, in fact, humanity tends to favor trust over 
mistrust can be found in the extreme mistrust that marked the Serbian-Bosnian-
Croat treaties of the 1990s compared to current treaties and relations between the 
nations. Treaties repeatedly failed in the past, but there is now little chance of 
upheaval because a younger generation exists who have been slowly learning to trust 
or forget the reasons not to trust. There is never a guarantee that trust will evolve, 
but neither is Hobbes correct that it will not. Examples like Croatia and Serbia and 
their relations today seem to indicate that it is more likely a fact of human nature 
that some trust will exist.  
     For a cooperative society to exist, there must be some trust among individuals. 
Trust is necessary for the kind of human cooperation present in justice and thus, 
necessary for justice to be possible. Failure to account for trust amounts to a failure to 
identify the correct circumstances of justice. In the absence of trust in the 
circumstances of justice, conceptions of justice risk not protecting against the 
vulnerabilities of trust. Extended voluntary cooperation would not be possible as 
cooperation would make one vulnerable, and principles of justice would not respond 
to the need for trust. For future reference, I label this challenge for the various 
accounts of the circumstance of justice the challenge of trust, which is: to formulate the 
circumstances of justice such that the vulnerabilities of trusting are protected against 
                                                
     17 Blackburn, Ruling Passions : A Theory of Practical Reason, p.193. 
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and mutual trust is possible, rendering cooperation and conceptions of justice 
necessary and possible. To return to Hobbes, it seems we not only have reason to 
reject the Leviathan as an un-just conception of justice, or rather, view it as rules for 
a civil society rather than as a conception of justice, we also have reason to reject his 
circumstances which rule out the possibility of significant mutual trust. If, however, 
we can work trust back into the circumstances, it seems that something very near 
Hobbes’s view of the circumstances of justice could be useful. Hence, we will 
consider Hume’s circumstances of justice in part as a response to this challenge of 
trust made clear in Hobbes.  
     Briefly, there is another criticism to which Hobbes’s theory is vulnerable. The 
problem of exclusion charges that the circumstances of justice define the scope of justice 
too narrowly. In Hobbes’s case, any individual in the civil state over whom the 
sovereign rules is afforded the protections (and obligations) of justice; anyone outside 
of that state at that time will not be. This means that individuals from different states 
stand in no relation of justice to one another.18 Additionally, future people could 
never stand in a relation of justice to us. They would be outside of the circumstance 
of equality. Another concern is that any time or place without limited scarcity of 
resources or any other of the conditions set forth by Hobbes would fall outside of the 
scope of justice. C.D. Broad, for instance, argues (addressing this condition in 
Hume’s work) that we would applaud equal divisions in times of famine and 
disapprove of other attempts to get what food exists.19 He takes this to be evidence 
that a concept of justice would apply in times of scarcity. These issues may make 
Hobbes’s circumstances overly restrictive.  
     In sum, Hobbes’s circumstances of justice should be rejected as a theory of the 
circumstances of justice. This is because they fail to account for the mutual trust 
                                                
18 An objection could be raised against my criticism here that Hobbes was only 
attempting to establish a foundation for justice within the state, not between states. 
His example of the mistrust between states and the relation between nations being in 
a state of war does not mean he was addressing justice between states. Insofar as this 
may be true, my remarks here can be read as a critique of a possible Hobbesian view, 
not necessarily a critique of his project. 
     19 C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 
1930), pp.95-98. Similar arguments are found in D. Clayton Hubin, "The Scope of 
Justice," Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (1979), p.9-10 and Peter Vanderschraaf, "The 
Circumstances of Justice," Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (2006), p.330. 
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which makes coordination necessary, and they are overly narrow in scope. Without 
mutual trust at the center of the circumstances of justice, peace may not be possible. 
Hobbes saw this and suggested the somewhat unjust solution of the all-powerful 
sovereign. Modern Hobbesians forgo the sovereign and argue that instrumental 
rationality and a desire for goods are enough to enable cooperation. The duties that 
follow are called justice, though they look more like rules for a civil society than 
justice. Further, they cannot explain how trust could ever arise given the 
instrumentally rational, self-interested conception of individuals they support. We 
turn now to Hume, who offers an explanation of the circumstances of justice that 
takes us a step closer to the inclusion of trust within justice. 
III. Hume’s Circumstances of Justice 
     Hume can be read as offering an account of the circumstances of justice in 
response to Hobbes’s failure to include trust in his description of justice. The Humean 
conditions of justice, specified most fully in the Enquiry’s discussion on justice, are 
limited scarcity of resources, limited generosity, equality, and human sociability. We now consider 
precisely how Hume articulates these four conditions of justice. 
The Moderate Scarcity of Resources Condition 
     To explain the moderate scarcity of resources condition, Hume posits a golden 
age that is opposed to a Hobbesian state of nature. In the golden age there is an 
absolute abundance of goods and this leads to such an abundance of virtue that 
justice is unnecessary: “It seems evident that, in such a happy state, every other social 
virtue would flourish, and receive tenfold increase; but the cautious, jealous virtue of 
justice would never once have been dreamed of.”20 Hume contrasts this with the state 
of nature in which there is an absolute dearth of goods. He explains that “where the 
society is ready to perish from extreme necessity, no greater evil can be dreaded from 
violence and injustice; and every man may now provide for himself by all the means 
which prudence can dictate, or humanity permit.”21 
      It is only within this mean that justice will exist. Hume cites land and air as two 
goods that need no division because there is such an abundance, but imagines a time 
in which someday these goods will also need to be divided because they will become 
                                                
     20 Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, pp. 183-84. 
     21 Ibid., p.186. 
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scarce. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Hume uses examples of it being no 
crime to seize any goods available for survival after a shipwreck or in a famine, 
because one has nothing to fear from violence and injustice. On this lower bound, his 
examples make use of the concepts of owners, property, and even an equal division of 
bread. Hume is denying that such acts of survival would be judged as criminal or 
injurious because any just distribution would be impossible; he is not denying that 
notions such as property and equality would cease to exist. Central to this condition 
is that individuals know that coordination will lead to greater production of goods. 
They know it is possible to coordinate in such a way that their conflicting interests in 
procuring goods for themselves have a solution.  
The Limited Generosity Condition 
     Hume supports the limited generosity condition, arguing that if the human mind 
were so replete with generosity that no man felt more concern for himself than any 
other, “it seems evident, that the use of justice would, in this case, be suspended by 
such an extensive benevolence, nor would the divisions and barriers of property and 
obligation ever have been thought of.”22 Hume contrasts this attitude with the 
opposite end of the spectrum, a society of ruffians, with no generosity or benevolence, 
in which a ruffian’s “regard to justice being no longer of use to his own safety or 
others, he must consult the dictates of self-preservation alone, without concern for 
those who no longer merit his care and attention.”23 These examples delimit the 
scope of the generosity condition. 
     In the example of absolute generosity, Hume asks why people would build fences 
between fields when there is no division between our interests, and men share all 
their sorrows and joys “with the same force and vivacity as if originally” one’s own?24 
In response to this question, Hume observes that the whole human race would be like 
a single family. He argues that we see something similar to this in marriage, where 
the bond of friendship is so strong that laws do not even need to recognize separate 
possessions. However, Hume’s virtuous man does revert to the sword to protect 
                                                
     22 Ibid., p.185. 
     23 Ibid., p.187. 
     24 Ibid., p.185. 
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himself in the society of ruffians.25 For Hume, this is analogous to instances in 
political society in which a man renders himself obnoxious to the public such that the 
rules of justice are suspended toward him and it is “equitable to inflict on him” what 
would otherwise be wrong. That is, he must be punished for his crimes, for acting as 
though he were not in the circumstances of justice. While men are not perfectly 
benevolent, neither are they perfectly selfish. They do have a natural tendency to 
take others’ interests as their own interests, even if the range of people this is true of 
may be limited to family and friends. The fact is that people are capable of interests 
beyond narrow self-interests and that they generally exist in a state of caring (to 
varying degrees) about others’ interests. 
The Equality Condition 
     What is known as Hume’s equality condition is explicit in the Enquiry, though only 
implicit in the Treatise. Hume explains this condition by imagining a species of 
creatures rational but weak who had no power to make their resentment felt. As a 
result of their inability to make their resentment felt they fall out of the scope of 
justice. Even so, Hume recommends we treat them benevolently and give them gentle 
usage. The equality condition, unlike the other circumstances of justice, does not exist 
as a mean with an upper and lower limit. Equality exists or it does not. This 
circumstance, like the others, offers both the problem and solution of justice. The fact 
of equality makes violence, attacks, and any number of other injustices possible, but 
for Hume it also involves the ability to make one’s resentment (a sentiment) felt, and 
gives people a reason to want to coordinate and form a society. This condition is the 
most problematic for Hume’s position and has landed him in a good deal of trouble. 
Its problems will be discussed in detail in the following section of this chapter. 
The Sociability Condition 
    Hume has one more explicit condition of justice. The sociability condition is often 
overlooked; presumably it is sometimes thought to be a part of the circumstance of 
limited generosity. As I find this condition to be a singularly important reason to find 
solutions to the problem of justice and as it appears in both the Treatise and the 
                                                
     25 The exclusive use of masculine pronouns in this paragraph and others, which 
involve a number of quotations from Hume, is intended to preserve the integrity of 
his original passages and to promote clarity in style. 
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Enquiry,  I consider it an independent circumstance.26 Further, in the context of 
explaining this condition Hume actually responds to the challenge of trust, as he sees 
it in what we can only assume is his reading of Hobbes’s state of nature. In the Enquiry 
Hume argues, “on the first origin of mankind, we are told, their ignorance and savage 
nature were so prevalent, that they could give no mutual trust, but must each depend 
on himself and his own force and cunning for protection and security.” That this state 
of mutual distrust could continue long enough to “merit the appellation of the state, 
may justly be doubted. Men are necessarily born into a family-society.”27 Hume later 
goes on to propose a counterfactual to man who “possessed within himself every 
faculty, requisite both for his own preservation and for the propagation of his kind: 
Were all society and intercourse cut off between man and man,” if man were capable 
of this solitary condition, “it seems evident, that so solitary a being would be as much 
incapable of justice, as of social discourse and conversation.”28 Hence, necessary for 
human cooperation and justice is human interdependence, human sociability. If 
humans were not inherently social, there would be no possibility of coordination or 
justice. Moreover, such interdependence demands that individuals cooperate because 
self-interests can only be achieved in conjunction with others.29  
                                                
     26 D. Clayton Hubin, "Justice and Future Generations," Philosophy and Public Affairs 
6 (1976); and Thomas Reid, Essays on Active Powers of the Human Mind (Charelston, 
Mass: MIT Press, 1969) include it in their discussions of Hume’s circumstances. H. L. 
A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) includes it in his account 
which he claims follows Hume and Hobbes. However, Brian Barry, Theories of Justice, 
California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy 16 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1989); Vanderschraaf, “The Circumstances of Justice;” and Rawls, 
A Theory of Justice do not.  
     27 Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, p.189. 
     28 Ibid. p.190-91. Similar discussions appear in Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 
p.486-8. 
     29 Interestingly, Rousseau and Kant each have conditions like this in their account 
of human society, known as man’s “unsocial sociability.” In Kant, man is driven to 
be an isolated individual and yet must socialize and this inevitable conflict becomes 
the driving force of progress and civilization. For a full discussion, see Heiner 
Bielefeldt, Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge, U.K. ; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 131-132.  
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     In addition to these conditions, Hume occasionally references human sagacity, 
mutual trust, and a few other human characteristics as necessary for justice.30 This 
indicates that Hume did not view the four conditions as the only necessary conditions 
of justice.31 Though he gives no extensive explication of these supplementary 
conditions of justice, Hume’s position seems to be that the four explicit conditions are 
merely the most salient features necessary to the development, existence, and merit of 
the rules of justice.  
        In Hume, the essence of justice, as well as its status as a moral virtue from which 
obligations arise, is only possible because of its utility for society. And it only has 
utility in situations in which the circumstances of justice obtain. Both the natural 
motive to justice (self-interest) and the motive to its moral obligation (sympathy with 
the public utility of the virtue) are contained within the circumstances. For Hume, 
the rules of justice are morally obligatory only if his four conditions of justice are met, 
although, as mentioned above, he may think some other conditions are also 
necessary.  
     Justice is a virtue because it underpins society, and we have sympathy with the 
usefulness of this. We are obliged to be just precisely because justice is useful and 
agreeable for society. But if the circumstances did not exist to create the problems 
that need a solution, and if the circumstances were such that there was no solution to 
the problem, then justice would neither exist nor be obligatory. It is only once justice 
arises and society is constituted via conventions that it is morally obligatory to be just. 
The circumstances of justice are such that individuals within them will (generally) 
want to conform to the rules of justice and want the group to conform as well. It is 
clear then that Hume’s perspective on the role of the circumstances of justice 
matches my own interpretation, which is to delimit the range of facts about human nature and 
the world by virtue of which we need principles of distributive justice and which make such principles 
possible. We are now in a position to ask how successful Hume’s explanation of the 
                                                
     30 Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, p.189, p. 205. 
     31 This rules out the possibility of interpreting the circumstances as logically 
necessary for justice. For an account that treats the circumstances of justice as the 
logically necessary and sufficient conditions to justice see Vanderschraaf, "The 
Circumstances of Justice,"  pp.322-23. 
 45 
circumstances is at explaining the necessity and possibility of human coorperation 
and justice. 
IV. Objections to Hume’s Account 
    The standard objections to Hume’s view of the circumstances of justice are 
problems of scope. I will begin with these, and then later move on to consider how 
Hume’s position responds to the challenge of trust. Criticisms arise primarily from 
the condition of equality.32 I cite Hume’s passage explaining the equality condition 
here for reference:  
Were there a species of creatures intermingled with men, which, though rational, 
were possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were 
incapable of all resistance, and could never, upon the highest provocation, make us 
feel the effects of their resentment; the necessary consequence, I think, is that we 
should be bound by the laws of humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures, but 
should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them, 
nor could they possess any right or property, . . . Our intercourse with them could 
not be called society, which supposes a degree of equality; but absolute command 
on the one side, and servile obedience on the other. . . . And as no inconvenience 
ever results from the exercise of a power, so firmly established in nature, the 
restraints of justice and property, being so totally useless, would never have place in 
so unequal a confederacy.33  
 
Hume continues in the following paragraph: 
This is plainly the situation of men, with regard to animals . . . The great superiority 
of civilized Europeans above barbarous Indians, tempted us to imagine ourselves on 
the same footing with regard to them, and made us throw off all restraints of justice, 
and even of humanity, in our treatment of them. In many nations, the female sex 
are reduced to like slavery, and are rendered incapable of all property, in opposition 
to their lordly masters.34 
 
     One of the earliest objections to these passages is found Thomas Reid’s work. He 
responds to Hume arguing that under the circumstance referenced above, justice 
would not be totally useless and “surely to be treated with justice would be highly 
                                                
     32 The benevolence and scarcity of resources conditions have criticisms of scope 
from Hubin, Vanderschraaf, and Broad. However, as these criticisms hinge on 
interpretations of the circumstances which amount to the claim that it would be good 
if justice existed outside of these circumstances, instead of showing that it is possible for 
it to, I leave them aside. Further, the criticism of exclusion seems to capture what is 
most relevant to the benevolence and scarcity of resources criticisms, though they will 
come up in discussion in Chapter 4. 
     33 Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, p.190-91. 
     34 Ibid., p.191. 
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useful to the defenseless species he here supposes to exist.”35 This objection has been 
reiterated and reinterpreted in a number of modern critiques. Postema distinguishes 
two separate categories of objections on this front.36 First is the problem of exclusion 
which is ultimately the charge that the equality condition excludes individuals from 
the scope of justice who should, in fact, count within that scope. This problem is 
exacerbated by a further criticism introduced by Michael Ridge, the problem of 
paternalism. The problem of paternalism emphasizes that duties of benevolence, when 
unchecked by any sense of justice, can actually result in a justification of paternalism. 
A second problem for Hume’s defenseless creatures is the problem of inequality which is 
unique to theories of justice that rely on bargaining power. It argues that even if the 
very weak are in the scope of justice, they will have so few protections that they would 
be nearly useless.  
     There are a number of responses to the criticism of inequality. The first simply 
points out how little Hume is committed to a bargaining-power model of justice. 
Hume’s conditions of justice outline the problems to which justice is a possible 
solution, but they don’t define principles adopted within that scope as justice based on 
bargaining-power. In short, those within the circumstances could adopt any 
conception of justice within the scope of the conditions. As Gauthier explains, “Hume 
conceives of the problem of selecting among rules as one of coordination, rather than 
bargaining. Bargaining  . . .[is] suitable only when our differential preferences among 
possible conventions are strong.”37 Hume himself argues that it is generally best for 
the stability of society to never change conventions.38 It seems that any theory which 
considers the circumstances of justice to be the facts that render distributive justice 
necessary and possible, and not as defining a conception of justice, will be exempt 
from this criticism. This includes Rawls, whose bargaining position is marked by a veil 
of ignorance so that no one person has a stronger bargaining position than anyone 
else. However, Hobbesian Contractarians, such as Gauthier, are susceptible to this 
criticism. 
                                                
     35 Reid, Essays on Active Powers of the Human Mind, p.428. 
     36 Gerald J. Postema, "Making Resentment Felt: Hume on the Environment of 
Justice," (The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), p.24. 
     37 Gauthier, "David Hume, Contractarian,"  p.23. 
     38 This point is also discussed in Michael Ridge, "David Hume, Paternalist," Hume 
Studies 36 (2010), p.158.  
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     The problem of exclusion is much more pertinent, not only for Hume, but for 
anyone adopting his version of the circumstances of justice, or what is referred to as 
the standard account. The concern here is not about how bargaining positions affect 
one’s position in a theory of justice, but about who counts in the theory of justice. 
Ridge explains that this “is a worry about the grounds upon which any group or 
individual ought to be included.”39 It could be the case that some group is counted as 
equal, but if it is deemed equal based on the wrong considerations, then the system 
itself is flawed since it will be susceptible to erroneously including or excluding groups 
in the future.  
     Hume’s equality condition posits a rational but inferior species that would fall 
outside the scope of justice. They are “incapable of all resistance” and could never 
“make us feel the effects of their resentment.” The necessary consequence of this is 
that we “should not . . . lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them.”40 The 
problem of exclusion captures that neither the fact of being incapable of resistance 
nor the fact of being incapable of making others feel the effects of resentment are 
good reasons to exclude individuals from the purview of justice, particularly given that 
they are rational individuals. Their rationality indicates that their species would be 
capable of following the principles that comprise a conception of justice and so would 
not threaten the stability of the system. In summary, the inability to make resistance 
or resentment felt is the wrong sort of reason for excluding anyone from justice.  
     Just how damaging a problem this is for Hume’s theory depends on how one 
interprets the equality with which Hume is concerned. Hume’s term “resistance” does 
seem to suggest he had a thick notion of equality in mind. Certainly, most of Hume’s 
critics read a Hobbesian conception of equality into this condition. Brian Barry, for 
instance, in his early criticism of Hume, addresses the example of the Native 
Americans found in the previously quoted passage on equality: “Hume must be 
accused of drawing back from the full implications of his doctrine. Why does he think 
the European settlers were only ‘tempted to imagine’ themselves above justice? 
Surely, on his theory, they were above justice in their relation to the Indians.”41 
                                                
     39 Ibid., p.14. 
     40 Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, p.190-91. 
     41 Barry, Theories of Justice, p.162. 
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Postema, however, insists that Barry completely misses the fact that Hume is pointing 
out that the European’s treatment of the natives was a horridly mistaken judgment.42 
Barry’s exegesis of Hume’s circumstances explains that Hume’s theory of justice is 
motivated by a desire to avoid a “war of all against all.”43 Indeed, many of Hume’s 
commentators seem to have this notion of Hobbesian equality in mind. That Rawls, 
for instance, claims that he is following the Humean circumstances but then relies on 
a Hobbesian explanation of equality suggests that he too understands Hume’s concept 
of equality in a Hobbesian way. If this were what Hume was advocating, equality qua 
power, it would be a worryingly narrow circumstance of justice. This, however, is not 
what Hume had in mind and so is not what those who adopt Hume’s circumstances 
(or possibly the standard account) must defend themselves against.  
     Hume’s use of equality is not as a condition that motivates a “war of all against all.” 
Rather, it is a statement about when justice will have application. Justice will have 
application when it evokes our sympathy with the public utility of the virtue, where 
the public is comprised of all who are a part of the interdependent society that secures 
the stability of possessions. Those who would call forth sympathy, those with whom 
we are interdependent, are those who can make their resentment felt. He explains our 
relation to the creatures outside of the scope of justice in the following passage: “our 
intercourse with them could not be called society, which supposes a degree of 
equality; but absolute command on the one side, and servile obedience on the 
other.”44 This is not equality, which leads to fear and then motivates men to 
coordinate as in the Hobbesian tradition. Humean equality is not as strong a notion 
of equality, nor does it amount to as narrow a conception of justice, as its critics seem 
to think. This is because resentment in Hume is not akin to power in the way that 
resistance is. Further, Hume allows either condition, resistance or resentment, to be 
sufficient for justice. This significantly broadens the scope of justice compared to 
accounts that rely on Hobbesian equality, because while resistance may involve power 
relations, resentment does not. As Postema explains, resentment in Hume is “a matter 
                                                
     42 Postema, "Making Resentment Felt: Hume on the Environment of Justice," p.4. 
     43 Barry, Theories of Justice, p.163. 
     44 Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, p.190. 
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of holding people to certain expectations about their relations to oneself.”45 To 
appreciate this interpretation of Hume’s notion of resentment, we must first 
understand what Hume understands resentment to be, and what kind of condition it 
is. 
     Resentment for Hume is both a calm and a violent passion.46 In either case it 
arises from a judgment of having been injured.47 Hume characterizes the passion of 
resentment as arising “more from communication than from my own natural temper 
and disposition.”48 He argues that this communication of the passions is achieved via 
sympathy, which exists in animals to the same degree that it exists in humans. Hume 
observes that animals exhibit expressions of concern when at play. Although in play 
they use the same techniques as when they attack, they restrain themselves to avoid 
harm, “tho’ they have nothing to fear from [one another’s] resentment.”49 This brings 
out a salient feature of Hume’s notion of resentment. Other species are capable of 
making each other feel their resentment. It is between differing species that Hume 
doubts the ability to make resentment felt.50 According to Hume, the role of 
sympathy, which is most vivacious and lively when there is a strong continuity and 
resemblance between others and ourselves.51 Where this continuity or resemblance is 
lacking, we will be unable to feel the resentment of others. For Hume, however, even 
the most self-interested of men would be incapable of such disregard. In the Enquiry 
discussion on self-love, he imagines such a self-involved individual who would still 
necessarily have some propensity for the good of mankind. He asks, “Would any man, 
                                                
     45 Postema, "Making Resentment Felt: Hume on the Environment of Justice," 
p.11. 
     46 Hume’s taxonomy of the passions divides them along several fronts. One of the 
divisions is whether they are calm or violent. The distinction is not exact, but 
roughly, the violent passions are more turbulent and intense. The calm passions are 
often very strong and exert a steady influence on our deliberation and actions. See: 
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p.276, p.417, p.437.  
     47 Ibid., p.369, p.417. 
     48 Ibid., p.317. 
     49 Ibid., p.398. 
     50 Hume does admit at the beginning of this discussion on the passions in animals 
that they feel them to a different degree. They judge not by imagination, but only by 
knowing good and evil, so while it is probably not the same type of resentment that 
helps motivate justice that Hume is accusing animals of, he seems to think the 
sentiment is broad enough to apply to them (among themselves) as well. 
     51 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p.317. 
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who is walking along, tread as willingly on another’s gouty toes, whom he has no 
quarrel with, as on the hard flint and pavement?”52 This sympathy, the resentment of 
injuries, the happiness we can feel of another’s advantages, are not only ubiquitous in 
humanity, they are also other-regarding. We feel sympathy toward others because of 
our contiguity and resemblance to them.  
     Hume’s account then, is immune to much of the criticism lodged against the 
equality condition insofar as it does not exclude those who are not interpreted as 
equal qua power (i.e. able to compete for goods). This does not entirely allow him to 
avoid criticism, however. The trouble arises for Hume because the ability to 
sympathize with others ought not preclude normative relations of justice with others. 
The justice-status of anyone ought not depend on the range of our sympathy. This is a 
reason of the wrong kind, even if in practice it is broadly inclusive. To some extent, 
however, Hume seemed to realize this as well. In his examples of the Europeans’ 
treatment of Native Americans and the subjugation of women, his message is that it 
was wrong to exclude these groups from justice. Hence, it seems Hume may have also 
thought that making judgments about who is included within the scope of justice 
dependent on sympathy can be very dangerous for many marginalized sets of 
individuals. 
     The problem of paternalism is yet another criticism that arises from Hume’s condition 
of equality. Regarding the rational creatures that fall out of the scope of equality, 
Hume explains that “we should be bound by the laws of humanity to give gentle 
usage to these creatures, but should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of 
justice with regard to them.”53 Ridge points out that because inclusion in the scope of 
justice hinges on one’s ability to resist and make resentment felt, Hume cannot 
accommodate the moral intuition that paternalism is justified as “a function of that 
person’s rational competence.”54 In short the entire species of rational but inferior 
creatures of whom Hume speaks would potentially fall into a category of individuals 
toward whom paternalism was justified. Ridge explains that the real problem here 
arises from the fact that constraints on paternalism must be constraints of justice, not 
                                                
     52 Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, p.226. 
     53 Ibid., p.190. 
     54 Ridge, "David Hume, Paternalist,"  p.162. 
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constraints of humanity. If we are given license to treat such a rational but inferior 
species paternalistically, as incapable of making good decisions of their own when 
they may in fact be capable, the treatment is not immoral but unjust. Hume has no 
grounds for objecting to these wrongs.55   
     Insofar as Hume can be seen (in part) to be responding to Hobbes’s position on the 
circumstances of justice and his assumption of mistrust as a fact of human nature, we 
may now ask whether Hume is any more successful at responding to the challenge of 
trust. Interestingly, H. L. A. Hart’s discussion of the circumstances of justice offers a 
great deal of insight to the Humean attempt to incorporate trust into the necessary 
conditions of justice. Hart characterizes the condition of moderate scarcity as the 
division of labor in society to explain the motive to cooperation and justice. However, 
for Hart, this division of labor is only possible if there is sufficient generosity to create 
confidence in the behavior of others and ensure the “predictability necessary for co-
operation.”56 Cooperation is possible if there is sufficient generosity to ground a 
system of mutual reliance. Without generosity or benevolence, mutual 
reliance/mutual trust will never unfold and cooperation and justice will not be 
possible.57  
     Hart is correct in his analysis that some predictability is necessary to expect, rely 
on, or trust in cooperation. Hume seems to provide some degree of predictability 
with his benevolence condition. It is not enough, however, to ground the mutual trust 
necessary for cooperation and thus, justice.58 Hume initially described his 
benevolence condition as existing as a mean between absolute selfishness and 
absolute love. According to his view, if any benevolence exists to any degree 
between the extremes of absolute selfishness and absolute love, his condition is met. 
                                                
     55 See Michael Ridge, "David Hume, Paternalist," Hume Studies 36 (2011) 
especially pp. 162-66 for the full account of this objection and possible Humean lines 
of response. 
     56 Hart, The Concept of Law, p.193. 
     57 There is significant debate on whether mutual trust involves more than mutual 
reliance, e.g., optimism or good will. At this stage, I remain ecumenical regarding 
any difference between the two as nothing at present hinges upon the possible 
differences. 
     58 Though it is worth noting that Hume does criticize Hobbes for precisely ruling 
out the existence of mutual trust, necessary for justice, in his state of nature. Hume 
clearly knew this was needed for justice, he simply does not capture it explicitly 
enough. See Enquiry p.189-190 for his objection to Hobbes. 
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If the other conditions also obtain then there can be justice. I submit, however, that 
ordinary benevolence is not able to make cooperation warranted or predictable in 
others. Consider, for example, the benevolence of a priest or philanthropist. This 
type of benevolence is unidirectional. No amount of unidirectional benevolence will 
do the work necessary for mutual trust.59 The philanthropist can give and give, but 
can never reasonably form expectations about the behavior or feelings of the 
recipient of his generosity. Neither can the recipient of such benevolent behavior 
ever make claims on the philanthropist. This benevolence is the sort involved in 
moral patient cases. It is a dependency relationship, making it insufficient to bring 
about the trust needed for justice. Trust of the sort necessary for human cooperation 
and justice, of the sort Hobbes doubted and replaced with a Leviathan, must be 
mutual if one is to choose the cooperative strategy, that is, to uphold or undertake 
duties (e.g., refraining from stealing or killing one another). The need to be able to 
make claims and depend on others to fulfill them makes human cooperation and 
justice necessary and possible. Justice is a relationship that involves duties and claims, at 
its core is the assurance that we can make certain claims in exchange for following 
certain rules. Hence, the circumstances of justice ought to include some fact about 
the world that involves mutual trust. This is the crux of the challenge of trust: the 
circumstances of justice must include some fact that makes mutual trust both 
necessary and possible. Moreover, to meet a constructivist version of Requirement 
N, the concept and conception of justice must be sensitive to the fact of mutual trust, 
which makes us vulnerable and engenders a need for reliable cooperation.  
     To identify the circumstances of justice, to determine when justice has 
application, we must identify what individuals require in order to be capable of 
trusting within a system of reciprocal claim-making. Unlike Hobbes, who knew he 
hadn’t provided a foundation for trust in his description of human nature, Hume 
thought he had. He was so confident that, given the condition of humans and the 
world, justice would naturally and inevitably arise in any human groups, it didn’t 
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matter to Hume which rules of justice existed or how the society was ruled. 
However, given our rejection of benevolence qua unidirectional feelings or duties in 
the above discussion, what could Hume have been relying on to ground the mutual 
trust necessary for cooperation? 
      In addition to his sociability condition, Hume’s discussion involves a number of 
other factors that appear to assist the benevolence condition in its establishing trust. 
In the Treatise, Hume hypothesizes about the actions of individuals that lead to 
justice and its rules: 
I observe, that it will be in my interest to leave another in possession of his goods, 
provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like 
interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is 
mutually express’d, and is known to both, it produces suitable resolution and 
behaviour. . . [T]hat it arises gradually . . . assures us still more, that the sense of 
interest has become common to all our fellows, and gives us confidence in the 
regularity of their conduct: And ‘tis only on the expectation of this, that our 
moderation and abstinence are founded.60 
 
   Hume states that “justice establishes itself by a kind of convention or agreement; 
that is, by a sense of interest, suppos'd to be common to all, and where every single 
act is perform'd in expectation that others are to perform the like.”61 Finally, Hume 
speaks of a “sense of common interest; which sense each man feels in his own breast, 
which he remarks in his fellows, and which carries him, in concurrence with others, 
into a general plan or system of actions, which tends the public utility . . . justice 
arises.”62 In these passages, Hume speaks of a common sense of interest, not man’s 
own interest that he feels in his breast and sees reflected back to him in his 
companions. It is this feeling of shared interests that leads to a plan of shared actions 
which, in turn, leads to the good of those with whom one shares this feeling. When 
this common sense of interest is known and mutually expressed, gradually trust 
arises from the regular observance of acts that express this common sense of interest. 
Finally, expectations arise within the group. These expectations include people’s 
willingness to curb their own behavior in accordance with the common sense of 
interest. This sounds very much like a rough-grained version of the modern idea of 
solidarity. To be sure, the word solidarity did not come into English until decades 
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after Hume’s death, during the French Revolution. However, his explanation of 
what makes benevolence do the work of trust, that is, this shared feeling in our 
breasts that we mutually express to one another, does seem to hold something of this 
later concept. Postema explains that, to Hume, “[t]he job of the rules of justice is to 
constitute a people, to make a community out of an aggregate of socially inclined 
but ununified individuals.”63 These individuals, it should be noted, are already in a 
circumstance of some basic social relations, relations which already provide a 
foundation of mutual trust.  
V. Rawls’s Circumstances of Justice 
     Though Rawls’s exposition on the circumstances of justice in Theory is intended to 
model Hume’s account, he adds (perhaps not intentionally) two conditions of his own 
which change the benevolence condition in such a way that yet another solution to 
the challenge of trust is offered. Rawls first adds to the circumstances of justice the 
condition that “individuals coexist together at the same time on a definite 
geographical territory.”64 The second condition he adds is that “men suffer from 
various shortcomings of knowledge, thought, and judgment.” The consequence of 
this, Rawls explains, is that “individuals not only have different plans of life but there 
exists a diversity of philosophical and religious belief, and of political and social 
doctrines.” He explains at an earlier point in Theory that the interests of these plans of 
life are “not assumed to be interests in the self, they are interests of a self that regards 
its conception of the good as worthy of recognition.”65 Here a conception of the good 
is a view of what is valuable in human life. What one determines to be valuable will 
often be the product of one’s experiences, including social and family groups of 
which one is a member. The limits of knowledge to which Rawls refers suggests that 
a society that is marked by a pluralism of conceptions of the good will sometimes 
have incompatible doctrines and conceptions of the good.  
     Critics such as Hubin have written off the first of these conditions as unnecessary, 
but the condition of coexistence carries with it a guarantee that people will have an 
immediate need to coordinate in order to share the same time and space. Hume and 
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     64 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.109. 
     65 Ibid., p.110. 
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Hart touch on the second condition of imperfect knowledge as well. In the Enquiry, 
Hume states, 
If every man had sufficient sagacity to perceive, at all times, the strong interest 
which binds him to the observance of justice and equity, and strength of mind 
sufficient to persevere in steady adherence to a general and a distant interest . . 
.there had never, in that case, been any such thing as government or political 
society.66  
 
On this use of knowledge or sagacity, Rawls’s second condition explains why we need 
conceptions of justice, and why the sense of justice alone is not enough. Hart adds 
weight to this reading, arguing that, though the facts which make a system of mutual 
advantages advantageous are generally known, “individuals may obey from a variety 
of motives.” Even so, Hart contends that “neither understanding of long term 
interests, nor the strength or goodness of will, upon which the efficacy of these 
different motives toward obedience depends, are shared by all men alike.”67 He closes 
his discussion arguing that sanctions and laws are not required to create reasons to be 
just, but to guarantee that those who are voluntarily just will not be taken advantage 
of by those who would not voluntarily be just. This condition creates a need for some 
conception of justice.  
      Rawls includes the circumstances of justice with the information that the parties of 
the original position know their society is subject to.68 This is because without the 
circumstances of justice, there would not be a need to choose among principles of 
justice, which is to say, no need to enter the original position. And without the 
circumstances, solutions to the problem of choosing principles would be impossible. 
Thus, the parties know that they are in a society where the circumstances obtain. 
They know that when they emerge from the veil of ignorance, after participating in 
the original position decision procedure, the society will be characterized by moderate 
scarcity, rough equality, and limited benevolence, as well as imperfect understanding, 
and existence in the same time and territory. At this stage the parties are mutually 
disinterested as they choose principles of justice. Rawls explains in the following 
passage: 
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     68 Because society already exists, society could also be taken as one of Rawls’s 
circumstances, though he never explicitly includes it. I will say more on this below. 
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    We may note also that the motivational assumption of mutual disinterest 
parallels Kant’s notion of autonomy . . . this assumption has been used to 
characterize the circumstances of justice and to provide a clear conception to 
guide the reasoning of the parties. . . . the concept of benevolence, being a second 
order notion, would not work out well. Now we can see that the assumption of 
mutual disinterest is to allow for freedom in the choice of a system of final ends 
(Theory p.223).69  
 
     Rawls does not assume that benevolence is the proper motivational assumption in 
the original position, because it would allow personal preferences to influence choices 
in the original position. Rather, mutual disinterest is assumed on the proviso that 
parties know they must choose principles that will be agreed to post-original position, 
that is, under the circumstances of justice (including benevolence). In the original 
position the parties arrive at principles without actually being in or being motivated 
by benevolence. However, Rawls also claims just before the previous passage that 
“[t]he parties arrive at their choice together as free and equal rational persons 
knowing only that those circumstances obtain which give rise to the need for 
principles of justice.”70 The principles agreed to in the original position are principles 
that must respond to the need the circumstances create for such principles. 
Simultaneously, post-original position, all of the circumstances are necessary for the 
chosen principles to be endorsed by the members of the particular society. This group 
endorsement is necessary for the resulting conception to be stable. Change the 
circumstances and the principles are no longer valid because they do not answer the 
problems they were needed to solve in a way that makes coordination possible and 
stable. If the circumstances change, there would be no obligation to abide by the 
principles of justice outside the original position. So, while generosity may not be 
Rawls’s motivational assumption in the original position, it is present in reflective 
equilibrium. It is also one of the facts in human nature that makes human cooperation 
possible and necessary for Rawls.  
     Finally, in each of Rawls’s discussions of how the original position is set up, and 
what motivates individuals to engage in reflective equilibrium, there is already a pre-
existing society in place. We might infer that Rawls treats society as a circumstance of 
justice since, without it, the motivation to engage in reflective equilibrium or the 
original position would be lacking. Indeed, it seems unlikely that one would have any 
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need for distributive justice without at least some degree of social intercourse. Rawls 
may believe this is already explicit in his related condition of the same time and 
geographic place. He may, alternatively, believe that Hume’s approach (which he is 
explicitly following) of including a sociability condition already incorporates society 
into the circumstances of justice well enough that he offers no further explanation of 
it. I will discuss some implications of this implicit circumstance of justice in the 
following section. 
VI. Objections to Rawls’s Account  
     Like Hume, Rawls’s account is also vulnerable to the problem of exclusion. 
Because of the structure of the original position, his explanation of the circumstances 
of justice in Theory seems to generate two problematic exclusions: the 
intergenerational and international domains. In excluding other generations from the 
original position and allowing societies that do not meet his criteria of a just society 
into the international original position, Rawls makes his theory subject to the concern 
that intergenerational and international groups are excluded for the wrong sorts of 
reasons. In this section, I first address reasons for concern regarding intergenerational 
justice, which stem from the generosity, equality, and limited scarcity of resources 
conditions. I then move on to the international worries, which stem largely from 
Rawls’s Hobbesian equality condition. I conclude this section by exploring how well 
Rawls’s account(s) of the circumstances of justice respond to the challenge of trust. 
     Rawls addresses the intergenerational problem in Theory. He gives the original 
position a present time of entry interpretation so that the decision procedure takes 
place at only one point in time. As a result the parties in the original position know 
their generation. Rawls thinks this process could take place at any point in time and 
result in the same outcome because the parties will virtually represent future 
generations. Rawls admits that it is unfounded to simply claim that parties entering 
the original position have duties toward other generations.71 One could make the case 
that the easiest way around this would be to have representatives from across 
generations enter the original position and keep each representative’s generation 
unknown. Rawls rejects this in the first edition of Theory on the grounds that such an 
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original position would “stretch fantasy too far.”72 Rawls instead proposes that the 
parties adopt a motivational assumption and asks that we “think of the parties as 
representing a continuing line of claims.”73 The parties here are heads of families 
wanting to advance the interests of their more immediate descendents. If, according 
to Rawls, the parties will “agree to principles [which] . . . they wish all preceding 
generations to have followed . . . the whole chain of generations can be tied together 
and principles agreed to . . . [Then] we will have succeeded in deriving duties to other 
generations from reasonable conditions.”74 Barry argues that the motivational 
assumption “fails . . . because it makes justice dependent on actual sentiments of 
natural concern that people have for their successors.”75 Ultimately, Rawls assumes 
concern and benevolence where natural concern and benevolence do not exist  (i.e., 
the circumstance of limited generosity does not obtain). Hence, decisions made in the 
original position would not be binding beyond a generation or two when benevolence 
can be presumed to obtain.  
     A related problem is that Rawls’s description of the circumstance of equality 
reverts to Hobbesian wording. He explains that individuals are “roughly similar in 
physical and mental powers” and “no one among them can dominate the rest.”76 This 
rules out the possibility of equality between generations as the past and present 
generations will always be invulnerable to decisions of future generations, while future 
generations will always be vulnerable to the present and past generation. Even if we 
read Rawls’s conception of equality in a more Humean light (equality qua sympathy 
with resentment), it is still insufficient to include future people. This sympathy is 
other-regarding but it exists because of the relations of contiguity and resemblance. 
The relation to distant future people would lack sufficient vivacity to make resentment 
felt by present generations. Moreover, it is a central tenet in Hume’s work that cause 
must precede effect. Therefore, future generations would need to be able to make 
their resentment felt, and only then could they be in a relation of justice with us. This 
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is clearly not possible.77 It is unfeasible, then, to be in a relationship of rough equality 
(equality qua power or sympathy) with hypothetical people whose existence is 
contingent on our decisions. If, for instance, original position parties do not choose an 
adequate savings principle for generations, the world’s resources may be depleted so 
severely that future people may not exist, and certainly not within the circumstance of 
moderate scarcity of resources. Hubin points out that the circumstance of moderate 
scarcity of resources is especially vulnerable given current trends of resource 
depletion. Such resources may only exist if original position conveners choose to 
ensure that they do.78 Ultimately, Rawls’s approach is worrying because it offers 
grounds for exclusion from the scope of justice based one’s generation, which is the 
wrong kind of reason for exclusion. Rawls hopes to motivate concern between 
generations but it is extremely unlikely that this is possible beyond a generation or 
two. Interestingly, neither equality, benevolence, interdependence, nor Rawls’s 
condition of existing in the same time and geographic territory mark the present 
generation’s relation to future people. This means that intergenerational coordination 
falls outside the early Rawlsian circumstances of justice. The options are either to 
reject the notion of intergenerational justice or to find a set of circumstance that could 
include it. This is the subject of chapter 6. 
      Rawls’s early work is also subject to the problem of exclusion with regard to issues 
of international justice. There is a reading of Rawls’s international justice that suggests 
he thinks that equality exists only to an attenuated degree between nations. The 
upshot of this supposition is that individuals can be excluded from the scope of justice 
because of the nation they are born in. This is the wrong kind of reason for exclusion. 
To be clear, Rawls never explains that it is because of the circumstances of justice that 
he leaves some people out of the justice relation on the international level. However, 
to justify excluding individuals from the scope of constructivist justice, it must be the 
case that the relevant facts of the world that make justice possible do not apply to 
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those individuals or their situation. To some degree, it seems Rawls thought that this 
was the case with regard to international justice. 
      The aim of Rawls’s original position is to filter out arbitrary biases, while still 
accommodating both our intuitions about justice and his aim of justifying inequalities 
so that they can exist only if they benefit the worst-off. It seems that the easiest way for 
Rawls to ensure this on an international scale is to let all individuals be represented 
globally in a single original position. Indeed, before Rawls wrote about his 
international original positions, two other theorists addressed the issue with a 
Rawlsian framework. Pogge in his book Realizing Rawls, and Beitz in his Political Theory 
and International Relations, propose just this Rawlsian extension resulting in 
cosmopolitan theories of global justice. Rawls, however, rejects this idea in his original 
essay on an international original position, The Law of Peoples, as “too narrow.”79 
Instead, Rawls sets up a two-level original position for liberal societies in which 
individuals participate in a domestic original position and then representatives from 
liberal societies come together with representatives from decent hierarchical 
societies80 who have not organized themselves via a domestic original position. 
Rawls’s decent hierarchical societies do not have the two principles of justice in their 
society. This means that those from decent hierarchical societies will not be motivated 
by the desire to promote liberties and arrange inequalities so that they benefit the 
worst-off. Furthermore, even if the agreement reached in the international original 
position were to yield similar principles, the lack of corollary principles at home may 
lead to nations or peoples achieving nearly equal distribution of primary goods 
internationally, but it does not follow that fair distribution of primary goods would 
extend to the domestic level. This is presumably because Rawls thought there was 
insufficient equality or insufficient generosity for justice to be possible toward even 
those in decent hierarchical societies. This is the wrong sort of reason to exclude an 
individual from the scope of justice. Precluding individuals in non-liberal societies 
from the direct protections of justice because of their nation/people is not the kind of 
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consideration we want to count in favor of excluding people from justice, especially 
when these individuals possess all the capabilities of being just. 
       These are primarily problems generated by the equality condition which Rawls 
included in his first formulation of the circumstances in Theory, but left out (perhaps in 
response to criticism) in Political Liberalism and “Kantian Constructivism in Moral 
Theory.”  However, as he did not entirely abandon the notion of equality by moving 
it out of the circumstances, how far he remains committed to at least some of his 
original formulation is open to interpretation. In Political Liberalism, he endorses a 
concept of justice as reciprocity as, “a relation between citizens expressed by 
principles of justice that regulate a social world in which everyone benefits judged 
with respect to an appropriate benchmark of equality defined with respect to that 
world.”81 Rawls, at least minimally, still endorses a notion of justice that requires 
some equality between individuals. In “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” he 
adopts the position that “everyone is equally capable of understanding and complying 
with the public conception of justice; therefore all are capable of honoring the 
principles of justice and of being full participants in social cooperation throughout 
their lives.”82 This clearly addresses the issue of the scope of participation, and 
broadens it to include all with an equal capability of participation. Though this more 
Kantian condition is much thinner and less subjectively dependent on the views of the 
dominant participants in justice, it is left to conjecture as to whether certain 
individuals (e.g., the mentally infirm or handicapped) are capable of being full 
participants in social cooperation in Rawls’s view.  
     Turning to the challenge of trust, it seems that Rawls’s early view is open to the 
same criticisms as Hume’s, given that his position aims to follow Hume’s. However, 
there are a couple of features of Rawls’s position that lead one to surmise that he may 
have something like a relationship involving mutual trust already in mind. He 
explains his subjective circumstances of justice, those aspects relevant to the people 
involved, as involving the fact that individuals have their own plans of life, and 
conflicting conceptions of the good. This results in people within any given society 
having a diversity of religious, philosophical, social, and political positions. It is an 
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important feature of Rawls’s view that sorting out the best conception of justice only 
takes place within a preexisting society, a society marked by individuals who have 
various beliefs and social practices already, and where cooperation is both necessary 
and possible. Though Rawls does not explicitly make society a circumstance of justice, 
his emphasis on the diversity that marks society makes it clear that he has this in 
mind. A certain amount of mutual trust must already exist within a pre-existing 
society.  
     In Rawls’s later work, Political Liberalism, he changes his approach to the 
circumstances of justice drastically, and makes the possibility of trust within justice 
even more plausible. Here he names only two circumstances, moderate scarcity of 
resources, and the fact of pluralism, which in a well-ordered society will be the fact 
of reasonable pluralism.83 The fact of pluralism is essentially the fact that individuals 
within a society are marked by certain burdens of judgment. No matter how altruistic or 
objective these individuals are they will adhere to irreconcilable religious, moral, and 
philosophical doctrines resulting from these burdens of judgment. Because of this 
pluralism, “fair terms of social cooperation between citizens as free and equal should 
meet the requirements of full publicity.”84 Only then can people give reasons for 
beliefs and conduct, confident that such reason-giving will strengthen public 
understanding. This is because Rawls believes that in a political regime, the 
overlapping consensus will be such that all adults will adopt the same political conception of 
justice. This conception of justice represents an agreement about principles for the 
basic structure, but does not require that citizens have identical moral reasons for 
agreeing to these principles.  
     Where then, does this leave trust? Presumably buried away somewhere in the fact 
that questions of justice only arise within a preexisting society. A society already 
marked by a political conception of justice is one in which individuals already agree 
on the same fundamental principles because the society’s basic structure has had 
“deep and long-term social effects . . . [which] in fundamental ways [have shaped] 
citizens’ character and aims, the kinds of persons they aspire to be.”85 This requires 
that mutual trust already be present, for human cooperation could not exist without 
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it. In fact, it implies the presence of much more than mutual trust. It implies a kind 
of social arrangement that involves something much more substantive, including 
shared political values and similar personal aims resulting from these shared values. 
Rawls’s background vision of such a society plausibly incorporates the work of 
mutual trust. However, it needs to be moved explicitly into the circumstances of 
justice so that the circumstances are complete. Mutual trust is too crucial a feature of 
justice to be left hidden within the various other background conditions that 
conceptions of constructivist justice are offered within.  
Conclusion 
     In this chapter I have shown that the circumstances of justice should be 
interpreted normatively as the facts that must be true for justice to be needed or 
possible. I have demonstrated that this interpretation of the circumstances of justice is 
consistent with how they appear in Hobbes, Hume, and Rawls. I have also 
established the importance of mutual trust in justice via my discussions of these three 
theorists. While Hume and Rawls do not give accounts of justice that resolve the 
challenge of trust given to us by Hobbes, they do give us theories that lend themselves 
to a solution to that problem with something similar to the concept of solidarity. Just 


















Solidarity: A Reconciliatory Account  
 
     Recent discourse in social and political philosophy has revived interest in the 
normative nature of solidarity. The result has been a multitude of inquiries into 
solidarity with no consensus on the content of the concept. For the notion of 
solidarity to be of optimum use in determining whether it is a candidate for the 
circumstances of justice, we must determine precisely what solidarity is. Most 
accounts of solidarity approach it as an idea embedded in particular uses or 
situations. These approaches ask questions such as “What does solidarity against 
oppression look like?” or “How does feminism use solidarity?” I seek to establish a 
description of solidarity as a normative social relation, divorced from its specific 
instantiations. My task is therefore explanatory; its success hinges on how well my 
analysis of the concept helps us to understand the phenomenon of solidarity and how 
the account produced by this investigation fits with previous discussions of solidarity.  
     In this chapter I offer what is largely a reconciliatory account of solidarity taken 
from instances of solidarity, and certain applied approaches to solidarity in the 
literature. This chapter will also set out a new distinction between two kinds of 
solidarity, expressional solidarity and robust solidarity. I will argue that these different kinds 
of solidarity are two species of the same fundamental idea of solidarity. What 
differentiates them is the multidirectional or unidirectional nature of the relationship. I 
begin with a rough definition of solidarity embedded in historical and modern usage, 
and consider core examples of solidarity to clarify my approach to the concept. I next 
briefly articulate a few seminal accounts that allow me to extrapolate what I put forth 
as the four definitive conditions of robust solidarity. I then contrast this kind of 
solidarity with expressional solidarity in a way that illustrates that the two are rightly 
considered solidarity. I draw from this analysis an explanation of the source of the 
normative and moral status of solidarity.  
I. What is Solidarity? 
     Solidarity as a term entered the English language in the 1840s from the French 
solidarité, meaning mutual responsibility. Solidarité evolved from the earlier solidaire 
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meaning interdependent or complete. The root derives, however, from a much older 
notion in Latin law: the obligatio in solidum, the unlimited liability of each member of a 
family or community for shared debts. Comte used the term solidarity to indicate a 
cohesiveness of communities. Durkheim developed this concept further when he 
defined two types of solidarity in society: mechanical and organic.1 Modern notions 
of solidarity vary from unity to charity to sympathy to opposition against an out-group. This 
proliferation of meanings, unlike many political concepts, does not stem from an 
abundance of theories, but rather from a notable lack of a compelling, more 
abstracted account that might unite them. This is coupled with the fact that, in 
everyday politics and society, people do not hesitate to employ the term as they see 
fit: to motivate aid, to support troops abroad, or to make international alliances 
appear stronger. Keeping in mind the semantic history of the term and its myriad 
uses, I propose the following rough definition of solidarity from which to begin our 
enquiry: solidarity is a kind of cohesive bond, seen in the capacity to affect the 
individuals related to that bond. Though somewhat elliptical, this definition will serve 
as a starting point of inquiry. We might now ask, which cohesive bonds are solidarity 
bonds? While much of this chapter will be dedicated to establishing an adequate 
response to this question, here I offer a couple of examples that I understand to be 
uncontroversial. It is this type of social bond, its existence, and the way in which it 
generates obligations in all of its contexts, that I will explore in this paper. 
     Example 1: A large group of Western university students organize a fast 
to show support for Palestinians fasting to protest a recent bombing. The 
students consider themselves to be acting in solidarity with the fasting 
Palestinians. 
     Example 2: Nearly a third of a nation’s working class population joins a 
political movement which uses civil resistance to advance workers’ rights 
and social change. The workers who are members of this movement 
consider themselves to be acting in solidarity with one another. 
 Example 3: Monika is a German citizen. She is outraged by EU 
immigration laws which do not give immigrant workers the same rights 
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as EU citizens. As the citizen of a member-state of the EU, Monika feels 
her nation is supporting unjust policies and feels ashamed so she works to 
change the policies. She helps organize grassroots movements to 
promote foreign workers’ rights, attempting to sway her own government 
to alter its position.  
     The three types of groups in these examples (e.g., protesters, a labor union, and 
the citizens of a nation-state), represent a range of solidary relations. Solidarity 
embraces innumerable classifications of relations between individuals. These 
examples illustrate that the strength of solidary bonds vary greatly from group to 
group. 
     These examples constitute two divergent, though equally dominant, uses of the 
term solidarity in the literature. Both of these uses of solidarity will be fully explained, 
along with their relationship to one another, in the following discussion. The kind of 
solidarity in example 1 is the type we find in acts such as joining a march for 
immigrants’ rights, fasting in solidarity with hunger strikes, or global rallies for 
oppressed minorities’ rights. These kinds of acts of solidarity I will call expressional 
solidarity. The kind of solidarity found in examples 2 and 3 I call robust solidarity. It is 
important that expressional solidarity is a species of solidarity. Though it is 
motivational, expressional solidarity differs significantly from robust solidarity as it 
does not generate moral obligations (as robust solidarity does). Because I will largely 
focus on robust solidarity in this project, for simplicity I will refer to it hereafter 
simply as solidarity. If my account of solidarity is successful, it will explain why 
expressional solidarity is only weakly normative, but is still properly considered 
solidarity.  
II. Leading Accounts of Solidarity 
     The literature on solidarity offers little to no consensus on a principal account of 
the phenomenon itself. Indeed most accounts of solidarity consider themselves in 
conflict with the various other accounts of solidarity found in the literature. My claim 
is simply that there is much less conflict than the abundance of divergent accounts 
would suggest. For example, some accounts of solidarity emphasize cohesiveness or 
fellow feeling, while others focus on obligations or resistance to out-groups. Very few 
give reference to other attempts to explain the phenomenon and thus are frequently 
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read as conflicting. This has led to Jean Harvey’s observation: “Studying the current 
literature, however, there seems to be no agreed upon meaning of the term 
‘solidarity,’ nor even a clear consensus as to the kind of item it refers to.”2 The result 
is that most taxonomies of solidarity focus on several similar examples of solidarity, 
which appears to create endemic conflict between these different taxonomies of 
solidarity. For example, Scholz, Mohanty and, most recently, Kolers define solidarity 
in opposition to some other group. This is because they focus on those types of 
solidarity whose aim is to unite a group of people to achieve some end against 
another group.3 Clearly, not all solidary groups take this form (Scholz notes as much). 
For example, the family, a community, even some labor unions do not require 
opposition to be a solidary group. In contrast, global justice accounts of solidarity 
tend to focus on sympathy or empathy because this is what the theorists need to 
encourage in order to claim grounds for global rules or laws of justice. Joan Harvey’s 
account of solidarity focuses on empathy and members of the group having a 
common interest.4 Carol Gould’s “Transnational Solidarities” also focuses on 
empathy.5 Likewise, sociologists focus on the groupness of the association, because 
the phenomenon that they are most interested in is the normative element brought 
on by group membership.6 William Rehg, by contrast, views solidarity as a common 
                                                
     2 Jean Harvey, "Moral Solidarity and Empathetic Understanding: The Moral 
Value and Scope of the Relationship," Journal of Social Philosophy 38 (2007): 22-37, 
p.22.  
     3 Cf. Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Feminism without Borders : Decolonizing Theory, 
Practicing Solidarity (Durham ; London: Duke University Press, 2003); Sally J. Scholz, 
Political Solidarity (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008); 
Avery H. Kolers, "Dynamics of Solidarity," Journal of Political Philosophy 20 (2012), 
pp.365-383. 
      4 See Harvey, "Moral Solidarity and Empathetic Understanding: The Moral 
Value and Scope of the Relationship.” 
     5 See Carol C. Gould, "Transnational Solidarities," Journal of Social Philosophy 38 
(2007): 148-164. 
     6 See Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1987).  
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good which could be described as a specific value, goal, or interest.7 Similarly, Shelby 
places shared values at the center of his account.8  
     These are just a few instances of divergence in the understandings of the concept 
of solidarity, but nearly all accounts can be classified by what they identify as the core 
component or components of the concept. Focusing on one or two instance of the 
relation (e.g., solidarity as political oppression or solidarity as empathy) has resulted 
in the illusion of conflicting kinds of solidarity with very little overlap or commonality 
(e.g., solidarity as political oppression, as opposed to solidarity as empathy). This is a 
mistake. The literature on solidarity largely diverges in ways that do not contradict 
one another but, rather, result from focusing inquiry on a limited number of applied 
examples regarding certain kinds or uses of solidarity.9 There is need and space, 
however, for an approach that brings the previous literature together to identify a 
common concept and its normative impact.  
     It would be impossible here to discuss the perceived conflicts among all of the 
existing literature on solidarity and examine how they could be reconciled 
coherently. I instead begin with discussion of Joseph Feinberg’s early analytic 
treatment of solidarity. I will use his explanation of solidarity as a framework by 
which to classify the central focuses of various subsequent solidarity theorists. I then 
unite these and other accounts by abstracting from the literature my own four 
conditions of solidarity, demonstrating that many of the previous accounts of 
solidarity can be reconciled into a single account that is supplementary to, rather 
than in conflict with, the majority of the literature discussed herein.10 
     Joel Feinberg, in his essay “Collective Responsibility,” explains that, “[a] group 
has solidarity to the degree that its members have mutual interests, bonds of 
                                                
     7 William Rehg, "Solidarity and the Common Good: An Analytic Framework," 
Journal of Social Philosophy 38 (2007): 7-21. 
     8 Tommie Shelby, We Who Are Dark : The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005). 
     9 This is a method explicitly encouraged by Bayertz and Scholz. In Kurt Bayertz, 
"Four Uses of Solidarity," in Solidarity, ed. Kurt Bayertz (Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Kluwar Academic, 1999):3-28, p.4. and Scholz, Political Solidarity, p. 20 
and ch. 7. 
    10 Some conflict, however, will be evident with previous literature. 
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affection, and a ‘common lot’.”11 Feinberg’s first feature, mutual interest, may be an 
overlap of shared interests or “it may be a community of interests of the sort that 
exists when each member’s integrated set of interests contains the integrated interest 
set of each of the others.”12 This is seen, to use Feinberg’s example, in a family in 
which a father’s interest set includes his son’s achievements and vice versa. This 
mutual interest that unites the group is found in Tommie Shelby’s theory of black 
solidarity. It is also one of the four uses identified by Kurt Bayertz and defines Sally 
Scholz’s theory of political solidarity. In my own discussion of solidarity, mutual 
interest plays a leading role as the feature that defines a solidary group. 
     Feinberg’s second feature, bonds of affection with members of the group, follows 
from his first feature of mutual interests. If one has an interest in other group 
members’ interests, one probably feels sympathy toward their projects and persons, 
and this is reciprocated within the group. This is a popular idea in the writings on 
solidarity. Larry May calls the bonds of sentiment a necessary condition to solidarity, 
arguing that these bonds of sentiment entail a willingness to lend moral support.13 
Jean Harvey’s account puts “empathetic understanding” at the core of solidarity. 
Recent political theorists have become interested in the role of empathy in solidarity 
and developed it independently into a basis for global justice.  
     Cosmopolitans tend to either appeal to this notion of empathy as the mechanism 
to motivate global redistribution of resources and rights, or they appeal to the 
collective responsibility made possible by solidarity and the resultant duties we owe 
the global poor.14 As theorists of the latter approach capitalize on the notion of 
collective responsibility as a result of pre-existing solidarity, they do little to explain 
the solidarity itself, so we set this view aside. The first approach, however, argues that 
a specific feature of solidarity, empathy (sometimes sympathy), is what characterizes 
solidarity. This is a special concern for in-group members that goes beyond sympathy 
to become an actual disposition to “come to the aid of those with whom one 
                                                
    11 Joel Feinberg, "Collective Responsibility," Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968): 674-
688, p.677.  
    12 Ibid. 
    13 Larry May, The Socially Responsive Self : Social Theory and Professional Ethics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).  
    14For the responsibility approach see Thomas Pogge and Andrew Dobson among 
others.  
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sympathizes.”15 This aspect of solidarity is central in views that aim to explain how 
solidarity can motivate groups to action (e.g., Fiona Robinson, Virginia Held, and 
Carol Gould).16 Drawing from these theorists, empathy will play a role in my 
reconciliatory account of solidarity as well. 
   The final feature of Feinberg’s definition of solidarity—a common lot—is 
somewhat less clear. He explains only that it is when the group’s goods and harms 
are indivisible, and that this is when the well-being of the group is shared. This seems 
expected in robust groups such as family and friendship, but also possible to some 
degree in weaker groups (e.g., an attack on a nation is a harm to all members of the 
nation). Shared values or a shared sense of well-being may arise after a solidary 
group is formed or may in part lead to a group’s formation. Shared values will be 
values relevant to the purpose of the group; members of a group do not share all 
values, only those related to the group’s aim. Shared values constitute the core of 
William Rehg’s account of solidarity.17 Shelby seems to explicate this feature in both 
his conditions of a shared value or goal and identification with the group. One of the 
uses Kurt Bayertz identifies shares similar content to Feinberg’s condition of a 
common ground (i.e., shared history, feelings, convictions, or interests).18 
Accordingly, I will incorporate the concept of a common lot within my discussions of 
a shared joint interest and identification with the group in this project. 
     Tommie Shelby articulates one of the most detailed and analytic accounts of 
solidarity in the literature. His account is motivated from the perspective of African-
American solidarity, though his theory is applicable to all types of solidarity. In 
addition to shared values or goal and identification with the group mentioned above, Shelby 
adds the conditions of loyalty, and mutual trust.19 A problem for Shelby, however, is 
that in grounding his theory in the applied case of “black solidarity,” he becomes so 
                                                
    15 Shelby, We Who Are Dark : The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity pp.68-70. 
    16 Gould construes solidarity as social empathy and does not advocate universal 
solidarity in “Transnational Solidarities”. Also see: Fiona Robinson, Globalizing Care : 
Ethics, Feminist Theory, and International Relations, Feminist Theory and Politics (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview Press, 1999); Virginia Held, "Care and Justice in the Global 
Context," Ratio Juris 17 (2004):141–55.  
    17 Rehg, “Solidarity and the Common Good: An Analytic Framework.”  
    18 Bayertz, “Four Uses of Solidarity.”  
    19 Shelby, We Who Are Dark : The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity, pp. 68-
70. 
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committed to a form of solidarity that requires a prior shared identity, that it is 
unclear what space is left for solidarity outside such shared group identity. If 
solidarity requires prior shared identity, then many instances of what we could call 
solidarity cannot be adequately explained. In an attempt to avoid this mistake, which 
is common in taxonomies of solidarity, I draw on a variety of contributions from the 
aforementioned views, and attempt to reconcile central features and core 
components into a single, united theory of solidarity. If successful, this approach will 
show that the literature on solidarity does not conflict as generally supposed.  
III. Four Conditions of Robust Solidarity 
     In this section I articulate what I take to be the four jointly necessary conditions of 
robust solidarity: joint interest, identification with the group, disposition to empathy, and mutual 
trust. Here I seek to establish that these features are necessary for a relation to be 
considered solidarity, and that my understanding of how they are mutually 
supportive helps us to explain how solidarity is both motivation and obligation-
generating. Though this section aims to treat solidarity descriptively—to explain the 
features that exist when solidarity is strongly normative—justifying the descriptive 
features will sometimes make reference to normative aspects of solidarity. My analysis 
does not, I hope, conflate the descriptive and normative. If my account of robust 
solidarity is successful, it will explain why expressional solidarity is not strongly 
normative, but is still properly considered a species of solidarity. 
Joint Interest  
     A joint interest provides the content which defines the solidary group. A joint 
interest is an interest or aim that is held by all members of the group, but which 
could not be realized by the individuals alone. Individuals will have an interest in the 
ends of their solidary group, but individuals cannot hope to achieve this end without 
the shared aims and interests of others. This condition incorporates the mutual 
interest requirement in Feinberg’s description of solidarity. The joint interest can be 
something as specific as getting a political candidate elected, or as broad as 
promoting general well-being of a group, or working out how individuals can live 
together peacefully. A shared joint interest is not the same as parallel identical 
interests. While a group of individuals on a train may all have the identical interest of 
getting to the same destination, this is not a shared joint interest—as relevant to this 
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discussion—as it is achievable without others. However, if an armed robber stops the 
train and the passengers are held hostage, they may develop the relevant kind of joint 
interest in getting out alive, because only if all individuals perform in certain ways will 
this be possible (e.g., they must not antagonize the armed robber). This condition 
rules out any sort of crowd or assembly being in solidarity.  
     Another feature of a joint interest is that solidary groups will have a primary 
interest that defines the group, as well as secondary interests and aims that members 
of the group understand to promote the group’s defining interest. For clarity, I will 
refer to the defining interest as the group’s executive interest. I will refer to interests the 
group members adopt in order to promote the executive interests as subsidiary interests. 
In reference to example 2 above, the workers’ party in question might have an 
executive interest of creating a capitalist labor economy. Some members of the 
workers’ party may think that this involves a subsidiary interest of retirement benefits 
necessarily linked to one’s labor. However, other members of the workers’ party 
think that the group has a subsidiary interest in not advocating retirement benefits 
linked to labor because they believe that retirement benefits distract from and 
undermine the group’s executive interest of promoting a capitalist economy. As long 
as the group’s executive interest is shared, conflict in subsidiary interests present no 
threat to solidarity. It may even be the case that there is some conflict in the 
interpretation of executive interests. In diverse groups with more abstract goals such 
as the joint promotion of the well-being of some set of individuals, the executive 
interest will be sufficiently abstract that it may even involve essentially contested 
concepts. This presents no problem for the group so long as there is a sufficient 
amount of convergence on what they must do and how each member works toward 
the group’s executive interest. As Kolers puts it, “What distinguishes solidarity is that 
it occurs notwithstanding disagreement about [shared interests]; it survives 
incompletely shared interests.”20  
      One might object that if the executive interest of a solidary group is open to such 
interpretation by group members, perhaps the identification of a joint interest is 
merely imputed by outsiders attempting to define a group in a way that its own 
                                                
     20 Kolers, "Dynamics of Solidarity," p.366.  
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members do not recognize. In such cases, a group may appear to fulfill the conditions 
of solidarity, but the group members would not recognize a joint interest. The 
problem is that this is not the kind of group we want to call solidarity.  
     My response is twofold. First, robust solidary groups do not need to explicitly 
recognize an executive joint interest, but they must all share the aim of said interest 
to be in solidarity. If the joint interest is only imputed by outsiders, then the group is 
not a solidary group. Second, a group can exist and not be in solidarity; it is not the 
case that every group is a solidary group. Solidarity does not exist in all human 
interactions or groups and a joint interest alone is not enough for solidarity. 
Conversely, if a group exists, but lacks a joint interest, this is not a solidary group, 
though it may come to identify such an interest and become a solidary group. After all, 
there are numerous social groups that exhibit some form of the other features of 
solidarity (i.e., empathy, group identification, and trust) when divorced from a joint 
interest. For example, most instances of friendship or neighborliness would involve 
these features. However, not all such groups could entail obligations. It is the joint 
interest that preserves solidarity as a relationship which is marked by specific kinds of 
empathy, group identification, and trust, and it is the unique interaction of all four 
features that make the generation of solidary obligations possible. Solidarity marks 
only certain kinds of group relations that involve all four conditions currently under 
discussion. I will return to these concerns later in this section. 
Identification With the Group 
     This second characteristic of robust solidarity must be bidirectional. Not only does 
an individual need to identify with the group, to some extent the group needs to 
recognize the individual. Mason explains group identification as “[committing] 
oneself to it in a way that normally involves endorsing its practices and seeking to 
promote its interests, whilst regarding one’s well-being as ultimately linked to its 
flourishing.”21 For a person to be able to commit herself to a group, she must 
conceive of the group and its practices as valuable. Solidarity involves adopting the 
group’s interest as one’s own interests, and linking the achievement of such interests 
to one’s own well-being. This does not mean that every subsidiary interest of the 
                                                
     21 Andrew Mason, Community, Solidarity and Belonging : Levels of Community and Their 
Normative Significance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.23. 
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group will be linked to one’s well-being. Rather, the group’s executive interest, 
whether it is explicitly identified by all individuals or not, is the goal which is linked to 
members’ well-being. From example 2 above, if Jon, a member of the workers’ party, 
disapproves of the party’s subsidiary interest of only promoting the rights of workers 
who are citizens of that nation (i.e., he wants to promote immigrant worker’s rights as 
well), Jon is still in solidarity with his party, but disapproves of a subsidiary interest 
and its ensuing actions. He may act within the group to change this subsidiary 
interest while at the same time be promoting the group’s executive interests. Jon still 
acts in solidarity with the group even though the group endorses a goal he does not 
promote. Jon may act to prevent the plan to exclude foreign workers because he feels 
his involvement in the workers’ party reflects on him and he would be ashamed if the 
group were to promote such practices. Conversely, if the workers’ party can achieve 
its ends while at the same time securing working rights for immigrant laborers, we 
can imagine Jon being proud of this. What this illustrates is that, to some extent, a 
person can view her moral status as linked to the projects and interests of the group. 
It is common in all solidary groups that, because of one’s identification with the 
group, one sees one’s own well-being and moral standing reflected by the group to 
some degree. 
     An important feature of identification with the group is that it requires that each 
member have some degree of interpretive competence of the group’s shared joint 
interest. This interpretation does not need to be explicit. In some groups this will be 
understood tacitly. For instance, we can imagine that the workers’ party was a post-
communist Eastern Bloc workers’ party. This party might garner support from 
individuals outside of the economic community in question. For instance, Western 
capitalists or members of other Eastern Bloc nations that also want to promote a 
capitalist market system might coordinate with and take on responsibilities for the 
workers’ party. In this case, those who identify with the group will not necessarily 
reside within the community’s physical territory. It is not shared language or way of 
life or even history that generates solidarity, contra Bayertz, Scholz, and others. 
Instead, it is an identification with the interest of promoting the group’s shared joint 
interest, whether or not members have actually recognized this interest. Those who 
do not identify with the executive interest may receive some benefits of the group 
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because they are close to those who do identify with and participate in the group’s 
efforts. However, they will not necessarily receive such benefits. Such individuals are 
not properly in solidarity with the group. They do not shape the group or its interests 
or have any role within it.  
     Another central feature of identification with the group diverges from the typical 
treatment of solidarity in the literature. Generally, solidarity is examined in the 
context of a single group, and an individual will belong to that one group. It is 
important to recognize, however, that individuals may identify with a number of 
solidary relations at any given time. In traditional typologies of solidarity, those that 
do suggest something beyond membership in an individual group tend to discuss a 
distant relation or sympathy with distant people, not a network of overlapping 
solidary commitments. In fact, it is possible to identify with two occasionally 
conflicting groups, as long as the only subsidiary interests of the group—and not the 
executive interests—conflict. In large groups, such as a nation, a group may be rife 
with economic and political conflict along smaller group lines (e.g., political parties). 
Such conflicts may undermine the unity of the larger group and the degree to which 
individuals identify with the group, but these conflicts and the weakening of 
identification with the larger group do not undermine solidarity so long as there is 
still some degree of identification with that larger group as an entity. 
     Finally, identification with the group will yield some loyalty to the group’s goals 
and, sometimes, the group itself. The extent that one is loyal to the group may 
depend on a number of factors, including how successful one interprets the group to 
be at achieving its executive interest, and how one ranks the value of the group’s 
interest among one’s own set of values. Another factor may be how one is recognized 
in the group, and one’s corresponding role as a member. There are too many factors 
involved in group loyalty to outline herein. What is significant is that some loyalty 







A Disposition to Empathy 
     The third condition of solidarity is something more than sympathy with the plight 
of others.22 A disposition to empathy incorporates Feinberg’s concepts of a common 
lot and bonds of affection. It involves being affected by other individuals’ situations 
or, minimally, being disposed to being affected. In the context of solidarity, empathy 
involves understanding the kind of social facts with which other members of the 
group are living (those facts about the social environment related to the group’s 
executive interest, not all social facts) and to understand the emotional configuration that 
arises in response.  
     Emotional configuration is a useful notion introduced by Lawrence Thomas in 
the following example. Most men when walking alone at night give very little thought 
to being raped or attacked, though it is possible. Most women, however, when 
walking alone at night do think of and fear the possibility of an attack or rape. 
Thomas explains that the difference in the two attitudes “marks a difference in the 
emotional configurations between women and men.”23 This does not mean all men 
or all women have the same emotional configurations. A number of experiences 
shape the emotional configuration of any individual. However, individuals who 
identify with a group united around a single executive interest will share salient 
features of their emotional configuration. They not only share common knowledge 
regarding events that lead to endorsement of their common interests, but actually 
share (to varying degrees) the emotional experience involved in having those interest. 
     A disposition toward empathy is met when one’s attitude makes empathy readily 
possible. This will involve, primarily, a willingness to hear relevant information 
regarding social facts, and a willingness to imagine the emotional experience which 
results from these social facts. It is important that this only requires social facts 
directly relevant to the group’s executive interest (or future executive interest).24 So, if 
                                                
     22 Taxonomies of global solidarity or solidarity outside simple communities tend 
to discuss solidarity as sympathy for others’ situations; the global cosmopolitan 
thinkers mentioned above, for instance. 
     23 Laurence Thomas, "Moral Flourishing in an Unjust World," Journal of Moral 
Education 22 (1993): 83-96, p.86. 
    24 Hence, it is possible to actually hate or greatly dislike individuals in one’s 
solidary group and still be in empathy, or minimally, be disposed to empathy toward 
them insofar as the group’s executive interest is concerned.  
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you and I are in a national solidary group, my social experience in my running club 
is nothing you will be expected to be disposed to be empathic about. If, however, we 
are both Americans and I tell you that my family was in the World Trade Center 
attack, I can reasonably expect you, if not to actually feel empathy toward my 
situation, to at least understand the social experience of the facts involved and 
imagine my emotional configuration as a result, and act accordingly.  
    A disposition to empathy most clearly obtains in examples of solidarity against a 
shared oppressor or out-group, whether another nation, a political group, a different 
race, or environmental conditions. An out-group forces recognition of shared 
emotional configurations. However, empathy is also pervasive in solidary groups that 
do not form against an oppressor. A community in an underdeveloped nation, for 
example, in which there is a joint interest of working together to survive and 
common identification with this community, could be a solidary group. In the 
experience of sharing a life marked by similar challenges, empathy within the 
community may be what motivates recognition of a shared joint interest. A 
disposition to empathy may be the condition that leads a group to identify joint 
interests and come to be in solidarity. 
      A disposition to empathy may manifest itself in a number of ways, depending on 
the strength of the solidary bond within the group. In a strong friendship group or 
family, this condition may appear as love. In a community, it may appear as a mild 
concern for the well-being of one’s neighbors and a willingness to assist where 
possible. In a weak group it will, minimally, appear as a tendency to consider 
members of one’s in-group as morally equal.25  
 Mutual Trust  
     Mutual trust is the final condition of solidarity. The other three conditions act as 
intensifiers of mutual trust, and produce the specific kind of trust present in robust 
solidarity.26 Hence, the stronger the other features, the more robust the trust and 
corresponding obligations within the group. This trust is not an all-encompassing 
trust in individuals with whom one is in solidarity, but a goal-specific trust, in which 
                                                
    25 The tendency to see in-group members as equal corresponds with Bayertz’s first 
use of solidarity. 
     26 Thanks to Mike Ridge for suggesting framing this in terms of intensifiers and 
these examples. 
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one trusts the individuals in one’s solidary group regarding the group’s executive 
interest. Solidarity-trust is distinct from ordinary mutual trust, though it is a species of 
mutual trust.  
      Following Baier, Jones, and McLeod, I take it to be fairly uncontroversial that 
trust involves: (1) that we be vulnerable to betrayal, (2) that we think well of others in 
certain domains, and (3) that we are optimistic that others are competent in certain 
respects.27 In ordinary mutual trust then, we may assume that both parties 
experience all three conditions. For example, if you make a promise to me to meet 
for coffee we are both vulnerable to betrayal, that is, being stood up. However, we 
each think well enough of the other in this domain to trust each other to respect the 
commitment, and we are optimistic that the other will be competent to show up (e.g., 
pay attention to time, find the coffee shop, etc.). Instances of mutual trust may be 
more or less robust than meeting at a coffee shop. For instance, a wedding vow, given 
the circumstances under which it is taken, seems to intuitively involve a stronger kind 
of trust and corresponding duties than meeting for coffee. This is because a wedding 
vow carries certain features with it that other instances of promises and mutual trust 
do not; for example, commitment to longevity, emotional attachment, the sanctity of 
a formal vow, etc. These features are intensifiers. In solidarity, the conditions of a 
shared joint interest, identification with the group, and a disposition to empathy all 
foster an environment of trust that generates a more robust species of mutual trust 
than ordinary mutual trust.  
    Within a group, the agent’s having and understanding the aims that she trusts 
others to achieve depends on other individuals having and understanding those same 
objectives. In addition those other individuals must understand the agent’s intentions 
regarding an executive interest. To rely on another person doing his part toward a 
joint interest, the proposition that he intends that they act and that he will perform 
his part enters the agent’s cognitive framing of her own intention that they act. This 
                                                
     27 This largely follows Carolyn McLeod, Self-Trust and Reproductive Autonomy, Basic 
Bioethics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002) ch.2; Karen Jones, "Trust as an 
Affective Attitude," Ethics 107 (1996): 4-25; and Annette Baier, "Trust and Antitrust," 
Ethics 96 (1986): 231-260. 
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framing is reciprocated by the other person.28 This reciprocity makes the relevant 
kind of mutual solidarity-trust contingent on others sharing one’s executive interests 
and this knowledge being shared, but also on there being a mutual disposition to 
empathy and mutual identification with the group. So, if I know that you and I 
identify with a group, and that we share its joint interest, and that we share an 
attitude of a disposition of empathy toward one another, mutual trust of a robust 
nature is warranted. The other conditions of solidarity act as intensifiers which create 
a distinct kind of robust mutual trust that differs from ordinary mutual trust, similar 
to the way that the features of wedding vows distinguish them from ordinary 
promises like meeting for coffee. The more robust the other conditions, the more 
warranted this mutual trust, and the more robust the solidarity.  
     The environment of mutual trust that develops in a solidary group is necessary for 
people within solidary groups to make claims upon one another and undertake the 
duties necessary for the fulfillment of those claims. Only if I can trust that you will 
respond in kind will I make myself vulnerable and constrain my behavior or make 
sacrifices in such a way as to achieve the group’s shared joint interest. So, the success 
of a solidary group is dependent on the degree of mutual trust among the individuals 
regarding the group’s aims and interests. 
      A unique aspect of this kind of trust is that a fairly robust level of trust is possible 
among people who have never interacted. In other kinds of trust, some degree of 
interaction is usually required for warranted mutual reliance and trust. Ordinary 
mutual trust usually provides a good reason to believe in an agents’ performance of 
what they are being trusted to do (e.g., they have been paid, they have promised, 
etc.). Solidarity-trust, however, can involve robust trust between individuals even if 
there has been no direct interaction. An example of the robust nature of solidarity-
trust can be found by extending the example 2 from above. Imagine the workers’ 
party decides that a strike is in order: those who strike make themselves very 
vulnerable. Minimally, they risk loss of wages and employment. Only if all workers 
strike will it achieve or contribute to the achievement of the group’s political aims. 
However, to strike, workers must trust that all the other workers, including many one 
                                                
    28 Facundo M. Alonso, "Shared Intention, Reliance, and Interpersonal 
Obligations," Ethics 119 (2009):444-75, p.457. 
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has never met, will in fact strike. If a worker does not strike, the individual’s actions 
will risk the group’s efficacy in achieving its joint interest, and may even result in an 
alteration in the individual’s position of trust within the group.  
     It is essential to my position on the conditions of solidarity that all of these 
conditions be mutually supportive of one another. Generally, the stronger the 
conditions, the stronger the solidary bond. A group will seem to exhibit more of some 
conditions than others depending on its shared joint interest. In a family or 
friendship, empathy may seem stronger because the group’s interest is related to 
actually caring about and valuing other members. In the nation-state, however, joint 
interest will seem like the strongest condition because the goal of living together does 
not require as strong an identification with the group or empathy as friendship 
would. Similarly, according to Scholz’s political solidarity, which centers on an aim 
of opposing some out-group, group members would have a more dominant shared 
joint interest than, say, empathy, because the group exists to achieve that political, 
oppositional aim. It is important to note, however, that members will have duties 
because of membership in the group only when all four conditions are met.  
     Earlier I argued that placing a shared joint interest at the center of a description of 
solidarity does not risk making the solidary relationship overly inclusive and, in fact, 
preserves the notion of solidarity as a rare and unique relationship, rather than 
simply the convergence of interests or recognition of shared norms. A concrete 
example in light of the additional conditions may help clarify my position. An 
example of the concern about over-inclusiveness can be found in the history of the 
American civil rights movement. Two organizations, the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC) were often thought to be a single group.29 The groups appeared 
to have similar joint interests in the way necessary for solidarity. Both held an 
executive interest of promoting equality between African-Americans and other 
Americans in the United States. The SCLC saw its subsidiary interests as more 
linked to ending Jim Crow laws and organizing large-scale activities such as marches 
and protests to create public awareness of endemic racism in the South. The SNCC 
                                                
     29 Thanks to an anonymous referee at the Journal of Political Philosophy for this 
example. 
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favored shock tactics with less chance of individual recognition, and put voter 
registration at the forefront of their agenda. Initially, Martin Luther King Jr. hoped 
that the SNCC would become the youth division of the SCLC, but the groups’ 
differing ideals prevented this. This example is a case in which there was a common 
joint interest between two groups, and probably a disposition to empathy, but an 
insufficiently similar interpretation of the joint nature of their projects, a lack of 
shared identity, and no solidarity-trust. The concern that may arise from placing a 
joint interest as the defining condition for a group is that this could result in the 
SCLC and SNCC being identified as a single solidary group. However, given the 
necessity of the other conditions for the robust solidarity with which I am concerned, 
the two groups were not in solidarity with one another (though possibly in the 
beginning of the SNCC it was unclear if solidarity would develop between the two). 
Central to my account of solidarity (and similar to many other descriptions of 
solidarity in the literature) is the notion that solidarity is not so easily come by as 
many other types of social relations. 
     A related concern is that two groups that do not share executive interests, such as 
a group of Quakers and a group of Communists, may share a subsidiary interest such 
as supporting an anti-war effort. In the context of the anti-war effort, could the 
subsidiary interest become the executive interest of the two groups? Would this mean 
the groups were in solidarity? My response is that it is possible, but only if all of the 
other conditions for solidarity are met. So, if the Communist and Quakers began to 
identify with a central anti-war group and had a disposition to empathy and the right 
kind of trust for one another, then it would be possible for the groups to be in 
solidarity. It is crucial to my view that the executive interest of the group is not 
relative to the group’s aims at a single point in time alone, but relative to how the 
members identify with it, and how empathy and trust relate to it as well.30 The 
consequence is that the executive joint interest of a solidary group does not change 
rapidly over time, though some variance—along with the other conditions—is 
possible.  
 
                                                
     30Thanks to an anonymous referee for The Journal of Political Philosophy for raising 
this concern and example. 
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IV. Expressional Solidarity 
     Finally, before addressing the normative nature of solidarity, we turn to 
expressional solidarity. Solidarity is often understood as an expression of empathy or 
concern for others, something which I previously referred to as expressional 
solidarity. This type of solidarity is frequently found in acts such as marching, 
conscientious purchasing, and fasting. I have distinguished this type of solidarity from 
the robust, obligation-generating solidarity with which I have been primarily 
concerned herein. A strength of my account of the necessary conditions of robust 
solidarity is that it can explain how both of these species of solidarity are properly 
considered solidarity. In each of the four conditions of robust solidarity above, 
solidarity involves mutual or bidirectional conditions (i.e., mutual recognition of 
identifying with the group, mutual trust, mutual disposition to empathy and a joint 
interest). Expressional solidarity occurs when any one or more of the four conditions 
is unidirectional. This is because the reciprocal nature of the characteristics of robust 
solidarity generate reliance upon other members of the group. However, without 
being able to rely on an individual regarding all four characteristics, the group would 
risk too much to trust that individual to carry out duties pertaining to the group’s 
executive interest. In the context of expressional solidarity, the features of mutual 
trust and a joint interest will look slightly different.  
     A joint interest is no longer joint, but a parallel interest in a group’s executive joint 
interest. Mutual trust will not be mutual solidarity-trust, but a demonstration of 
oneself as trustworthy in the eyes of the group toward which one has solidarity. The 
disposition to empathy, though not returned, will involve the same commitment for 
the individual in both forms of solidarity as will identification with the group. 
     Examples of unidirectional solidarity would be identifying with a group that does 
not recognize me, sharing a group’s interest when it is not a joint interest, or feeling 
empathy or trust for group members when none is returned. This type of solidarity 
does not generate obligations, though some motivation to act will be attached to it. It 
is sometimes the case that such expressional solidarity is an attempt to gain 
membership in or understanding of a specific solidary group. Fasting in support of a 
political group’s hunger strike, for instance, seems appropriate because one is trying 
to gain empathy for the situation experienced by those for whom one is fasting. 
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Monika, from example 3, may march in a parade for immigrant worker’s rights 
because she wants to express her similar interest and perhaps gain the trust of the 
group. These are actions that could lead toward membership in the immigrants’ 
group, but only if all four conditions of solidarity are bidirectional. The purpose of 
expressional solidarity, however, is generally not to gain membership in a robust 
solidary group, but to offer aid or support to that group. 
V. The Normative Aspect 
     Having articulated what I find to be the necessary conditions for solidarity and 
given some basic analysis to how they function together, I now turn to the question of 
how these conditions account for the normative nature of the relationship. Thus far, I 
have said little about the normative nature of solidarity. Durkheim thought that it 
was the division of labor that allows the individual to realize their dependence on 
society, and only after this awareness can morality develop. Other theorists have 
referred to solidarity as a normative moral relation.31 The literature, however, is 
often unclear about whether solidarity is motivation-generating or obligation-
generating. I will offer analysis on the normative nature of the solidary relationship 
by distinguishing how it motivates and how it obligates individuals as part of a group. 
I use the term motivation to refer to how committed one is to undertaking some act 
as a matter of moral psychology. I use the term obligation to mean something that it 
is wrong not to do. With this distinction in mind, I first ask how the four conditions of 
solidarity combine to motivate individuals to act in solidarity with a group, that is, how 
is expressional solidarity normative? 
     When the joint interest of a group is held by an individual who is not a member of 
that group, it is no longer a joint interest but a parallel interest. Specifically, it is a 
parallel interest in some group’s executive joint interest. For example, imagine the 
group of Western university students fasting to promote awareness of Palestinians 
fasting to promote a nonviolent Palestine. A university student may hope that her 
fasting gains awareness and promotes the interests of fasting Palestinians in Palestine. 
However, the University students’ actions are not marked by joint intention. Neither 
do the Palestinians rely on her actions in the promotion of their goal. The 
                                                
     31 Gould, Scholz, Mason, Hampton and a number of others call solidarity a 
normative moral relationship. Some speak of solidarity’s moral value and some refer 
to its obligations as moral. 
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Palestinians do rely on one another to fast—a single person fast is hardly a political 
statement—for the success of their executive interest, but they do not jointly promote 
their interest with out-group individuals who show them support. Though in fact, 
out-group individuals may do much to advance the group’s joint interest. 
     The disposition to empathy in the case of unidirectional, expressional solidarity 
entails that one is disposed to be empathic with members of the group one identifies 
with. This condition explains the content of many expressions of solidarity. When 
one is not actually a member of a particular group, but wants to show support and 
understanding for that group’s plight or position, an excellent way to better grasp 
that group’s reality is to act so as to develop actual empathy with the group (as 
opposed to sympathy or simply being disposed to be empathic toward that group). 
Hence, the fasting example above might be explained as trying to better understand 
the actual experience of the fasting Palestinians. It is important to note that to be 
moved to act so that empathy might be realized involves already being disposed to be 
empathic toward that group.  
     When the feature of trust is unidirectional, an individual will not be trusted or 
relied on by the group. Such an individual may be allowed to help support the 
group’s joint interest, but the group would not depend on them to do so. However, 
the desire to gain the trust of or to be viewed as trustworthy by the group is often a 
motivating reason. This is particularly true when one possesses the other features of 
solidarity (even if all of them are unidirectional), which involve holding the same 
interest as the group one wants to support, identifying with that group in light of this 
interest, and attempting to develop greater empathy with the group. To act in a way 
that betrays one’s own interest, identification, or feelings toward that group would be 
irrational. Such agents will act in a way that is trustworthy toward the group and its 
executive interest, even if the group does not recognize or trust them.  
      Group identification is perhaps the most important factor in explaining the 
motivation to expressional solidarity. It involves identifying oneself as a member of a 
group whose practices are viewed as linked to one’s well-being. Identification with 
any solidary group affects how one sees oneself as an individual. Hence, a person will 
be moved to act in ways that accord with his or her solidary groups and roles insofar 
as this person values these executive interests. The adoption of a solidary identity is a 
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reason for individuals to act in ways that promote the executive interest of the group, 
rather than expressing that value in some other way. So, while an individual will 
understand themselves to be in this kind of solidary relationship only if he or she 
already values the group’s ends, the fact of the group and its specific goals and 
interests specifies particular actions to the individual by which to express his or her 
value of the executive interest.  
     In the example of the fasting students, the students may have already valued the 
promotion of rights for marginalized individuals, and that may be why they want to 
express solidarity for the fasting Palestinians, but they could have expressed the value 
that led to their solidarity toward the Palestinians in a number of ways. They may 
have tried to support some other marginalized group, or simply shared information 
about Palestine and Israel, or they may not have been motivated to act in accordance 
to that value at all. However, because the students value a solidary group’s particular 
interests, and that group chose a course of action to promote its own executive 
interest (thus giving the students a group toward which to have expressional 
solidarity), the students now have reason to act to aid or support the group’s 
particular plans of action. In this case, it motivates them to fast, and to act in ways 
that support the Palestinian group’s interests. Under this description, rational action 
will involve acting for reasons that support an individual’s various identities, 
including whatever solidary groups one identifies with. 
     It is important to note that each of these features generate the same motivation for 
robust solidarity. Robust solidarity is different in that the features also generate 
obligations because the bidirectional nature of these conditions generates warranted 
reliance. Before considering these obligations, however, it merits mention that while 
expressional solidarity usually involves voluntary association, robust solidary groups 
do not always involve voluntary associations, but are still motivation-generating. For 
example, how do we account for the motivation of a native-born citizen in the 
nation-state or of a child raised in a family to act in solidarity with that group? My 
response is that in involuntary solidary groups, one is motivated because one values 
the shared group interest, regardless of how one became a member. If it is possible 
for an individual to stop valuing the interest, either through dissolution of the group 
or a change in one’s personal values, then one could leave the group. Many solidary 
 86 
groups have this exit capacity. However, membership in groups like the nations or 
the families in which we are raised are rarely ever relinquished. It is outside the scope 
of this project to explain why there are some associations and their related values that 
individuals seem unable to give up. I simply observe that one is motivated to act in 
accordance with involuntary solidary bonds because one still identifies with the group 
in a strong enough manner that one cannot cease to value its executive interest.  
     In light of the four conditions of solidarity, we can piece together an explanation 
of why they generate obligation when bidirectional or multidirectional in contrast to 
their motivation-generating status when unidirectional. My aim is to show how a 
certain kind of obligation is generated within robust solidary groups as I conceive 
them; it is not to identify obligations to be in solidarity. The four necessary conditions 
of solidarity jointly assure agents that they are warranted in trusting one another 
regarding the group’s executive interest. Mutual recognition of the group’s executive 
interest, members’ group identification, and a disposition to empathy for other group 
members serve as intensifiers that generate solidarity-trust. This trust generates 
weighty pro tanto obligations among members of the group to perform their roles 
within the solidary group. Insofar as interpersonal, participatory obligations are 
moral obligations, then solidary obligations are moral obligations. 
    When an individual signals that he or she is to be trusted regarding the executive 
joint interest of the group, whether intentionally or through negligence, that 
individual is then obligated to perform what he or she is being trusted to do. For, 
following Scanlon’s analysis, to reinforce a person’s reliance and then disappoint is to 
act in a way that the other would have reason to object to and thus morally wrongs 
that person.32 One might reject Scanlon’s contractual reasons behind the obligation 
to honor the expectations one creates. However, it remains that, given membership 
in a solidary group, one has a pro tanto obligation to perform the actions one has led 
others to trust one to do. If one fails to perform, the solidary group has standing to 
rebuke or even banish the individual and, minimally, trust will be lessened, as will the 
likelihood of being identified by the group as a member of the group. One’s standing 
in the group will be negatively affected.  
                                                
    32 Thomas Scanlon, "Promises and Practices," Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 
(1990):199-226. 
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     The normativity of solidarity involves morality insofar as the interpersonal 
obligation produced when the four conditions of solidarity are present is a moral 
obligation. The solidary relationship is not necessarily a moral relationship.33 The 
consequence of this is that solidary obligations are more similar in structure to the 
obligations of promise keeping than obligations of fair play. This is because fair play 
duties hinge on benefits received, whereas solidary duties involve signals of 
trustworthiness—and recognition of trustworthiness—with the group. The receipt of 
benefits is not enough to entail obligation. In fact, many individuals may receive 
benefits of a solidary group who are not members of that group, for example any 
member of the labor class who is not a part of the worker’s union from the example 
above.  
     Solidary obligations are pro tanto obligations; one’s membership in such a group 
generates weighty obligations to perform in compliance with the group’s interests. 
One might object that an upshot of this analysis is that I have labeled clearly immoral 
groups (e.g., pirates or Nazis) as solidary groups. However, this objection stems from 
an understanding of solidarity as a concept with moral content, but it is not. If a pro 
tanto solidary obligation conflicts with a moral ultima facie obligation ceteris paribus one 
ought to abandon the solidary obligation.34 Solidarity as a normative phenomenon 
can be understood without requiring that the group be moral. Whether or not the 
group is moral will hinge on the content of the joint interest and the reasonability or 
rationality of the practices and actions the group chooses in promoting that interest. 
The fact of a solidary relation has no relevance to whether or not the group itself is 
moral.  
     This account of interpersonal group obligation applies to situations in which 
people have been led, intentionally or through negligence, to rely on another 
individual. Such reliance is clearly the case in voluntary associations. However, there 
                                                
    33 This contradicts much of the literature on solidarity, which claims that it is a 
moral relationship. See among others, Durkheim, On the Division of Labor in Society ; 
Scholz, Political Solidarity; Harvey, "Moral Solidarity and Empathetic Understanding: 
The Moral Value and Scope of the Relationship,"  . 
    34 This analysis of pro tanto vs. ultima facie reasons is compatible with an account 
of contextualized reasons in which one does not have reason to do something unless 
there are no contradicting reasons against so acting. For example, a group of pirates 
may be in solidarity but do not have reasons to engage in piracy because better 
reasons outweigh the choice to be a pirate.  
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seem to be grounds to ask whether individuals are obligated to perform acts that 
promote the shared joint interest in involuntary solidary groups. To have obligations 
for which one has not volunteered or reinforced seems decidedly unfair and certainly 
anti-liberal. However, the actions one is obligated to perform in a solidary group are 
proportional to the strength of the solidary bond for that individual.  
     Given that a group has an interest in achieving and continuing its shared joint 
interest, roles, and duties within the group are assigned to members according to the 
level of trust they hold, which is warranted by the other conditions of solidarity. For 
instance, in a nation-state, one might reasonably expect that those who volunteer to 
take on more burdens for the association (e.g., political leaders) might feel solidarity 
with the nation more acutely than those who hold no role beyond that necessary for 
basic membership (e.g., native birth or not committing treason against the nation). 
Those with more burdens and duties have them because they are trusted by others, 
but also because they have chosen them. In the family, those who voluntarily take on 
obligations of parenthood have greater duties to the family than children who have 
no choice in their membership. And if the children, when able to take on more 
demanding obligations choose not to do so, or do not value the family’s shared joint 
interest (e.g., the value of association and promotion of members’ well-being), they 
can leave it. In the case of both the nation-state and the family, feelings of 
membership and identification may always linger. However, in the absence of the 
other conditions this is not sufficient for solidarity. Further, mere disapproval of the 
policies or workings of the institutions of a group does not warrant exit from the 
group; disapproval does, however, warrant attempts to change the group from within 
as in the case with Monika from example 3. To be in solidarity, whether one entered 
the association voluntarily or not, involves some personal endorsement of the group 
interest, and leads to corresponding obligations only insofar as other group members 
believe one can be relied on. I make no prescriptive claims about when a person 
should be in solidarity. My purpose has been to explain how the relationship itself 
generates obligations.  
Conclusion 
     Solidarity is a social bond that endures different normative interpretations. The 
four necessary conditions of solidarity offer a description under which solidarity is a 
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single concept with two different normative aspects. The fact that all four 
characteristics of solidarity are essential to both expressional solidarity and robust 
solidarity and furthermore, that these conditions can explain the normative 
differences in the two types of solidarity, not only lends the conditions support, but 
suggests that their interpretation herein is correct.  
     Solidarity has been subject to a variety of different treatments and inquiries. This 
has led to the perception of conflict between the various theories of solidarity. I have 
offered a reconciliatory account of solidarity, positing that diverging conditions does 
not rule out the compatibility of conditions. In my view, the bidirectional or 
unidirectional structure of these four conditions of solidarity determines whether the 
solidarity in question generates obligations or not. I have claimed that despite 
creating obligations which it may be morally wrong to not perform, solidarity is not 
an inherently moral relation, however, solidary groups may form around an interest 
in a manner that sometimes makes them so. We now turn to consider how solidarity 






















The Alternative Circumstances of Justice 
 
     In the previous chapters I have argued that any constructivist theory of justice 
must respond to the right account of the circumstances of justice in order for the 
principles of justice it grounds to be normative. In chapter 2, I claimed that the role 
of the circumstances of justice is to delimit the range of facts in human nature and the world in 
virtue of which we need principles of distributive justice and which make such principles possible. 
The circumstances of justice delimit the scope of justice, and more specifically, they 
identify when justice’s rules and duties can be applied. Historically, the most 
prominent accounts of the circumstances of justice have been those of Hobbes, 
Hume, and Rawls. These accounts are subject to the criticisms of exclusion and 
paternalism. I have argued that all of these theorists give accounts of the circumstances 
that ultimately fall short of fulfilling the function of the circumstances, given the 
challenge of trust. This has been the challenge of formulating the circumstances of 
justice in a way that the vulnerabilities of trusting are protected against and mutual 
trust is possible, rendering human cooperation and conceptions of justice necessary 
and possible. Chapter 3 gives an account of solidarity which includes a shared joint 
interest, identification with the group, a disposition to empathy, and mutual trust. On 
this account, mutual trust is already warranted among individuals within solidary 
groups. In this chapter, I will explain how exactly solidarity fits into the 
circumstances of justice. I will also offer a new account of the circumstances of justice 
that avoids the challenge of trust and problem of exclusion and is thus, minimally, a 
more appealing account than previous accounts. Accordingly, this chapter poses the 
question, what are the circumstances of justice?  
     To answer this question, I begin by first offering a very brief general account of 
what a duty of justice will look like. Only then do I ask in the following section, what 
facts in the world are required for principles of cooperation to be necessary and 
possible?  The answer to this question constitutes my own account of the 
circumstances of justice, which I understand to include: the fact of solidarity, 
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moderate scarcity of resources, and limited human understanding. In section III, I 
explain how my account has the additional advantages of incorporating positive 
aspects of earlier theorists’ accounts, and avoiding negative aspects of those accounts. 
I argue for new account by identifying reasons against the standard accounts of the 
circumstances of justice which I do not adopt myself. In the fourth section I move on 
to show how this new account responds to the challenge of trust. In the final section I 
argue that it also largely avoids the problems of exclusion and paternalism that I 
examined in the second chapter. I close by addressing a possible communitarian 
critique against my project as a whole. Chapter 5 will articulate exactly where and 
when I think this means justice should have application. 
    A quick note on methodology is necessary before beginning this chapter. The 
nature of this project (and justice itself, I think) is such that I could not claim to have 
found what is necessarily the account of the circumstances of justice. I offer this 
account as one that is an improvement over the standard account and, therefore, 
much closer to what Constructivists should be engaging with when they ask questions 
of justice. Because my criticisms of the standard account of the circumstances amount 
to criticisms of what the scope of justice should properly be, a number of the 
arguments in this chapter and the next will appeal to intuitions about the scope of 
justice. This may seem circular, but is ultimately unproblematic as it is not necessarily 
the case that because our traditional descriptions of the scope of justice are wrong, 
our intuitions on the scope of justice will also be wrong.  
I. Principles and Duties of Justice 
     A very brief account of constructivist justice and, more specifically, what its 
obligations and principles look like is necessary to answer the question of the next 
section, what facts about the world make human coordination and hence, principles 
of justice possible? Ultimately, the structure of constructivist justice is reciprocal. This 
is no new idea and I will do little to advocate it here though I do address it greater 
depth in chapter 6. For this chapter, it will suffice to point out examples of justice qua 
reciprocity to give an idea of the structure of principles of justice for Constructivists. 
Rawls explicitly endorses justice as reciprocity.1 Hume, in explaining that the merit of 
justice lies in its being advantageous to a society, also characterizes justice as a 
                                                
     1 See, for instance, his essay, “Justice as Reciprocity.” 
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reciprocal relation. Hume states that “every individual person must find himself a 
gainer, in balancing the account . . . Every member of society is sensible of this 
interest: Every one expresses this sense to his fellows, along with the resolution he has 
of squaring his actions by it, on condition that others will do the same.”2 Kant’s 
second formulation of the categorical imperative, “[a]ct in such a way that you treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in any other person, always at the same 
time as an end, never merely as a means”3 is read by Rawls as building reciprocity 
into the foundation of morality and justice. T.M. Scanlon thinks that justice lies 
within the scope of questions defined as what we owe to each other, where what is 
owed depends on others’ standing to reasonably reject certain principles. The result 
of this method is a structure of reciprocally endorsed or rejected principles. Drawing 
from these examples, it seems that one hallmark feature of a constructivist account of 
justice is reciprocal claim-making and duties.  
     Popular theories of rights outside the context of specific theories of justice also 
support the notion that rules and principles of justice are ultimately reciprocal. A 
Hohfeldian privilege states that A has a privilege to ϕ if, and only if, A has no duty 
not to ϕ.4 A Hohfeldian claim is structured as the opposite of this: A has a claim that 
B ϕ if, and only if, B has a duty to A to ϕ. Feinberg similarly stressed that to have a 
claim right involves having the grounds to demand or claim that to which one has 
the right.5 As Darwall emphasizes, this consists not only in another person having 
good reasons to do something, “but in the claim-holder’s authority to demand 
compliance and, perhaps, compensation for non-compliance.”6 Darwall offers an 
analysis of rights that is particularly useful. Rights are reciprocal. Before any claims 
can be made, before any privileges taken, grounds must already exist that give 
                                                
     2 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p.190., p.497-98. 
     3 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Thomas E. Hill and 
Arnulf Zweig, Oxford Philosophical Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
p.230. 
     4 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld and Walter Wheeler Cook, Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, and Other Legal Essays (New Haven,: Yale 
University Press, 1923). 
     5 Joel Feinberg and Jan Narveson, "The Nature and Value of Rights," Journal of 
Value Inquiry 4 (1970), p.151. 
     6 Stephen L. Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint : Morality, Respect, and Accountability 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp.18-19. 
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individuals the standing to legitimately make these reciprocal claims on one another. 
Regardless of whether this standing is the result of membership in a state or 
community, or participation in some type of trust relationship, the structure is the 
same: I have no claim against you if you cannot in turn claim the performance of 
certain acts or behaviors against me.7 At bottom, however, the duties, rights, and 
claims of justice are networks of claims and demands, not only between just two 
individuals, but also between all the individuals standing in a relation to make such 
claims on one another. That is, indirect as well as direct reciprocity marks the claims 
and duties of justice.8 
     A consequence of defining the rights and duties of constructivist justice as bi- or 
multi-directional is that this structure can be used to distinguish justice duties from 
moral duties. Bidirectional and multi-directional reciprocal duties will be justice 
duties, whereas if a duty is unidirectional it will be a moral duty. This is not to say 
that all moral duties are unidirectional. There may be some that are also reciprocal, 
but if a duty (excluding duties of prudence or other non-moral duties) is 
unidirectional, then it is a moral duty. This is not because we do not owe moral duties 
to someone, nor does it follow that other people do not owe those same duties to us. 
Rather, moral duties are owed to all individuals within the scope of morality qua 
status as an individual9 regardless of whether or not those duties are reciprocated by 
other individuals. Justice, however, is owed to individuals contingently, depending on 
their justice-status, which includes their ability to fulfill the relevant duties and 
standing to make relevant claims.  
     This leaves open the possibility of non-constructivist moral duties. For instance, 
while we may have justice duties not to kill one another, there may at the same time 
be moral duties that we not harm or kill. I point this out only to clarify that my 
discussion of the reciprocal nature of duties applies only to justice duties; it is 
compatible with my account for a Constructivist about justice to appeal to 
                                                
     7 Ibid.  
     8 For a full explanation and defense of this position see chapter 6, section VI.  
     9 I use the word “individual” rather than person or being in an attempt to stay 
neutral on who exists in the scope of morality, e.g. persons, animals, etc. 
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perfectionist considerations regarding moral principles, but not justice principles.10 It 
will sometimes be the case that we identify a duty that a group or government has 
which will not be a justice duty. It may be rare that governments in particular have 
moral duties that are not justice duties, but it does sometimes occur. J.S. Mill, for 
instance, explains the distinction between moral and justice duties as being, in part, 
based on whether they are reciprocal in structure (justice duties) or not (moral duties). 
He also thinks that legal duties come from both moral and justice duties, not merely 
justice as is often supposed.11 Humanitarian duties, such as giving aid, may be one 
such moral and juridical duty. After a natural disaster, a particular state and its 
constituents may feel they ought to aid the disaster-stricken nation as a moral duty. 
For instance, after Haiti was devastated by an earthquake, the U.S. government not 
only gave relief money and supplies, but also lent its troops to help clean up and 
rebuild. The point here is that my account of the circumstances of justice does not 
hinge on moral duties in any way. While I think that using the structure of duties and 
principles to distinguish between justice and morality is both useful and plausible for 
a constructivist account of justice, it has not been a dominant distinction. What 
matters for this chapter is simply that constructivism is not committed to reciprocal 
duties for all of morality. 
 II. Alternative Circumstances of Justice 
    Given these observations on the structure of duties of justice, we are now in a 
position to ask, What are the facts in the world and human nature that make human 
coordination and thus justice both possible and necessary? What are the 
circumstances of justice? I propose that the circumstances of justice are: (1) the fact of 
solidarity in the world, (2) moderate scarcity of resources, and (3) limited human 
knowledge.12  
                                                
     10 See for instance, Vinit Haksar, Equality, Liberty, and Perfectionism, Clarendon 
Library of Logic and Philosophy (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 
1979), chs. 1-3 for reasons this is necessary for Constructivists. Also, chapter 1, 
section V of this project addresses this in the discussion of Cohen and Rawls and 
foundational principles. 
     11 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Roger Crisp, Oxford Philosophical Texts 
(Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.93. This passage is discussed 
in further detail in chapter 6, section VI of this project. 
     12 Insofar as solidarity is type-identical with its conditions, another way of listing 
my alternative account of the circumstances of justice would be: capacities for (1) 
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The Fact of Solidarity as a Circumstance 
       In the previous section I argued that the structure of a principle or duty of justice 
is reciprocal. Fichte, in his Foundations of Natural Right, attempted to bring a Kantian 
perspective to rights. He argued that, “I must in all cases recognize the free being 
outside me as a free being, i.e., I must limit my freedom through the concept of the 
possibility of his freedom.”13 He calls this the principle of right, which is deduced 
from the concept of the individual.14 It seems fair here to ask, however, if I limit my 
freedom through the concept of the possibility of your freedom, does there not need 
to be some trust that you will do the same toward me, that you will limit your freedom 
through the possibility of my freedom? No single individual limiting freedom because 
of another’s freedom or autonomy, ensures that the other limit his or her freedom in 
return. This returns us to Hobbes’s puzzle of what can induce individuals to 
cooperate, to give up their absolute right to all things. The puzzle exists because 
Hobbes saw that giving up one’s absolute right to things must only be done with the 
assurance that one not be taken advantage of in this vulnerable position. That is, the 
sacrifice of one’s unlimited right to things must involve a guarantee that the 
vulnerability of that position is not taken advantage of. In chapter 2 the challenge of 
trust is described as this very challenge of formulating the circumstances of justice 
such that the vulnerabilities of trusting are protected against and cooperation is 
possible.  
      The standard accounts of the circumstances of justice found in Hume, Rawls, 
and to some extent, Hobbes do not agree on what circumstance creates the need for 
trust, nor on how that trust can get started so that human coordination is possible. In 
Hobbes, his circumstances are marked by mistrust, but the Leviathan is needed for 
cooperation to be possible; Hume likely thought it was generosity in conjunction with 
his sociability circumstance. In his early work, Rawls agreed with Hume but, later, 
                                                                                                                                     
mutual trust; (2) identification with the group;  (3) a disposition to empathy; (4) shared 
joint interest in conjunction with: (5) limited scarcity of resources and (6) limited 
human understanding. 
     13 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right : According to the Principles of the 
Wissenschaftslehre, ed. Frederick Neuhouser, trans. Michael Baur, Cambridge Texts in 
the History of Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
p.49. 
     14 Ibid.  
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his rather ambiguous condition of reasonable pluralism appears to attempt to 
respond to the challenge of trust. I propose that solidarity is the fact in humanity that 
renders human cooperation necessary and possible because of the role of trust within 
it. Solidarity not only gives rise to the need for individuals to coordinate outside of 
particular solidarity groups, it also helps coordination be possible insofar as 
individuals within solidarity groups are capable of a specific kind of trust which arises 
in the context of intensifiers where a system of claim-making and duty-bearing is 
already possible. Hence, in this respect, under the circumstance of solidarity, human 
coordination and hence, justice is possible. 
     Solidarity is a pervasive, reciprocal relationship between individuals that makes 
mutual trust warranted on a large scale, which is necessary for large scale 
cooperation. This is true not only of small groups involving frequent interactions, but 
also of large groups which will often have weaker solidary bonds. In chapter 3, I 
argued that even groups with weak solidary bonds will have some degree of mutual 
trust and that such trust is ubiquitous. This type of trust is not necessarily trust 
directed at particular individuals whom we know and interact with regularly; this 
type of trust is characterized by a network of trust. Each member of the solidary 
group or community shares some degree of this network-style solidarity-trust with 
other individuals in her groups. The subject and extent of trust will depend on other 
aspects of the group. In sum, mutual trust is necessary for human cooperation and 
justice, and solidarity as a circumstance of justice ensures that the right kind of 
mutual trust is possible. This in turn renders cooperation and justice qua reciprocity 
possible.  
     The fact of solidarity in humanity not only makes the prospect of human 
cooperation and justice possible, it also makes human cooperation, as necessary for 
justice, necessary for at least two reasons. First, in a world unregulated by justice, 
partiality toward one’s in-group members would be problematic. If one’s duties 
extend no further than one’s solidary groups, economic and social relations would be 
very limited; something like the family groups of ancient Greece before the rise of the 
polis. Such extreme particularism would necessarily disadvantage out-group 
members and create a need for justice to regulate behavior between groups in order 
to avoid a system based solely on power relations. The necessity of adjudication 
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between such groups is at least a part of what makes human cooperation necessary. 
Additionally, protection against in-group vulnerabilities should be protections of 
justice. In many solidary groups, weaker members are easily taken advantage of, 
whether in the nation-state, where the poor have a history of being more vulnerable 
than the wealthy, or in a family in which women and children have a long history of 
being the vulnerable members. In each of these cases, justice—or fair principles of 
human cooperation—is needed to protect individuals in such disadvantaged 
positions. I will give specific examples of this in the following chapter. 
      It is important that the circumstance of justice I am proposing is the fact of 
solidarity in human societies and not solidarity itself. The fact of solidarity in society is 
simply the fact that solidarity is pervasive in human society and that nearly all 
individuals are capable of it. Individuals are constantly participating in a myriad of 
solidary relations—from families, friendships, clubs, teams, communities, and 
organizations, to the nation-state and even intra-national groups whose projects and 
aims extend beyond traditional conceptions of solidarity. It is this fact of pervasive 
solidary relations that is a circumstance of justice, not a preexisting solidary group 
itself. That is, duties of justice are not contingent upon membership in a group and 
the corresponding identification with it or feelings of empathy with it. Justice depends 
upon being capable of being in solidarity with some people. Because it is the capacity 
to be in robust solidary relations that is a circumstance of justice, it is important to 
note that the capacity for strong solidary relations and weaker relations, such as those 
in large groups like nations or states, is all that is necessary for this circumstance of 
justice to be met. The challenge of trust highlights that a condition of justice and 
human coordination more generally is that people are able to trust one another 
sufficiently to coordinate effectively. Membership in some solidary relations and the 
demonstration of solidarity’s constitutive features via that membership represent a 
necessary threshold for relationships of justice. It is only after the necessary capacities 
for participation in justice are developed, particularly the capacity of mutual trust, 
that one can be reasonably trusted—or expected—to participate in a scheme of 
cooperation.  
     It is not the fact that the nation-state is in solidarity that leads to justice within the 
state or that makes the state an actor in a scheme of justice. Rather, it is that 
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solidarity exists in its people, and the need for coordination regarding distributive 
issues extends clearly to the nation-state.15 Historically, states have arisen from pre-
existing solidary groups (e.g., Israel, Kosovo, etc.), and also from situations that 
involved a common joint interest (e.g., colonial America’s shared interest in not being 
taken advantage of by the British, which later led to a sense of solidarity on a shared 
territory).16 In cases where solidarity already exists among individuals, the mutual 
trust necessary for human cooperation will already exist. In cases where a shared 
joint interest leads to the formation of a state, mutual trust may be slow to arise to a 
degree sufficient to render human cooperation possible and stable. However, as long 
as individuals are capable of solidary relations, the necessary threshold of mutual 
trust will be met.  
     Here one might easily ask, why solidarity? Surely mutual trust is enough to ensure 
that human cooperation—as necessary for justice—is possible. My response is 
twofold. First, on my view of mutual trust within solidarity, the other three conditions 
of solidarity—shared joint interest, identification with the group, and a disposition to 
empathy—act as intensifiers. They ground the robust nature of trust in solidarity 
which makes possible a system of indirect reciprocity (i.e., claim-making and duties 
whose exchange is not tit-for-tat). They also make this trust warranted. In sum, 
because of the other three conditions of solidarity, individuals are capable of indirect 
reciprocity, which is often required for the robust human coordination (necessary for 
justice) to be possible. Mutual trust alone, without the other conditions, could not 
ensure indirect reciprocity and widespread cooperative behavior beyond the 
individuals with whom one actually interacts. Solidarity also makes human 
cooperation and thus, justice necessary in a way mutual trust cannot. Not only do 
individuals need to be protected from the vulnerabilities of trust, strong solidary 
groups would have much more power than weaker groups. Justice is needed to 
                                                
      15 The circumstance of scarcity of resources, for example, requires coordination 
at a number of levels (e.g., municipality, regional, national) 
     16 Note for instance the existence of the weak central state in the Articles of 
Confederation compared to the stronger central state in the later Constitution in the 
American colonies. Arguably one reason colonials eventually accepted the stronger 
central government was that the need for it became more recognizable and the trust 
among them had grown sufficiently to make a strong central government seem like 
less of a risk. 
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temper such power relations. Mutual trust on the other hand, might call forth reasons 
that human cooperation is necessary, but it does not also lend itself to any possibility 
of human cooperation. Hence, it is solidarity and not mutual trust that makes the 
human cooperation necessary for justice, both necessary and possible. 
     The capability of being in solidarity is necessary to make possible the large-scale 
human cooperation that is needed for justice because it exhibits not only the ability to 
participate in mutual trust relations, it also shows a capacity for the other three 
conditions. This is the second part of my response to the question, why solidarity? 
Constructivist justice demands adaptability. As Requirement N illustrates, whatever 
renders justice necessary is what makes a principle of justice necessary and useful. As 
different societal values and principles give rise to the need for different principles of 
justice, conceptions of justice must respond to this. For instance, for hundreds of 
years women could not own property. This was rarely viewed as unjust. More 
recently, moral principles of equality between the sexes and the extension of equal 
dignity to both sexes have created a need for different conceptions of justice to deal 
with the problems of arranging the distribution of goods. According to constructivist 
theories of justice, the conception of justice must be responsive to facts that make 
distributive justice necessary. However, establishing the best conception of justice also 
requires that conception of justice to be responsive to other values and principles—
which will alter the concept of justice—as well as being able to adapt as these values 
and principles change. Solidarity involves features, beyond mutual trust, that render 
individuals capable of being sensitive to such changes in the values and principles of 
others participating in their scheme of justice, and it is that sensitivity which makes 
such changes possible. As demands and needs shift, so will the content of justice. 
Without the capability of solidarity, individuals will not easily be able to adapt to the 
changes necessary for some conception of justice to continue to meet a constructivist 
Requirement N over time, hence, they may not be able to engage appropriately in 
human cooperation over time. 
The Circumstance of Moderate Scarcity of Resources 
     Moderate scarcity of resources is perhaps the least contentious circumstance of 
justice. The fact that individuals want more goods in conjunction with the fact that 
they know they can obtain more of these goods via cooperation creates an 
 100 
environment that makes human cooperation both necessary and possible. Individuals 
are willing to abide by restrictions of justice in part because they will reap the rewards 
of greater resources if they do. Similarly, they look to justice as something that a 
society needs because they want continued possession of these resources. That is, 
property rights must be adjudicated in some way given that there is not a limitless 
supply of resources. The need for rules pertaining to ownership, transfer, and other 
aspects of property possession make some system of justice not only preferable, but 
also necessary for the society’s sustainability. It is my position that resources extend 
beyond property and include all matter of limited resources. Understood this way, 
resources will, minimally, include something like Rawls’s primary goods, but will 
extend further to include resources such as time, effort, and possibly others. Any 
resource which is finite to the extent that it is or could be scarce will qualify as the 
right kind of resource around which questions of justice can arise.  
     Following the lead of Hume, Hart, and Rawls, it is my position that this condition 
exists between the absolute extremes of total abundance, in which case no laws of 
property would be necessary, and an absolute dearth of goods, in which case there 
would be insufficient goods for any system of dividing them to have merit or be 
justifiably enforced. In the case of a dearth of goods, no system of fair trade would be 
possible, so rules and duties governing it would have little or no normative 
significance.  
The Circumstance of Limited Human Understanding 
     The fact of limited human understanding as a circumstance of justice is often 
contested. The circumstance appears most explicitly in Hart’s and Rawls’s accounts 
of the circumstances of justice, but as discussed in chapter 2 of this project, Hume 
makes some mention of it as well in the Enquiry. Having examined their work, I 
articulate here my own understanding of the salient features of this circumstance. In 
the literature, limited human understanding is often incompletely explained or read 
as a circumstance unintentionally included.17  
     Rawls explains that powers of reasoning and judgment are always limited and 
sometimes distorted by bias, anxiety, or self-absorption. He claims that these defects 
                                                
     17 Brian Barry, in his Theories of Justice, for instance, seems to interpret Rawls as 
accidentally including this circumstance. 
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are the natural human condition and contribute to the diversity of life plans. In the 
Enquiry, Hume argues that if man were sufficiently sagacious, he would always be 
aware of the strength of his interest, which binds him to the observance of justice, 
and that if he had sufficient strength of mind to always persevere in steady adherence 
to this interest, which is sometimes distant, then there would be no need for 
government or political society. Hart clarifies Hume’s position by arguing that as 
men have unequal understanding of the long-term interests that require justice, and 
as they also have unequal strength of good will, some system of rules is needed. He 
adds that it is because of this inequality in understanding the obligations of justice 
that we must create a system of laws to guarantee that those who are voluntarily just 
are not taken advantage of. This situation contributes to the need for human 
cooperation and a conception of justice, whatever that conception may be, so that 
free-riding is limited. Hart further supports this condition by pointing out that, even 
though the advantages and disadvantages of being just are generally known, 
individuals will generally obey for a variety of motives. Even so, “neither 
understanding of long-term interest, nor the strength or goodness of will, upon which 
the efficacy of these different motives toward obedience depends, are shared by all 
men alike.”18 In the absence of some rules and duties, many would succumb to the 
temptation of their more immediate interests.  
     In summary, some limited human understanding is needed for individuals to 
sufficiently discern and endorse rules of justice. For individuals to recognize that a 
system of justice is necessary, some amount of human understanding of these rules 
and duties must exist. Likewise, for human coordination to be possible, there needs to 
be sufficient understanding that a given conception may be a viable solution to the 
coordination problems of distributive justice. Conversely, imperfect understanding of 
what constitutes justice and long-term interests of individuals contribute to the need 
for an explicit system of justice in the first place. 
III. Circumstances Rejected 
     Before defending my view of the circumstances of justice, I first want to consider it 
in relation to conditions presented in the standard accounts of the circumstances of 
justice introduced in chapter 2 of this project. In some cases, my conditions 
                                                
     18 Hart, The Concept of Law, p.193. 
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incorporate aspects of these other circumstances. Compared to these other 
circumstances, my account is better at capturing what is necessary for human 
cooperation and justice while avoiding certain pitfalls. The analysis in this section is 
necessary to put me in a position to argue that the alternative account presented in 
this project fulfills the role of the circumstances of justice by delimiting the range of 
facts in human nature and the world by virtue of which the human cooperation 
necessary for distributive justice is necessary and possible. My reasons for rejecting 
alternative principles will also clarify how I understand the circumstances to work 
together and bring out salient features of the solidarity condition.  
     I begin with limited generosity because the reasons for abandoning this circumstance 
are clearest, having already addressed its shortcomings in chapter 2: those arguments 
are briefly reviewed here. Limited generosity in Hume, Hart, and the early works of 
Rawls serves the function of making human cooperation both necessary and possible. 
Without generosity, individuals would not show concern for others’ benefit or well-
being, which is a quality necessary to engender cooperation. Limited generosity 
renders human cooperation and justice necessary because, if we were perfectly 
generous, there would be no need for rules or a system of forbearances, as people 
would willingly sacrifice their interest for the advantage of others and almost never 
dispute whose interest should take precedence. Likewise, generosity will naturally 
form bonds and duties toward those nearest, such as friends and family. Justice is 
needed to make sure that those outside of these attachments are treated fairly.19  
     My criticism of this circumstance is that generosity in no way makes possible the 
kind of mutual reciprocity that makes the mutual trust required for human 
cooperation, that is, which protects against the vulnerabilities of trusting others.20 
Feelings and acts of generosity are unidirectional. While a philanthropist may be 
willing to donate resources or time to other individuals, expecting no return, these 
feelings of generosity do little to enable the sort of return necessary for human 
cooperation to be possible or reliable. For one to be willing to take on the constraints 
and forbearances of justice, with its reciprocal rights and duties, there must be some 
                                                
     19 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p.487. 
     20 The co-existence of the sociability circumstance does nothing to protect against 
these vulnerabilities either. It merely suggests that they may already be possible, but 
this is insufficient for trust to be warranted. 
 103 
assurance that other individuals are at least capable of feeling some mutual 
inclination toward such cooperative behavior. Solidarity, and more specifically its 
condition of a disposition to empathy, assures individuals that others take the same 
risks. This disposition to empathy, as previously discussed, does not require that 
actual empathy exist between individuals, rather that individuals’ attitudes make such 
empathy possible. This involves a willingness to hear information regarding certain 
relevant social facts, and a willingness to imagine the emotional experience of these 
facts.21 The fact of solidarity in society minimally ensures that all individuals who 
participate in any solidary relation have the capacity for this kind of empathy toward 
other individuals. Hence, my condition carries the benefits of the limited generosity 
condition. The fact of solidarity is not an assurance that individuals will feel empathy 
toward other individuals in a justice group, but it does limit justice to those who are 
capable of a disposition to empathy regarding the relevant social facts. 
     Whether or not some limited generosity does exist among individuals in a society 
is not here put in doubt. Rather, I contend that, given the structure of justice 
obligations and rights, the feeling that gives rise to the recognition of a need for 
justice, and the possibility of coordination, is a feeling that involves consideration of 
what other individuals are experiencing regarding certain relevant social facts. 
Simple generosity lacks the appropriate structure to make possible the mutual trust 
necessary to engender cooperation so that a system of claim-making and duty-
bearing is possible, whereas solidarity has this structure built into it. 
      Hume is sometimes credited with admitting a condition of sociability. (I included 
this in my discussion of Hume.) The sociability circumstance is primarily the fact of 
human interdependence. As I read Hume, this condition is something like a weaker 
version of the fact of solidarity. Though Hume’s condition may seem broader than 
the solidarity condition, he explains that if some completely asocial person existed, he 
would always “to the utmost of his power, challenge the preference above every other 
being, to none of which he is bound by any ties, either of nature or of interest.”22 If 
we understand this as individuals acting for only self-preferential interests because 
they have no ties to one another, we see that Hume too thinks that it is necessary for 
                                                
     21 This is discussed in chapter 3, section III. 
     22 Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, pp.191-92. 
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justice that we already have some other-oriented interests, and stand in certain 
interdependent relations with others. I argue that the fact of solidarity as a 
circumstance of justice guarantees that individuals who participate in justice are 
capable of the kind of relations with others which make mutual trust possible. The 
fact of sociability indicates only that such trust could be possible. In sum, it does not 
clearly protect against the vulnerabilities of trusting.  
     Having abandoned limited benevolence and sociability as viable circumstances of 
justice, I move on to reasons for rejecting Rawls’s fact of pluralism as a condition. In 
Theory, Rawls very closely follows Hume’s circumstances, though he explains limited 
human understanding so that it includes individuals’ diverging conceptions of the 
good. In Political Liberalism, Rawls limits his circumstances to moderate scarcity of 
resources and these diverging conceptions of the good, which he calls “the fact of 
pluralism as such.”23 This pluralism is the result of what Rawls calls the burdens of 
judgment, which include imperfect human understanding and the different life 
experiences that shape our normative judgments. These elements combined lead to 
conflicting, though reasonable, judgments about various political and normative 
facts. Because of this fact of pluralism in society, fair terms of cooperation should 
“meet the requirements of full publicity.”24 Only when these requirements are met is 
it possible for individuals to give reasons for belief, confident that this exchange will 
strengthen public understanding.  
     The fact of reasonable pluralism is a particularly appealing contender as a 
circumstance of justice. It easily contributes to Requirement N as discussed in 
chapter 1. It contributes to the concept of justice in that different plans of life and 
conceptions of the good are present in a society, and some method of reconciling 
them, so that reasonable plans and conceptions of the good are respected, is needed. 
On the other hand, it contributes to a conception of justice because the fact of 
pluralism is such that when it exists (in conjunction with the publicity condition), a 
certain liberal conception of justice will, ideally, be made possible. Individuals will 
understand and respect other individuals’ conceptions of the good, and be able to 
address reasons for their beliefs in certain principles. Even if the reasons are not the 
                                                
     23 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.66.   
     24 Ibid., p.68. 
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same, some general understanding of why they represent something valuable will be 
understood, and what Rawls calls an overlapping consensus will result. This allows a 
shared political conception of justice to be found.  
     The reason for rejecting this circumstance in my own account is that Rawls’s fact 
of pluralism and its corresponding burdens of judgment are, I believe, more clearly 
captured on my own account of the circumstances of justice. That is, my account not 
only includes considerations in favor of the fact of pluralism condition, it also explains 
more clearly why these considerations matter. The burdens of judgment are 
essentially the condition of limited human understanding (included in both my own 
and Rawls’s accounts), and the fact that all individuals have different experiences 
which, to some degree, affect their judgments. As Rawls puts it, “in a modern society 
with its numerous offices and positions, its various divisions of labor, its many social 
groups and their ethnic variety, citizens’ total experience are disparate enough for 
their judgments to diverge.”25 The fact of solidarity actually explains how and why 
these different experiences matter: because individuals are already normatively 
committed to some degree to these groups and their values and interests. Further, the 
divergent judgments to which Rawls refers make justice necessary since in the 
absence of full agreement, coordination is more difficult. The fact of solidarity as 
discussed in this project incorporates the issue of divergent judgment. In addition, 
this understanding of solidarity also recognizes that different groups will have 
different, divergent interests to advance.  
     A further reason for rejecting the fact of pluralism is that this condition, and its 
corresponding burdens of judgment, only contribute to an overlapping consensus 
which makes human coordination possible when this pluralism exists within a society. 
(Rawls himself always refers to this condition as existing with a society.) The fact of 
pluralism limits us significantly if we wish to apply a conception of justice more 
broadly, beyond a single society. Rawls limits justice to a pre-existing society because 
he wants to limit his conception of justice to groups of people whose relations 
“recognize certain rules of conduct as binding and who for the most part act in 
accordance with them.”26 Though a society is a cooperative venture, he also notes 
                                                
     25 Ibid., p.57. 
     26 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.4. 
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that it is marked by conflict, as people are not indifferent to how benefits of 
collaboration are distributed.27 As society is also a circumstance of justice for Rawls,28 
it both makes it likely people will cooperate on terms of justice, because they already 
cooperate, and gives rise to a need for justice, because the society is already marked 
by pluralism. Solidarity is also able to ensure that individuals have the ability to 
cooperate, and similarly gives rise to the need for a conception of justice insofar as 
diverging solidarity-claims must be adjudicated. It does so, however, without relying 
on potentially arbitrary social groupings (i.e., pre-existing societies, or shared 
recognition of rules), because it is the fact of solidarity in the world, not the existence 
of specific solidary groups, that makes human cooperation possible and necessary. 
Thus, my alternative circumstances of justice are able to capture the necessary and 
possible required by the fact of pluralism in a society without the potential problem of 
limiting justice to a single society, or group who recognizes certain rules. Instead, the 
fact of solidarity makes it much more likely that justice can exist between different 
societies as well as within societies.  
     This last advantage of rejecting the fact of pluralism circumstance is ensured only 
by also rejecting the same geographic territory circumstance from Rawls’s Theory. 
Presumably Rawls added the geographic territory circumstance to make it clear that 
individuals were in a position where they had to find some mechanism of 
cooperation. But, as with the previous circumstances, this condition once again limits 
justice to a single group or social unit, and rules out the possibility of international 
justice. Geographic boundaries, which are contingent on historic events, are not the 
right kind of reason to limit the scope of justice. As Rawls himself abandoned this 
circumstance, it will not be given further attention here.  
     I now turn to the equality condition found in the standard accounts of the 
circumstances of justice. The equality condition is unquestionably the most 
contentious of the conditions rejected on my account. The works of Hobbes, Hume, 
Hart, and Rawls, in Theory, have relied heavily on this condition. I have addressed 
the criticisms to this condition extensively in chapter 2 of this project, and will 
explain how solidarity avoids those same criticisms in section 5 of this chapter. 
                                                
     27 Ibid.  
     28 See chapter 2, section VI. Though Rawls never lists a society as a circumstance 
explicitly, he very clearly relies on it. 
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Therefore, in this section I only briefly address what equality does for the 
circumstances and how the fact of solidarity does this at least equally as well.  
     It is worth recalling at the onset that, in Theory, Rawls explicitly follows Hart in 
taking a Hobbesian position on equality.29 The Hobbesian interpretation of equality 
is essentially the rough equality of physical and mental powers: “their capacities are 
comparable in that no one among them can dominate the rest.”30 Hart explains that, 
although social rules requiring forbearances can be tedious at times, “it is at any rate 
less nasty, less brutish, and less short than unrestrained aggression for beings thus 
approximately equal.”31 He goes on to discuss international law, and explains that the 
reason for the “vast disparities in strength and vulnerability between states” is the 
inequality in brute strength between the states.32 According to these Hobbesian 
notions of the equality condition, equality makes human cooperation necessary 
because fear of attack from others motivates coordination and a desire for rules of 
forbearance. It seems that the fact of solidarity is in a better position than fear to 
motivate cooperation. This is because solidarity already involves cooperation. As 
Blackburn contends in a discussion of cooperation arising out of a Hobbesian state of 
nature scenario, “once co-operation is practised, it can be extended.”33 But it is not 
until cooperation has been established and individuals have some practice of 
cooperating that we could ever reasonably expect individuals to take on the 
constraints of justice. Ultimately, there is no reason to cooperate or trust others to 
cooperate if some form of cooperation does not already exist. 
     Additionally, as Hart’s observations on international relations make explicit, this 
type of rough equality seems to reduce justice to a system of power dynamics. I don’t 
deny that power is an important motivator in the need to coordinate; in fact, the fact 
of solidarity uses power to motivate justice as well. However, power alone cannot 
lead to coordination. According to the fact of solidarity, these power dynamics exist 
in a context in which individuals already have systems of cooperation. This makes 
coordination much more likely, and seems to represent global politics more 
                                                
     29 I discussed the division between the Hobbesian and Humean equality condition 
extensively in chapter 2.  
     30 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.110. 
     31 Hart, The Concept of Law, p.191. 
     32 Ibid.  
     33 Blackburn, Ruling Passions : A Theory of Practical Reason , p.193-94. 
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accurately than international relations qua Hobbesian equality. Consider, for 
instance, the plethora of international institutions designed specifically to aid 
cooperation: the United Nations, the European Union, NATO, etc. While power 
dynamics will always be a part of international relations, so will cooperation. 
Explaining justice in terms of equality endorses an interpretation of justice that seems 
to rely primarily on power dynamics, and ignores the cooperation that also marks 
many justice-relations. In short, the fact of solidarity not only avoids the problem of 
explaining coordination with those one fears, it also explains ensuing conceptions of 
justice as motivated not by power, but by other-oriented interests and a system of 
cooperation. Hence, the fact of solidarity makes human cooperation much more 
possible than the equality condition and equally necessary. 
     Humean equality, I argued in chapter 2, is somewhat different than Hobbesian 
equality. Equality in Hume does not appeal to brute force or power or even mental 
faculties, but rather is about “holding people to certain expectations about their 
relations to oneself.”34 To a limited extent, this seems like a reasonable demand for 
justice. If an individual is incapable of fulfilling certain justice expectations (e.g. duties 
and obligations), then that person cannot participate in a scheme of justice. The fact 
of solidarity is able to capture this. A person must be able to participate in relations 
involving mutual obligations in regard to a certain joint interest in order to be in 
solidarity. Failure to comply with duties within a group will result in that person 
being demoted or even removed from the group. Being capable of successfully 
participating in solidary groups entails being able to fulfill expectations as well as 
holding others to one’s own expectations. This captures the sentiment behind the 
Humean, making one’s resentment felt. It seems then, that solidarity can carry the 
advantages of the equality circumstance. 
      The problem with Hume’s circumstance of equality is that it makes the scope of 
who participates in justice contingent on actually having appropriate sympathy with 
other individuals. This is, intuitively, a bad reason for excluding individuals from 
justice. Similarly, the Hobbesian equality condition excludes individuals and states 
who do not share equal power or mental capacities with the majority of people in a 
                                                
     34 Postema, "Making Resentment Felt: Hume on the Environment of Justice," 
p.11. 
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given group or state. This is also an inappropriate kind of reason for excluding 
individuals from the scope of justice. This criticism was called the problem of 
exclusion. Another advantage of my own account of the circumstances of justice over 
the standard accounts discussed in chapter 2 is that my account avoids these 
problems. I further consider the problem of exclusion and the related problem of 
paternalism in section 5 of this chapter, but first, I revisit the challenge of trust from 
chapter 2 and the challenge it presents for the circumstances of justice.  
IV. The Challenge of Trust 
      Analysis from chapter 2 shows us that responses are needed to two questions to 
determine whether my alternative circumstances of justice are preferable to the 
standard account: (1) Does the alternative account fulfill the function of the 
circumstances of justice by, minimally, ensuring that the mutual trust necessary for 
human cooperation is met? (2) Does the alternative account avoid the problem of 
exclusion and the Humean problem of paternalism? A positive response to both 
questions does not necessarily mean that the alternative account of the circumstances 
is the best possible account of the circumstances of justice. Affirmative responses will 
give us an account that is, minimally, better than the standard account, assuming no 
new problems present themselves. I will address these questions in turn.  
     Recall from chapter 2 that the function of the circumstances of justice is to delimit 
the range of facts in human nature and the world by virtue of which we need principles of distributive 
justice and which make such principles possible. This definition is taken from the accounts of 
the role of the circumstances put forth most clearly by Rawls and Hume. I have 
argued that Hobbes, Hume, and Rawls each fail to meet this function in their 
accounts insofar as none of them offer adequate solutions to the challenge of trust. In 
Hobbes’s case, his circumstances make the mutual trust necessary for the right kind 
of human cooperation needed for justice impossible. Hume gets somewhat closer to 
responding to the challenge of trust with his addition of benevolence, but still fails to 
account for the right kind of trust. In Rawls’s earlier Theory, he is so closely guided by 
Hume that he is susceptible to the same criticisms. In his later Political Liberalism 
Rawls may plausibly succeed in getting around the problem for trust. However, his 
two circumstances of limited scarcity of resources and the fact of political pluralism 
are left sufficiently vague that we know little about why these circumstances are the 
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circumstances of justice. It is thus unclear whether they really meet the challenge of 
trust.  
     We turn now to the question at hand, Does my new account of the circumstances 
of justice meet the challenge of trust? In other words, Does it protect against the 
vulnerabilities of trusting and render cooperation, and thus justice, necessary and 
possible? My response is that it does. Consider Blackburn’s argument that without 
some degree of mutual trust, it is unreasonable to expect cooperation to come into 
existence.35 Solidarity requires that some mutual trust already exist. Solidarity is a 
relation between individuals in which a network of mutual trust already obtains. I 
argued in chapter 3 that to accept the obligations and duties of a solidary group, to 
be in good standing in such a group, one must be capable of mutual trust. This is 
because one’s position in the group will be compromised if one shows oneself to be 
untrustworthy. Further, to commit oneself to a solidary relation, one must also be 
able to trust that other individuals will be able to fulfill their duties and obligations. 
Otherwise, one would never take on the sacrifices and burdens that are sometimes 
required for membership. The fact that this type of trust, the right kind of trust 
necessary for cooperation, exists in all solidary groups makes plausible the possibility 
of cooperation between groups. It also makes cooperation possible for all individuals 
who exist within any such relation, even regarding individuals outside those groups.  
     Solidarity does not only involve mutual trust; coordination and cooperation are 
also necessary if the shared joint interest is ever to be achieved. The obligations of a 
solidary group are mutually distributed around a goal. Further, one only has the 
status of having duties and standing to make claims within a group insofar as one 
stands in a relation of mutual trust with other members of the group. Both of these 
features support the reciprocal structure of duties and obligations of justice as 
outlined in the second section of this chapter. The duties, rights, and claims of justice 
are multidirectional, between all individuals standing in a relation to make claims on 
one another.36 Individuals can only be capable of making such claims, and therefore 
within the scope of such duties and rights, if they are capable of solidarity. This 
ensures they are also capable of participating in a distribution of duties in order to 
                                                
     35 Blackburn, Ruling Passions : A Theory of Practical Reason, pp.191-99. 
     36 Solidarity generates a system of indirect reciprocity which, I argue in chapter 6, 
is one of the kinds of reciprocity necessary for justice. 
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achieve some shared joint interest. Furthermore, they will be capable of behaving in 
trustworthy ways and be capable of the empathy, shared joint interest, and 
identification with a group that makes such trust warranted. In sum, the right kind of 
mutual trust is captured in my alternative account of the circumstances of justice.  
     In terms of the circumstances of justice, the already existing capability to practice 
mutual trust means that human coordination and justice are possible. In Hobbes, the 
lack of mutual trust in the circumstances led to his requiring an all-powerful 
sovereign. In Hume, we saw that the benevolence and sociability conditions provides 
some assurance that others will be capable of  performing in a way that enables 
human cooperation. From Hume’s perspective, if I can count on you being generally 
benevolent toward me, then my taking on the duties associated with justice is not a 
significant risk. The problem with the unidirectional nature of this type of 
benevolence is that it does not give adequate assurance that another even can 
perform. The fact of solidarity provides this assurance, because it guarantees that 
individuals within the scope of justice are capable of the kind of mutual trust necessary 
for claim-making and reciprocal duties. Only if individuals were capable of such 
mutual claim-making would we reasonably hold them responsible for such duties and 
grant them standing as claim-makers within the scope of justice.  
V. The Problem of Exclusion 
     We turn now to the second question regarding the problems of the equality 
condition, Does the alternative account avoid the problem of exclusion and the 
Humean problem of paternalism? In this section, I argue that my alternative account 
of the circumstances of justice does avoid the problems of exclusion and paternalism. 
The problem of exclusion is ultimately the charge that the equality condition limits 
the scope of justice too narrowly for reasons that should not matter for questions of 
justice. In Hobbes and Rawls, justice depends on certain power relations. In Hume, 
it is contingent upon actually sharing feelings of empathy/Humean sympathy with 
other individuals to a degree that resentment may be felt.  
      Hobbes’s theory of justice is subject to the problem of exclusion because he limits 
the scope of justice to only those who are of equal strength and ability. These are not 
good reasons for excluding individuals from the scope of justice: obligations of justice 
ought to exist outside the scope of those with whom we have roughly the same 
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power. In Hume, the problem of exclusion exists because his equality condition limits 
who counts within the scope of justice for the wrong kind of reasons. Hume famously 
imagines a species of creatures that intermingles with men, who are fully rational (so 
capable of rule-following), but who are “incapable of all resistence, and could never, 
upon the highest provocation, make us feel the effects their resentment . . .”37 Toward 
this species, Hume claims, we would lie under no obligations of justice. We do, 
however, owe them certain moral duties. In chapter 2 of this project, I argued that 
Hume’s passage, which has come to be known as his equality condition, does not 
exclude individuals from justice based on power or rationality as Hobbesian equality 
would have it. Rather, Hume is excluding individuals based on whether they can 
make their resentment felt. Individuals can make their resentment felt through 
sympathy,38 which is easiest when there is a strong continuity and resemblance 
between themselves and others. The trouble for Hume, then, is not that justice will 
depend on power and rationality, but that justice will depend on our actually having 
a certain amount of sympathy for the individuals with whom we stand in justice 
relations. Making justice contingent on the actual presence of empathy/Humean 
sympathy with other individuals is, once again, not the kind of reason for which we 
want to exclude individuals from justice. Obligations of justice ought to exist—and 
surely do exist—outside the scope of our empathy. Finally, I have argued that Hume 
is subject to an additional criticism, the problem of paternalism with regard to the 
rational creatures that lay outside the scope of equality. The worry is that if one lies 
under no restraints of justice toward this species, we cannot accommodate the 
intuition that paternalism is justified only as “a function of that person’s rational 
competence.”39  
     At first glance, it may seem that solidarity is not the right kind of reason for taking 
someone to be within the scope of justice, as it may generate one of the same 
problems as equality: it is too thick a demand. To actually stand in a relation of 
equality with someone requires fairly robust mental, physical, and psychological 
                                                
     37 Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, p.190. 
     38 Recall that sympathy in Hume is closer to the modern notion of empathy than 
the modern understanding of sympathy. 
     39 Ridge, "David Hume, Paternalist,"  p.162. 
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background conditions. Additionally, equality is such a generally imprecise notion, 
that it is unclear what exactly is required in such a relation. The fact of solidarity in 
the world may seem nearly as problematic. After all, the conditions for solidarity as 
discussed in chapter 3 call for the presence of several factors. Solidarity requires 
being able to share a joint interest, which involves interpretation of that interest. 
Solidarity requires a shared identity, which involves recognition of others and valuing 
whatever that group identifies as its shared joint interest. Solidarity calls for a 
disposition to empathy, which requires a shared emotional configuration with some 
other individuals within the group. Finally, in order to be in a solidary relation, an 
individual must be capable of mutual trust. This involves being able to make claims, 
and standing to be held responsible by others for duties to the group. If the four 
conditions for solidarity are considered together, the conditions for solidarity seem 
too demanding for justice-status to hinge upon. Intuitively, justice seems most needed 
when the protections of in-group status are not afforded. If justice is contingent upon 
feelings of solidarity with someone, then, as in Hume’s account, my own account 
would require that certain feelings actually exist for a justice relationship. This, 
however, is avoided on my explanation because my condition is not solidarity, but the 
fact of solidarity in human societies.  
     To be in a solidary group, one must already share the dispositions and attitudes 
necessary for solidarity with one’s group. My claim, however, is not that justice maps 
on to solidarity or requires its attitudes and dispositions. Instead, the fact of solidarity 
merely requires that one share solidary relations with some group of people. It is having 
the capacity to be in a solidary relation that is necessary for human cooperation, not the actual 
existence of solidarity. This is a much thinner notion as the fact of solidarity is 
ubiquitous. But ubiquity does not necessarily make the fact of solidarity the right kind 
of reason for inclusion in justice’s scope. Rawls, in his “Kantian Constructivism in 
Moral Theory,” makes nearly the same argument about equality as I do here about 
solidarity. There, he explains equality in the following way: “everyone is equally 
capable of understanding and complying with the public conception of justice . . . On 
this basis, together with each person’s being a self-originating source of valid claims, 
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all view themselves as equally worthy.”40 Hence, he claims all individuals should be 
represented within the principles of justice.  
     The problem with this Kantian form of equality is that it doesn’t ensure that those 
one sees as equal view themselves as equals in return. Reciprocity is implied, and 
may often be the case, but seeing oneself as having equal standing, and being 
understood to have equal standing by others, do not amount to the same thing. 
Justice requires both. Rawls is correct to bring the capability to understand and 
comply with justice into his circumstances of justice. His error is simply that viewing 
oneself as equal does not ensure that everyone is viewed this way. One must also 
have the capacity to view others as having claim-maker standing. To participate in 
justice, one must be capable of acknowledging oneself simultaneously as a maker of 
claims, and one against whom claims can be made.  
     This baseline for participation in justice may strike some as objectionable, as 
making justice contingent on the wrong sorts of reasons (as so many before me have). 
However, if we consider cases of individuals who are outside of this standing, I 
believe it becomes clearer that the fact of solidarity condition is neither too thick a 
notion, nor the wrong kind of reason. It is only those who are not capable of 
solidarity, not those who could never be in solidarity, that the solidarity condition 
excludes from justice’s scope. Those who fall outside of the scope of justice will only 
be individuals whose relationship to those within the scope of justice is that of a moral 
patient. I consider two examples of such individuals now, and then the case of a 
sociopath’s relation to justice.  
   In the first example, Patient A is someone in a permanent vegetative state. Patient 
A is not capable of solidarity and on my understanding of the solidarity circumstance, 
would lie outside the scope of justice. Though this may seem a repulsive conclusion 
to some, it strikes me as intuitively correct. Patient A can neither perform duties of 
justice nor reap the benefits of participation. This is the kind of person we would be 
right to treat paternalistically as a function of their rational competence. It would not 
only be impossible to reasonably expect them to fulfill duties, they could not make 
the right kind of demands either. Such a person will still have moral claims against 
us—indeed it seems certain that they do—but these will be unidirectional claims that 
                                                
     40 Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,"  p.546. 
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have no reciprocal nature, the sort of claims found in Hume’s benevolence condition 
or Kantian imperfect duties. Society will have moral duties toward these individuals 
such as to treat them with dignity, to honor their previous decisions about their 
situation (e.g., no unnecessary measures wishes), and not to cause unnecessary pain. 
It should be emphasized, however, that these are moral duties, not duties of justice. 
In recent years civil courts have made rulings on how such individuals can and 
should be dealt with (e.g., the Terri Schiavo cases which were debated in U.S. courts 
from 1998-2005). In these instances the court was not asking what kind of duties and 
rights Patient A had; they asked who had the right to make decisions on Patient A’s 
behalf. Individuals like Patient A may seem to be included in the scope of justice 
because of the attention given to them by the courts, but they are not. The disputes 
involve separate agents within the scope of justice who are making claims against 
each other about who gets trusteeship and the powers that come with it. Patient A 
herself has no justice rights, but courts may still take an interest in her moral rights 
being upheld. 
      Patient A is admittedly an extreme case. There will perhaps be individuals who 
are not capable of solidarity, but still claim some ability to interact with individuals in 
the world. In my second example, Patient B is someone who has been in solidary 
relations in the past but, because of a degenerative brain condition, is no longer 
capable of such relations. There is something appealing about characterizing this 
person as within the scope of justice. After all, she clearly used to be. However, as 
long as she is incapable of the reciprocal structure of claims and duties, she will not 
have rights and duties of justice, although (as in the case above) she will still have 
some moral rights. A similar case will be addressed in much greater detail in the 
following chapter. 
      There are undoubtedly other cases that may make my account of the scope of 
justice here seem too narrow or seem to exclude individuals for the wrong kind of 
reasons. The cases above are meant to illustrate that if one is incapable of solidarity, 
one is incapable of the kind of human cooperation necessary for distributive justice. 
These examples, of course, do not encompass the full range of situations in which one 
is incapable of solidarity, but they give a clear idea of why such individuals are 
viewed as outside justice’s scope. There is another type of person who may seem 
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excluded from my account, which will certainly raise objections. Some sociopaths, it 
seems, may never have been capable of solidarity. A sociopath may have been raised 
in a family, but never felt any solidarity with the other members of the group. Such a 
person may never have been capable of solidarity, but it seems odd to say they are 
outside of the scope of justice. In fact, it seems that an important role of any justice 
system will involve how to deal with such individuals. In these cases, the answers are 
not straightforward. If someone is genuinely not capable of solidary relations, then 
that person is not within the scope of justice. Such a person may still be subject to the 
rules of a criminal system insofar as their actions may threaten the rights of people 
who are within the scope of that system. In civil issues (e.g., having voting or property 
rights), a sociopath may rightly be viewed as a freeloader as they make claims without 
the corresponding reciprocity. Such individuals are extremely rare (Historically, 
individuals who have committed the greatest atrocities have still usually been 
members of some solidary groups, for example Hitler, Stalin, Milosevic, etc.) and 
ordinarily, sociopaths who are outside the scope of justice, would probably be placed 
by courts into psychiatric care rather than into prisons. Once again such a person 
would still be subject to a number of moral rights and duties. It is simply their 
inability to participate in the reciprocal duties of claim-making that excludes them 
from justice.  
     Finally, we turn to the problem of paternalism, which was a charge against Hume 
specifically. Hume argues that a rational species, if not able to make their resentment 
felt, would fall outside the scope of justice. As Hume puts it, “we should be bound by 
the laws of humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures, but should not, properly 
speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them.”41 Paternalism, 
however, only seems justified as a response to an individual’s lack of rational 
competence. Further, the constraints of paternalism are constraints of justice. The 
worry arises becasue, according to Hume’s view, fully rational individuals could be 
treated paternalistically and have no standing for objection. This is not a worry for 
my alternative account of the circumstances of justice. Though rationality will play 
some role in an individual’s ability to be in solidary relations, many individuals who 
                                                
     41 Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, p.190. 
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are not fully rational are capable of solidarity (e.g., children, the majority of the 
mentally infirm, etc.). So, those who are treated paternalistically would only be 
treated as such because they are unable to participate in justice—as a function of 
their rational competence. Those who lack the competence (including basic 
rationality) to be capable of solidary relations will fall outside the scope of justice. 
This would include individuals such as patients A and B from the previous examples 
and infants. Such individuals would still be able to claim the protections of morality. 
That is, they would still hold moral claims against us, simply not justice claims. In 
these cases, treating such individuals paternalistically seems justified precisely because 
they are not capable of making decisions for themselves. In sum, according to my 
alternative account, paternalism is only justified if an individual’s intellectual and 
attitudinal capacities are seriously impaired. As long as individuals are capable of 
solidarity, they are afforded the protections of justice against paternalism. This is a 
thinner condition than Hume’s requirement that, to be afforded the protections of 
justice, one must be able to make one’s resentment felt. On my alternative account, 
paternalism is justified only when individuals cannot make choices for themselves.  
     In sum, my alternative account of the circumstances of justice seems able to avoid 
the problems of exclusion and paternalism that plague the standard accounts. In 
doing so it also avoids some general constructivist criticisms. Allen Buchanan, for 
example, in his “Justice as Reciprocity versus Subject-Centered Justice,” criticizes the 
constructivist project for reducing rights to contributions.42 If equality determines 
one’s justice-status, this is a legitimate worry. A major problem for some standard 
accounts is that only those who contribute to the cooperative surplus would have any 
right to social resources as this is a major determinate of equality. While I have 
excluded some classes of individuals from the scope of justice and ensuing rights and 
resources, by doing so on grounds of the fact of solidarity, I have narrowed the 
category of those excluded and also explained why some exclusions are necessary. A 
desire to include all individuals within the scope of justice does not mean that this is 
possible. I contend that my account avoids the majority of the criticisms of exclusion 
while still capturing the intuition that justice does entail reciprocity. 
                                                
     42 Allen Buchanan, "Justice as Reciprocity Versus Subject-Centered Justice," 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (1990): 227-52, p.230. 
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VI. Communitarian Critique 
     There is still a general criticism of my project as a whole that I have not yet 
addressed, that of the Communitarian. In this chapter I have argued that the 
circumstance of solidarity, in conjunction with the circumstances of limited human 
understanding and moderate scarcity of resources, renders the alternative 
circumstances of justice much more precise and discriminating than the standard 
accounts. In the next chapter I will demonstrate in much greater detail how broad 
the scope of this alternative account is. Before addressing this issue, however, it seems 
necessary to reject a communitarian criticism against any project that would either 
support or expand the circumstances of justice within civil society.  
     The criticism, as found in Michael Sandel’s work, charges that justice sometimes 
works to the detriment of friendship and community. Sandel argues that the 
existence of the circumstances of justice can be morally pernicious. He explains that 
an increase in justice (or the prevalence of the circumstances of justice) can come 
about in one of two ways. It can arise when there is injustice, or “it can occur where 
before there was neither justice nor injustice but a sufficient measure of benevolence 
or fraternity such that the virtue of justice had not been extensively engaged.”43 In the 
former case there is a clear moral improvement; in the latter, when an increase in 
justice “reflects some transformation in the quality of pre-existing motivations and 
dispositions, the over all moral balance might well be diminished.”44 Sandel’s 
criticism relies on it being true that justice and other moral virtues, such as 
benevolence and fraternity, are inversely proportional.  
     Sandel’s reason for believing this to be the case is explained when he offers his 
interpretation of Hume. In Treatise, Hume states, “Encrease to a sufficient degree the 
benevolence of men, or the bounty of nature, and you render justice useless, by 
supplying its place with much nobler virtues, and more valuable blessings.”45 Sandel 
derives the inverse relationship he sees between justice and benevolence from this 
passage, explaining that “to invoke the circumstances of justice is simultaneously to 
concede, implicitly at least, [that] the circumstances of benevolence, or fraternity . . . 
                                                
     43 Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge 
[Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p.32. 
     44 Ibid.  
     45 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, pp. 494-95. 
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prevail in so far as the circumstances of justice do not prevail.”46 It should be noted 
that Sandel concludes this from looking at only one half of Hume’s argument. Hume 
does explain that if benevolence were unlimited there would be no need for justice. 
But he also explains that if there were no benevolence, justice would not be necessary. 
Hence, it is “limited generosity” and not its absolute abundance or dearth that Hume 
cites as a circumstance. For neither Hume nor Rawls, with whom Sandel also takes 
issue, is the virtue of justice meant to replace or fulfill a role that benevolence and 
fraternity would be equally capable of fulfilling. Rather, it is only when there is a 
need for some set of principles or rules—and benevolence and fraternity cannot solve 
the issue—that a need for justice is generated. Even then, however, for Hume and 
Rawls, there must still be sufficient benevolence that human coordination (and 
justice) will be possible. Hence, as the circumstances of justice are not inversely 
proportional to other moral virtues, Sandel’s interpretation is incorrect. Further, his 
charge that an increase in the circumstances of justice, and thus in justice, can result 
in a moral loss does not follow. More importantly, the communitarian critique is not 
pertinent to my own account of the circumstances which puts something very much 
like fraternity and benevolence right at the core of the necessary conditions for 
human cooperation and justice.  
Conclusion 
     A final observation about the equality condition merits mention before leaving 
equality behind. One of the advantages of making equality a circumstance of justice 
is that it provides a benchmark for treatment of individuals. If people have standing 
to participate in justice because they are morally equal, it readily follows that the 
rules of justice should involve treating individuals equally. The fact of solidarity (and 
my alternative account in general) provides no such obvious correlation. It gives no 
goal for what principles of justice ought to look like, neither, however, does it prohibit 
equality as a benchmark of justice. According to my alternative account, a possible 
conception of justice could still have equality of individuals as a starting point for the 
rules of justice that would follow. The circumstances merely render some system of 
human cooperation and justice necessary and possible. They provide content only 
insofar as they clarify the subjects about which justice is concerned. They do not—
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and should not—transfer values onto those subjects. This, in fact, nearly reverses the 
roles of equality and reciprocity found in contemporary constructivist theories of 
justice. Typically, conceptions of justice will make equality a necessary condition of 
human cooperation, and argue that somehow the conception of justice is one of 
reciprocity. Instead, I make the fact of solidarity, which necessarily includes 
reciprocal claim-making and mutual trust, a prerequisite for human cooperation and 
justice. Equality can still be a feature of a conception or theory of justice, but justice 
no longer depends upon it.  
      In this chapter I have proposed an alternative formulation of the circumstances of 
justice. I began by first, outlining the reciprocal structure of justice rules and rights. I 
next established my account of the circumstances of justice, which I believe best 
captures the structure of these rights. I then defended my account against features in 
the standard accounts. While there can be no test as to whether my account of the 
circumstances is the definitive account of the circumstances of justice, I have shown 
that my account is more plausible than the standard accounts. I argued that my 
account avoids the two major criticisms of the standard account, defined in chapter 2 
as the challenge of trust and the problem of exclusion. If I have been successful in 
both addressing these criticisms and presenting a reasonable argument, then my 
alternative account of the circumstances of justice should provide, minimally, a better 



















The Scope of Justice 
 
     In chapter 2, I argued that a problem with the standard accounts of the 
circumstances of justice, found in Hobbes, Hume, and Rawls, is that they limit justice 
far too narrowly and this leads to the problem of exclusion. There are a number of 
cases that fit our intuitions about when questions of justice arise, and corresponding 
obligations and rights exist, which do not fall within the scope of the standard 
conception of the circumstances. If the circumstances of justice are articulated 
correctly, they should, ideally, not only capture a plausible descriptive explanation of 
when questions of justice arise, but they should provide a plausible guide for cases 
when it is uncertain whether questions of justice apply. This chapter tests my own 
characterization of the circumstances of justice by considering whether more of our 
intuitions about the normative scope of justice are accommodated by this approach 
than by the standard account. This chapter also considers whether my own account 
offers guidance when we are uncertain if something falls within the scope of justice.  
     To test my account, I will begin this chapter by considering situations where 
questions of justice arise, but which are excluded from the standard account of the 
circumstances of justice in Hobbes, Hume, and Rawls. In each of these cases I will 
show how my alternative approach can make room for the case in question and 
include it within the circumstances of justice. I will follow these inclusive cases with 
discussion of cases that the standard accounts include in the scope of justice, but 
which are excluded on my own account. From this discussion will emerge a critical 
element that marks each of the inclusive situations but not the exclusive situations. 
Accordingly, the latter half of this chapter asks, what is the principle behind these 
inclusive cases? This question aims to reveal the types of situations in which justice is 
applicable; situations where duties and obligations of justice do, in fact, exist. I will 
answer this question with a discussion of social power as a plausible subject of justice 
and conclude that even though social power is a good candidate for the subject of 
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justice, any constructivist subject of justice will still be normatively constrained by the 
scope of the circumstances of justice. 
I. Inclusive Cases and the Circumstances of Justice 
      It is important to keep in mind in the discussion of Hobbes, Hume, and Rawls 
that it is not their larger theories of justice that I am addressing herein, but merely 
their descriptions of the necessary conditions for questions of justice to apply. It will 
sometimes be the case that their accounts of the circumstances of justice are more 
inclusive than their theories of justice, or that their respective theories of justice 
attempt or claim to be more inclusive than their circumstances of justice allow. I 
largely lay aside any problems of scope generated by their theories of justice and 
focus only on the scope of justice found in their respective descriptions of the 
circumstances of justice.  
Case 1: Because of the growing demand for new electronics in the West, more e-waste is 
being generated every year. Many European nations have more waste than they 
can manage to make safe or store, so they pay undeveloped African nations to take 
their waste or sell them unusable electronics at minimal prices so they can be 
stripped for their elements (e.g., iron, silver, gold, etc.). Over time, lead from 
recycling and dump-sites leaks out of the old cathode ray electronics, enters stream 
and well water and introduces lead into the water source for a small African 
village. Many members of the community (and recycling plant workers) begin to 
experience the harmful effects of lead poisoning.  
      Intuitively, case 1 seems to belong fully within the scope of justice; it simply seems 
to be a case in which there is a need for justice but no mechanisms of enforcement. It 
is important that we not mistake the need for justice for the possibility of justice. We 
now turn to various accounts of the circumstances to see if this case is compatible 
with any of them. 
      For the sake of chronology I look first to Hobbes and ask whether this case would 
fall under the scope of justice on his view. Recall that in Hobbes, the circumstances 
of justice—his story of when it is the case that the obligations of justice exist—involve 
certain conditions: limited scarcity of resources (including the conflict of interest that 
follows), rough equality (between individuals), individuals who are instrumentally 
rational, and individuals who desire peace. With these conditions in mind, case 1 falls 
outside the circumstances of justice.  
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        Hobbesian equality prohibits this case from being included in the scope of 
justice. Insofar as one reads Rawls’s use of the equality condition in his Theory as 
Hobbesian equality, Rawls would also exclude this case from the scope of justice. In 
Hobbes, equality refers to equality of mind and body, which includes both limited 
confederacy and cunning against others. In case 1 there is no equality between the 
wealthy European nations and the underdeveloped African nations. While it may be 
possible for the African nations to join in confederacy with one another or with some 
other nation, it is doubtful that such a union would do anything to lessen the 
disparity in hard power between the nations participating in case 1. Hence, case 1 is 
out of the scope of the Hobbesian and early Rawlsian circumstances of justice. 
     Whether Hume would consider case 1 an instance in which questions of 
justice have application is not as definite. Recall from chapter 2 of this project 
that what is called the equality condition in Hume is not equality as such, but the 
ability to make one’s resentment or resistance felt, where resentment is a passion 
that is experienced via Humean sympathy or empathy. In short, the application 
of justice to this case depends on whether the stronger party (the European 
nations) actually feels enough empathy with the weaker group that the weaker 
group’s resentment is felt by the stronger.1 So, it could be the case that this 
instance is included in Humean justice; however, it may not be. Inclusion would 
depend on the empathy of the Western nation. This kind of contingent status 
seems as intuitively unappealing as leaving the African village out of the scope of 
justice because of its lack of equal power. However, as Hume’s commentary on 
women and Native Americans in the Enquiry makes clear that he disapproved of 
the way that the Natives were treated by the Europeans, we might conclude that 
Hume thought empathy should be extended to the Natives and, by extension, to 
most humans. Unfortunately, his analysis of making resentment felt does not 
prescriptively support this. Hence, we must conclude that, even if Hume found 
such exclusion wrong, his theory cannot support this judgment. In sum, it seems 
that the African village people would not stand in a relationship of justice to the 
European nations.  
                                                
     1 When I speak of the state feeling empathy or sympathy, I mean something like, 
when sufficiently many of a state’s citizens feel empathy toward someone/something 
that it is required for the state to act in response to that empathy.  
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      We turn now to my alternative account of the circumstances of justice to see if it 
would include case 1 within the range of instances in which questions of justice apply. 
To begin, limited human understanding and limited scarcity of resources definitely 
obtain. While there is certainly disparity in the economic resources involved, they still 
exist to the degree that there are enough goods to provide for everyone’s survival 
given some cooperation, which is the lower threshold of this condition. The fact of 
solidarity requires a little more consideration. I mentioned in chapter 3 that a 
cosmopolitan response to such a global problem is to simply claim that solidarity 
exists and therefore duties of justice also exist. On my interpretation of solidarity, 
however, there is no solidarity between the two groups; the wealthy European 
nations and the poor African village have few connections or associations. This, 
however, does not exclude the case from justice. On my view the fact of solidarity in 
the world is what matters. That both groups are capable of forming solidary bonds, 
and consequently are capable of trust and the obligations and claims that come with 
such relationships, is all that is necessary for human cooperation to be possible.2 This 
condition is met in case 1. 
     In sum, my alternative description of the circumstances of justice is better able to 
fit our intuitions on this case than the standard accounts. One could here object that, 
as it is not possible to enforce any rules to control the impact on the local Africans, it 
is not possible to include this in the scope of justice. My response is that this objection 
confuses the circumstances of enforcement with the circumstances necessary for 
human cooperation and ensuing duties of justice to exist. The European nations in 
this case do have duties toward the African villages in question. This would be true 
even if the African village never makes claims against these nations or, if they did 
make claims, if no enforcement mechanisms ever existed to require the performance 
of those duties. We move now to a second case which considers interpersonal 
relations and the scope of justice. 
Case 2: A couple, Jack and Jill, move in together and decide to split the cooking and 
cleaning duties evenly as they both have demanding jobs and neither can spare the 
                                                
     2 Recall from chapter four that the capability of solidarity is distinguished from 
feeling empathy insofar as it requires merely some understanding and an imagination 
that is able to affect one’s attitude, not that one feel empathy with others as in Hume. 
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extra time. Jill hates cooking and Jack enjoys it so Jack is allotted the job of 
cooking the meals, while Jill is given the task of cleaning up after them. Over time, 
Jack cooks less and less, making more of a mess when he does cook. Jill slowly 
takes on more of his share of the cooking as well as having to clean more when he 
does cook. Jill becomes increasingly overwhelmed by the amount of work she now 
has to do, but says nothing as she doesn’t feel she has any standing to complain. 
She rationalizes that she is, after all, the woman in the relationship. 
     Initially, case 2 may strike some as outside of the scope of justice. This arises, I think, 
from recent trends in thinking about justice only in the context of institutions. But even a 
simple practice such as the co-dependency of cooking and cleaning can be an institution. 
This case will appear to most people as involving some sort of injustice. That Jill feels she 
has no standing to speak up and try to change the situation she is in is unjust in a very 
important way. On the standard accounts of the circumstances of justice, however, this 
case seems to be excluded from justice’s scope.  
      With regard to Hobbes’s circumstances of justice, the parties are rational and 
forward-looking. We can assume they desire peace. This may, in fact, have 
something to do with Jill’s discomfort in saying anything to Jack about neglecting his 
share of the chores. Jack and Jill seem to be roughly equal, even if there may be some 
background cultural conventions that lead them to view themselves as unequal. So 
far, it looks like Hobbesian justice may have room for this case. But there is one final 
condition to consider: limited scarcity of resources. Hobbes’s concrete examples of 
limited resources include cattle, wives, children, others’ persons, and other physical 
goods.3 In case 2, physical resources are not in dispute, apparently excluding the 
situation from Hobbes’s justice. In fairness, there is a risk of anachronistic error in 
forcing Hobbes’s state of nature to apply to the scope of all justice. Had Hobbes 
mentioned any non-physical resources, we might more plausibly extend his scope of 
resources. As he did not, and as I believe my interpretation to be a plausible reading 
of Hobbesian justice, case 2 appears to fall outside the scope of Hobbesian justice.  
     Turning to Hume’s account of the circumstances of justice, we can assume that 
the equality condition is met in case 2. The two individuals living together in the 
above situation certainly seem likely to have sufficient Humean sympathy with one 
another that each could make his or her resentment felt by the other. The sociability 
                                                
     3 Hobbes, Leviathan , p.88. 
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condition is met. Yet, it is unclear whether the limited scarcity of resources condition 
is met. Hume, like Hobbes, seems concerned primarily with the resources of physical 
property. His examples of resources in the Enquiry represent “external conveniences:”4 
fare, fountains, beverages, clothes, and land (and possibly labor including land’s 
tillage and navigation). In the Treatise he speaks of property as the objects in a relation 
to oneself. However, Hume also explains that in a state of abundance of goods, no 
labor would be required; instead, “[m]usic, poetry, and contemplation form his sole 
business” and “every other social virtue would flourish.”5  Hence, on the upper 
bound of the resources condition, there is an absolute abundance which involves so 
much leisure that there is no need for justice. Leisure is not the kind of resource 
Hume is explicitly concerned with distributing. Nevertheless, his mention of such 
abundance of resources that “conversation, mirth, and friendship [form one’s] sole 
amusement,”6 does at least carry the implication that time and leisure—having time 
for friendship and mirth—are considered resources. In sum, it is unclear whether 
Hume would extend his understanding of resources beyond physical goods, but 
certainly it is possible.  
     Interestingly, it is the limited generosity condition that clearly rules case 2 out of 
the scope of Humean justice. On the overabundant generosity side of the limited 
generosity spectrum, Hume argues that, in such a state, “the whole human race 
would form only one family . . . without regard to property.”7 He continues that it 
may be difficult to find examples of this in the world, “but we may still observe, that 
the case of families approaches towards it” until the distinctions of property is lost. 
He insists that “between married persons, the cement of friendship is by the laws 
supposed so strong as to abolish all division of possessions.”8 For Hume then, it seems 
that the domestic alliance in case 2 actually has too much generosity for justice to be 
useful and consequently it would fall out of the circumstances of Humean justice. 
     In Rawls (who is guided by Hobbes and Hume), the conditions of equality and 
generosity are met in case 2. This case involves individuals who exist in the same time 
                                                
     4 Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals , p.183. 
     5 Ibid.  
     6 Ibid.  
     7 Ibid., p.185. 
     8 Ibid., p.185. 
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and geographic territory and between whom mutually advantageous cooperation is 
possible. We can assume that the individuals have conceptions of the good which 
they wish to pursue. In fact, this could be a reason Jack is neglecting his duties at 
home. He thinks they interfere with his pursuit of his life plans and his conception of 
the good. Whether this is the case or not, it is plausible that this condition obtains 
and, for the sake of the argument, we will assume here that it does. We are left, then, 
with the question of moderate scarcity of resources. Although Rawls claims to follow 
Hume, he states that “moderate scarcity [of resources is] understood to cover a wide 
range of situations. Natural and other resources are not so abundant that schemes of 
cooperation become superfluous.”9 In his discussion of the circumstances of justice, 
Rawls only explicitly addresses “natural and other resources,”10 which is 
unsatisfactorily vague. Later, however, in his original position, he is concerned with 
the distribution of primary goods (i.e., rights, liberties, income, wealth, and the bases 
of social self-respect). His description of natural primary goods is even broader, 
including intelligence, imagination and health. So, while Rawls’s discussion of the 
circumstances leaves it doubtful that he would include this broad list of resources 
from the original position, rather than the restricted list of his circumstances of 
justice, it is at least possible. The lack of clarity in what Rawls considers to be the full 
range of relevant resources leaves it, at best, unclear whether case 2 would be 
included in the Rawlsian ambit of justice. The inclusion of case 2 in Rawlsian justice 
ultimately depends on how committed Rawls was to the Humean view of the 
circumstances, as opposed to the wider conception of goods implied in his discussion 
of the original position. 
    According to my alternative description of the circumstances of justice, case 2 
would be included in the scope of justice. We can assume that the fact of solidarity 
obtains, as does limited human understanding. My own explanation of the moderate 
scarcity of resources explicitly includes not only physical goods and resources, but is 
broadened to include Rawls’s primary goods, time, and any other similarly scarce, 
valuable resources.11 In case 2, time is the resource being abused. As Jack neglects his 
                                                
     9 Rawls, A Theory of Justice , p.110. 
     10 Ibid.  
     11 I intentionally keep this as the slightly vague “any similarly scarce, valuable 
resource” as I intend for scarce resources to represent the idea that resources can 
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obligations and makes Jill’s chores harder, he is essentially depriving Jill of her finite 
resource of time—and probably the bases of social self-respect. The problem is that 
Jill feels she has no standing to address the issue and assert her right to her own time. 
According to my alternative account of the circumstances of justice, while Jill may 
not feel she can assert this right, according to a previous agreement she does in fact 
have this right and the standing to claim it. Jack, minimally, owes her reasons in 
support of his behavior. It is likely that an alteration in the agreement or his 
increased efforts to restore their practice of sharing the cooking and cleaning is in 
order. The situation has all the characteristics necessary for human cooperation to be 
possible in such a way that justice is possible. According to my account, case 2 is an 
example of injustice. 
Case 3: In the initial drafting of a new Nation-State’s constitution, the drafters decide 
that all white males will have the right to vote for their representatives and on 
some legislation. In particular, this excludes women and the non-white slave class 
within the society. Some women and members of this slave-class are upset that 
they are not allowed to vote. Nothing is done to change the original decision. This 
is simply a matter of who participates in politics and who does not. Women and 
non-white slaves have always been excluded. No real protests ever arise despite 
some of the marginalized individuals being angry about their situation. 
     Case 3 will strike most individuals as a gross injustice, probably because it is 
such a familiar case. The US constitution, among others, was drafted within a 
similar context and only after decades of protest was the right to vote extended to 
the non-white slave class or women. Few people can now reflect on this reality 
and not still be enraged at the past injustice. But would this situation fit into the 
standard account of the circumstances of justice?  
     This case appears to satisfy the Hobbesian conditions of forward-looking 
rational individuals who desire peace. We can assume there is a moderate 
scarcity of resources in this situation. There is a marked lack of clarity regarding 
the equality condition in case 3. Intuitively, it seems obvious that the slave-class, 
the women, and the white men in this case should all be considered equal. 
                                                                                                                                     
exist in a state of scarcity and that any such scarce resource could, potentially qualify 
as the kind of scarce, valued resource necessary for justice consideration. I do not 
want to offer a list that may be interpreted too narrowly as the only possible scarce 
resources relevant to justice. 
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Initially, this may strike some as similar to the situation in case 2 in which Jill had 
standing to claim a right, but simply did not feel that she could. The right still 
existed, however, so it may seem that equality, even unrecognized, would still 
exist. Equality, however, is a much messier notion than a right.  
     A right will either exist or not. This is not to imply that there is universal 
agreement on when rights do exist. Nevertheless, if one can show that a right 
does indeed exist, it follows that the right can be claimed. To show that a right 
exists, theorists will tend to appeal to salient facts about a given situation, 
including facts about human nature. Equality, however, often is a much more 
subjective notion and how one views others all too frequently determines who 
counts—or does not count—within some justice-group. In case 3, the white men 
do not view the slave-class or the women as sufficiently equal and it is unclear if 
these men are positioned in such a way that they could have known the women 
and slaves are equal. In modern debates it is popular to speak of equality as moral 
equality but it is in no way clear that this is what Hobbes had in mind. Hobbes 
speaks of equality in mind and body such that no person can rule the others. 
While this may be true regarding the women in case 3, it is not true regarding the 
slave-class who are in fact ruled and owned. At best, it is unclear whether Hobbes 
would consider case 3 as meeting the equality condition with regard to the 
women, though even if he does he would clearly still exclude the slave class.  
     Hume’s conditions of sociability, limited benevolence, and limited scarcity of 
resources are met in case 3. What is called his equality condition is where his 
account excludes case 3 from justice. Hume makes justice dependent on making 
one’s resentment or resistance felt, which is a function of one’s sympathy with 
another. Case 3 excludes the slave class from this sympathy; therefore case 3 is 
outside the Humean scope of justice. Given Hume’s commentary on women and 
Native Americans in the Enquiry, we can assume he thought such exclusion was 
wrong and that sympathy should be extended to most, if not all, humans. 
However, as his analysis of making resentment felt does not prescriptively support 
this, we must conclude that at least the slave class of case 3 would have no 
grounds of justice—only humanity—to object to their exclusion from voting.  
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     I now turn to Rawls. Excluding the equality condition, Rawls’s other 
conditions all seem to be met in case 3. There is the possibility of cooperation and 
limited human understanding, the fact of pluralism seems to mark the people, 
and we can assume that there is limited generosity. This brings us to Rawls’s 
equality condition. Rawls’s explication of equality in the circumstances requires 
that “no one among them can dominate the rest.”12 We are left with the same 
problem presented by Hobbes’s account: women may or may not be included 
and slaves are definitely not. Case 3 is exactly a case of one group of people 
dominating others, which would exclude the case from the scope of justice. 
However, if we turn to the conception of equality (qua moral equality) found in 
Rawls’s “Kantian Contractualism in Moral Theory,” the case may be included in 
the scope of justice. There he says, “everyone is equally capable of understanding 
and complying with the public conception of justice; therefore all are capable of 
honoring the principles of justice and of being full participants in social 
cooperation throughout their lives.”13 Rawls clearly wants to avoid the 
implications of the equality circumstance of justice. Though Rawls explains 
equality in this later work as though it was an inclusive idea, this is clearly not 
always the case. Not everyone is capable of complying with rules of justice and 
participating in social cooperation. In still allowing equality to mark the 
participants of his theory of justice, he opens his account to worries of exclusion. 
In his later work his exclusions are limited to those who actually cannot 
participate in social cooperation or honor principles, but the reason for this is left 
unstated. (Largely because Rawls avoids the problem by stating the role of 
equality inclusively.) It appears that Rawls may want to include case 3 in the 
scope of justice, but he doesn’t give us reasons why equality is inclusive, and why 
when it isn’t—and equality cannot always be inclusive—that is right. In sum, this 
case could fall into the Rawlsian scope of justice, depending on how far one 
understands Rawls to follow Hobbes. At best, however, we are lacking reasons for 
inclusion on his later view. 
                                                
     12 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.110. 
     13 Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,"  p.546. 
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     Finally, we turn to my alternative view in which case 3 clearly falls within the 
ambit of justice. Case 3 displays limited human understanding and we can 
assume that limited scarcity of resources also obtains. The fact of solidarity is also 
present. In fact, the exclusion and lack of equality could be understood as an in-
group/out-group divide with solidarity—specifically, white male solidarity—
actually causing the divide. Additionally, all of the individuals in question will be 
capable of solidarity and, even if a few are not, it is still the case that the society is 
marked by the fact of solidarity. In sum, case 3 falls clearly within the scope of 
justice on the alternative account. This allows us to explain why excluding 
women and slaves from the privileges of a legal system is unjust. 
II. Exclusive Cases and the Circumstances of Justice 
      Thus far, I have given three examples and corresponding analyses to show 
that my alternative circumstances of justice include many cases that intuitively fit 
with our understanding of when justice is applicable, but which the standard 
accounts do not allow. These examples answer the demand for the circumstances 
of justice to include the full range of situations we understand to be just or unjust. 
This effort is in tension, however, with a demand to exclude situations that do not 
give rise to questions of justice. Justice, after all, must have merit apart from other 
obligations. Finding a balance between these two demands within the alternative 
account of the circumstances of justice will show, minimally, that the alternative 
account is a plausible account of the circumstances of justice. Accordingly, I now 
turn to two examples that will generate mixed intuitions regarding whether they 
should fit into the scope of justice. I will show that they are excluded from my 
alternative view and offer analysis to support this exclusion.  
Case 4: In a famine-struck nation in which hundreds of thousands of individuals have 
already died and many more will soon die if they cannot get food, the government 
seizes certain rough food sources (e.g., grains, milk, and clean water). It redistributes 
the goods to the most needy individuals to prevent their dying. The government 
tries to give some compensation to the farmers from whom the food was seized, but 
it cannot afford to fairly compensate them. Hundreds of farmers take a fairly large 
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loss compared to what they had hoped to sell their products for. However, 
thousands of lives are saved or sustained through the redistribution.14 
     This case will strike many as falling within the scope of justice. It is, after all, the 
government who is acting on behalf of its citizens. According to my alternative 
description of the circumstances of justice, this case would not fall within the purview 
of justice. The case meets two of the conditions of my alternative account: the fact of 
solidarity and the limited human understanding conditions. It fails, however, to meet 
the limited scarcity of goods condition. This condition, recall, exists as a mean 
between a lack of the minimally necessary goods, when coordination is not possible, 
and an abundance of goods, when coordination is not needed. In this case, the 
dearth of goods is such that whatever rules of justice do exist in this nation (regarding 
the institutions of property and food), it is not wrong for the government (or any 
other individuals or group of individuals) to disregard them in order to feed its 
citizens (or fellow citizens). On my view, this means there is a moral consideration—
namely, the moral right to life—that is stronger than the rules of justice in this 
situation. According to my understanding, we have justice rights and duties which 
correlate with some moral duties, however, justice duties (e.g., I may have a duty not 
to steal from you) exist at least partly because you have this same duty regarding me. It 
will sometimes be the case that morality trumps justice. The reverse will also 
sometimes be true in cases where the need for some justice duty is stronger than the 
need for a particular moral duty in a given context.15 For instance, Robin Hood may 
have had a duty of morality to give to charity, but this can hardly be said to trump 
his justice duties not to steal, even if he did so to give to charity. If I am right, that 
justice duties are reciprocal, and moral duties have a different—usually 
                                                
     14 This case is similar to a case given by Hume and which has been addressed 
repeatedly in literature on the circumstances of justice as a situation that should be 
within the scope of justice. See for instance, Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, pp.96-
98, and Hubin, “The Scope of Justice,” pp.9-10. Hume, however, actually uses the 
example to show that a dearth of resources falls outside the scope of justice, in Hume, 
Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.186. I 
use this example to respond to a possible criticism of my own account, namely, that it 
is too narrow because limited scarcity of resources should not make any difference to 
the normative application of justice. 
     15 For clarity, I understand justice to be a subset of morality. So that duties of 
justice are a species of moral duties, but a different kind that can be weighed against 
other moral considerations.  
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unidirectional—structure, it will sometimes be the case that governments ought to 
enforce moral as well as justice rights and duties.16  
     I am claiming that case 4 falls entirely outside the normative application of justice 
and that justice’s duties and rights are in this case suspended, at least with regard to 
rules of property and resources. There seem to be grounds for an objection here, that 
after the government has seized the farmers’ property, regardless of whether this act 
is unjust, justice is now more necessary than ever.17 The farmers need justice to receive 
fair compensation, and the starving citizens need it to ensure they each get a share of 
the goods that have been seized. And human cooperation is still possible because there 
are a number of just ways to distribute the seized food. For example, every person 
could get an equal amount, or an amount based on need, rather than simply seizing 
the food and killing others to ensure that one has enough for oneself and one’s 
family.18  
     My response to this objection is in two parts. First, the claim that under the 
conditions of case 4 justice is more necessary than ever (or as necessary as ever) may 
be true, but in this situation justice (or more specifically the human cooperation 
necessary for justice) is not possible and so it cannot be delivered. Equal distribution or 
distribution of resources according to need is not necessarily a distribution of justice, 
only a distribution that aims at achieving the moral end of keeping the most people 
alive (the reason the food was seized in the first place). The intuition that an equal 
distribution is better than killing others to ensure you have enough to sustain yourself 
is well-founded, but this is because it is morally wrong to end someone’s life—or put 
her life in danger by stealing her food—not, in this case, because there are 
corresponding justice duties not to do so.  
     The second part of my response to this objection is that there may still be some 
duties of justice that obtain, given that some human coordination is possible. For 
instance, once the grain has been seized and redistributed, I may refrain from 
stealing your grain so that you will refrain from stealing mine, and we may even 
                                                
     16 See chapter 4, section I and chapter 6, section VI for full discussions of the 
structure of moral vs. justice duties. 
     17 See Vanderschraaf, “The Circumstances of Justice” and Hubin, “The Scope of 
Justice,” among others that give arguments along these lines. 
     18 This is actually Broad’s suggestion in Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, pp.95-
98. 
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make an agreement of some sort to act in this way. There is no reason to think that 
these duties toward one another are not justice duties. They are reciprocal duties that 
we all hold in common with one another which exist under the circumstances of 
justice. Notice, however, that once the grain has been redistributed the limited 
scarcity of goods condition is met. If it is not met, if several families are still starving, 
and they steal from other families so that they too can eat, I think it fits many 
people’s intuitions to say that this is not an act of injustice, but survival. Survival 
seems to supersede justice, probably because a moral right to life seems to supersede 
justice rights to property.  
     In sum, in case 4, the government’s seizure of the farmers’ foodstuff and its 
ensuing redistribution is not, on the alternative account, within the scope of justice. 
Stronger moral considerations would take precedence. However, this does not 
involve an indefinite suspension of justice. When all three conditions of justice are 
met, justice will apply, provided its duties and rights, that is the right kind of human 
coordination regarding specific goods is both necessary and possible. 
     Before putting aside the discussion of the parameters of justice according to my 
alternative account of the circumstances of justice, I turn to one final case. 
Case 5: Sam is twenty. She has a genetic degenerative brain disease. Until the age of 
eighteen she functioned as normally as anyone else. She went to school and did well; 
no one knew the condition existed. In the last year she has declined significantly. 
She has lost enough motor function that she is now confined to a wheelchair and 
even needs help eating. She still shows signs of experiencing some emotions, but 
even these are usually reflective of her state of bodily comfort. Sam’s parents receive 
some government assistance to take care of her. Recently, the government tax 
service charged her for not paying taxes; a judge ruled her incompetent and 
exempted her from all legal duties.  
     Case 5 will strike most people as correct: significantly disabled individuals 
should not have to pay taxes or meet other civic requirements like serving on a 
jury. The fact that Sam receives government assistance to help with her medical 
care does not seem to alter this. According to the standard accounts of the 
circumstances of justice, Sam may be considered as within the scope of justice. It is 
unclear whether she meets the equality condition, but she may. In the later work of 
Rawls, she would be seen as morally equal. On Hobbesian equality, she may be 
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considered to be in confederacy with those who would act for her. On Humean 
equality, we can imagine people would have enough sympathy with her that her 
resentment could still be felt. On the Hobbesian and Humean accounts of the 
circumstances of justice, Sam would be likely to be included in justice’s scope. 
Interestingly, it is on both of Rawls’s accounts that case 5 is excluded from the 
circumstances of justice.  
     On Rawls’s early account, the circumstance of limited human understanding 
excludes Sam from the ambit of justice. After all, without some effective degree of 
cognitive competence, one would neither understand why the rules of justice are 
needed nor how to follow such rules. Sam could do neither. In the formulation of 
the circumstances of justice found in Rawls’s Political Liberalism, however, he 
abandons the limited human understanding condition but adopts the fact of 
pluralism. He explains the fact of pluralism as the divergence of life plans and 
conceptions of the good, in addition to taking one’s plans to be worth pursuing.19 
Sam, however, has no life plans or conceptions of the good. On the Rawlsian scope 
of justice, she would not be included. However, most theorists who deal with the 
standard account criticize Rawls for including his early condition of limited human 
understanding. Those theorists prefer to include merely limited scarcity of 
resources, limited generosity, and equality. According to this popular version of the 
standard account of the circumstances of justice, Sam falls within the ambit of 
justice. 
     Based on my alternative explanation of the circumstances of justice, Sam would 
be excluded from the scope of justice because she is not capable of solidarity. The 
fact of solidarity makes human coordination possible in the way necessary for 
justice, because it requires that individuals exhibit the necessary capacities for 
taking on responsibility in a reciprocal relationship. Sam, however, cannot 
experience the capacities to trust, to be empathic, to take on duties or have 
interests, etc. Sam pays no taxes, serves on no juries, and owns no property 
because she cannot fulfill any duties of justice. Her society does not owe her 
assistance with her medical treatment for reasons of justice; rather, they offer it to 
                                                
     19 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.66. 
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her because it is a good thing to better someone’s quality of life.20 If the case were 
altered and Sam had accidentally killed someone while driving, having had a 
seizure before her initial diagnosis, at best we could call the situation tragic; we 
could not call it murder. What distinguishes murder from what the animals might do 
to one another is the fact of solidarity: the capacity to trust and be trusted, to feel 
empathy or be disposed to it, to take on obligations and to claim them against 
others, and the various other abilities required by the capacity of solidarity. Rawls’s 
circumstance of pluralism, which involves the ability to plan, is one component of 
this, but it does not clearly explain what in particular makes something a wrong of 
justice.  
     One might object that if Sam is killed, it would still be murder, and so she is still 
in the scope of justice. My response is that the wrong captured by this intuition 
responds to the violation of the moral duty not to kill, and does not represent a 
justice duty. So, in Sam’s case, the state provision of some medical care has the 
unidirectional structure of a moral duty, and is not a reciprocal justice duty. Even 
the fact that Sam had to be ruled incompetent in a court does not bring her into 
the scope of justice. In this instance a judge made a formal acknowledgement that 
she was no longer within the scope of justice. The fact a judge made the decision is 
simply because the justice system within Sam’s community gives judges the 
authority to decide such things; it could equally be recognized by any other 
member of her society that Sam is now out of the scope of justice and has no 
obligations to the state.  
     Regarding this case, both my own and Rawls’s later account of the 
circumstances of justice definitively exclude Sam from justice. Rawls’s approach 
seems well-motivated but his reasons are not clear enough to guide us in other 
cases in which it is unclear whether it falls within the scope of justice. It is not only 
Sam’s inability to plan and value her plans that excludes her; it is that she is wholly 
incapable of making claims or fulfilling duties held against her. She no longer trusts 
                                                
     20 What I have in mind, however, is a system of rights and duties in which some 
moral duties that a society generally considers to be important enough are enforced 
by the system of governance already in place for the enforcement of societal duties. 
This does not mean moral duties become duties of justice. Consider, if the 
government altered its policy and stopped assisting families of the severely 
handicapped it would be seen as very unfortunate and even wrong, but not as unjust.  
 137 
individuals to perform in particular ways toward her either, though she may rely 
on them. In sum, on my alternative description, we can see that Sam is—and 
should be—excluded from the scope of justice, though she is still subject to all 
moral duties, some of which may still be mandated by an enforcing body such as a 
government.  
     Through the course of the preceding discussion, I have illustrated the general 
scope of where justice applies within my alternative depiction of the circumstances 
of justice, as well as how my account can be used to assess situations, and whether 
they are appropriate for the application of justice. These five cases do not represent 
a comprehensive list of all the possible kinds of cases where the scope of justice is 
called into question. Rather, they represent a sample aimed at demonstrating that 
my alternative explanation of the circumstances of justice fits much more plausibly 
than the standard accounts with many of our intuitions about when justice should 
apply. For example, my account clearly includes individuals, international 
situations, and marginalized classes of individuals not traditionally viewed as equal, 
while the standard accounts have excluded such cases. Other examples, including 
groups of people traditionally left out of the scope of justice, will also be included in 
my proposed account. This illustrates that our intuitions on inclusion fit more 
closely with my alternative circumstances of justice than with the standard 
accounts. In contrast, I have excluded some persons from the scope of justice that 
the standard view may not. For some, these latter cases may not fit quite as well 
with our intuitions of justice; for many they still will. I have shown a concrete, 
though controversial, example of excluding severely mentally handicapped 
individuals from the scope of justice, and have given reasons explaining this 
exclusion. Hopefully, my reasons have more appeal than the Rawlsian reason for 
doing so. My account also explains why justice systems usually exempt individuals 
like Sam from any legal duties. Even if this final case does not fit precisely with our 
considered intuitions about justice, I believe my account of the circumstances has 
better addressed the tensions for inclusion and exclusion, and provides a more 
useful guide when our own intuitions about justice are unclear.  
III. Diagnostic: the Subject of Justice 
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    In the first half of this paper I offered a defense of the scope of justice set out by 
my alternative account of the circumstance of justice. This discussion anticipated 
the criticism that my description would not fit with our intuitions about when 
justice obtains. Another criticism one may make of this project is that using the 
circumstances of justice approach to define the scope of justice is mistaken, and an 
alternative methodology should be encouraged. In this section I explore the 
leading alternative method of defining the scope of justice, and defend the 
circumstances of justice approach to delineating the scope of justice against this.  
     In political theory it has been popular to define the scope of justice by seeking to 
establish a subject matter of justice, rather than the circumstances of justice. 
Though the debate became most heated after Rawls claimed the basic structure 
(the constitutionally endorsed and economic institutions) as subject, the question 
has been at the center of political debate much longer than this. I believe, however, 
that this method is subtly misguided as will presently become clear. That is not to 
say that there is no use in determining a subject matter of justice; however, 
establishing a subject of justice will not accurately forecast whether questions of 
justice have application or not. A good account of the circumstances of justice 
should be able to accurately address questions of application, as well as 
accommodate a plausible subject of justice. Hence, my analysis in the following 
section supports a specific, plausible subject of justice, but ultimately rejects the 
methodology which determines the scope of justice via the subject of justice, rather 
than by considering the circumstances of justice. 
      Examples of the scope of justice in the first half of this chapter have explicated 
the parameters of my approach to the circumstances of justice and, in doing so, 
have provided us with the means to ask a diagnostic question: What organizing 
principle do the cases of inclusion have in common? Put another way, what 
common characteristics are present when the alternative account of the 
circumstances of justice obtains? An answer to this question will illuminate a 
subject of justice that conforms to my explanation of the circumstances. If the 
answer seems plausible, this will lend more weight to my account as a plausible—
perhaps even the right—account of the circumstances of justice. Thus, my purpose 
here is not to provide a full defense of the subject matter of justice. It is rather to 
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see if, given the parameters of justice I laid out in chapter 4, and the examples 
given in support of these parameters in the first half of this chapter, we can arrive 
at a subject of justice that also supports my alternative description of the 
circumstances, and then evaluate this subject’s ability to elucidate when justice has 
application.  
     One distinct theme running through cases 1 – 3 above (the cases included in the 
scope of justice), is that each of them occurs within the context of some broadly 
conceived practice. This is no new idea in constructivist explanations of justice. In 
fact, the three thinkers who constitute the standard account of the circumstances all 
rely on practices in different ways to form their own accounts of the subject matter of 
justice. In Rawls’s case practices constitute the basic structure, which ought to be 
made to coincide with the principles of justice that come out of the original position. 
This means constitutionally endorsed institutions must conform to the principles of 
justice, and they should be changed if they do not. For Hume, justice is concerned 
with property conventions and promising. In both cases, justice applies to certain 
conventions that are just because of the way they arose, and legitimate only after they 
have been tested by time. Because they arise in answer to a need for coordination 
and rules governing the issues of property and promise-keeping, in conjunction with 
the fact that they do solve this task of stabilizing property and promise-keeping, 
Hume finds that the conventions simply are just. In Hobbes, promise-keeping is the 
core of his theory. Justice involves keeping one’s covenants. These covenants include 
not only the covenants to endeavor peace and respect a sovereign, but the agreement 
to obey whatever rules the sovereign sets out. Until the practice of covenant making 
is in place in civil society there is no justice. For Hobbes too, justice is a practice.  
    The circumstances of justice do not require an appeal to particular practices. It is 
the concept of justice that makes practices a central feature of justice, that is, part of 
the task of justice is to respond to the problems that arise because of the wide range 
of practices. Even so, the motivation behind Rawls’s adoption of the basic structure 
as the subject of justice is still appealing. He argues that the basic structure is that 
with which social justice is primarily concerned because of the profound effect of 
injustices at this level. If we consider why the effects are so profound, it seems that it 
is not the fact of constitutional coercion or the fact of the state that explains this. Rather, 
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it is the fact of these institutions’ coercive power over people, which is to say the 
profound effects they have on people. Though Rawls never says it explicitly, we can 
extrapolate from his work that the problem with which justice is most concerned is 
some form of institutional power.21 But with what kind of power, specifically, is justice 
concerned?  
      With this analysis of Rawls’s basic structure in mind, we can return to my 
examples above and find that cases 1 – 3 share a theme of social practices, albeit at a 
variety of levels. By social practices, I mean practices whose phenomenology requires 
more than one individual for it to be performed at all. Their being social 
automatically excludes from our consideration practices such as the practice of 
waking up at six in the morning or practices to develop skills, such as woodcarving, 
which require only one individual, though they may sometimes involve more than 
one individual. Even if there is more than one individual involved, what distinguishes 
a social from a non-social practice is that the non-social practice involves no 
dependency on others’ participation for the practice to continue. What is particularly 
striking about the social practices in the first three cases is the rich opportunity for 
coercion, for the abuse of power with which Rawls was so concerned. Diagnostically, 
when the circumstances for justice exist, the problem that justice must solve (to meet 
Requirement N) is to protect individuals from coercive power in social practices. The 
discussion will now turn to an analysis of the plausibility of social power as the subject 
of justice. I will argue that social power is a plausible contender for the subject of 
justice that fits well with my account of the circumstances of justice.  
    G.A. Cohen responded to Rawls’s allocation of the basic structure as the subject of 
justice with the criticism that this subject is too narrow. In fact, Cohen believes that 
all acts and choices of individuals should be the subject of justice because the 
opportunity for coercion is so pervasive. In “Power in Social Organization as the 
Subject of Social Justice,” Aaron James responds to Cohen’s criticism. James offers a 
compelling defense of Rawls, and an insight into social power, that fits well with my 
account of the circumstances of justice, and the proposed subject of justice currently 
under discussion. James argues against Cohen on the grounds that the structure of 
                                                
     21 A similar line of reasoning is found in Aaron James, "Power in Social 
Organization as the Subject of Justice," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2005):25-49. 
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principles of justice demands that justice takes place in social practices. However, 
James does find it useful that Cohen clarifies the fact that, in focusing on justifying his 
use of the basic structure, Rawls never got around to justifying the rationale behind 
his practice-based conception of justice. That is, “[Rawls] has not identified the form 
of importance characteristic of social practices in virtue of which we treat the class of 
principles for their guidance and assessment as a class of principle of a special moral 
kind.”22 James then attempts to bridge this gap by offering up social power as the 
subject of social justice.  
     Traditionally, according to James, the state has been cast as the paradigmatic 
subject of justice. This is because the state has creative power to realize goods through 
the coordination of actions: goods such as freedoms, protections, efficiency, etc. 
Additionally, the state claims power as control. This includes behavioral, exclusionary, 
and distributive controls as well as dangerous power. Examples of these kinds of 
power are: the power to penalize and to constrain, the power to decide who votes or 
is a citizen, the power to distribute wealth and create prerogatives of office that lead 
to corruption.23 James insists that each of these social powers is present in some form 
in a variety of social practices that mark all societies, such as games, labor 
movements, school-yard cliques, academic networks, etc. In each of these social 
practices, James explains, it is the activity of the group as a whole, not specific 
members, that creates these forms of social power. Social power is created by the 
structure of coordination, which is never subject to the will of a particular agent. 
James here answers the question he set out to address, Why is it that “justification to 
persons in the context of a social practice might have a distinctive kind of significance 
in virtue of which a distinct concept of right is appropriate[?]”24 He responds that 
there is need to justify a social practice to a person because that person may be 
subjected to some form of power, whether it be coercion, constraint, exclusion, 
inadequate or unequal provision, precaution, or protection. What is unique about 
seeking justification for a group’s social practice is “that no particular person can 
directly regulate how the relevant form of power is exercised.” 25 When an individual 
                                                
     22 Ibid., p.39. 
     23 See Ibid., p.32. for more on these types of power. 
     24 Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
     25 Ibid., p.42. 
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abuses power (e.g., carelessness, recklessness, or negligence by a doctor), that person 
can be directly asked for a justification of his or her actions. A group cannot be asked. 
Someone subject to the power of a group’s social practice must demand justification 
from the group as a whole. For the practice of making and assessing such demands, 
there is justice. 
     With this analysis in mind, we now ask whether social power, as conceived by 
James (and probably also Rawls), is a plausible subject of justice, and whether it is a 
plausible description of when the circumstances tend to obtain. Certainly, when the 
fact of solidarity exists, social power is a factor. In chapter 4, I explained that 
solidarity leads to a need for justice, not only because there is a need to regulate 
interaction between groups, but also a need to regulate abuse of power within groups. 
Minimally, we can say that when the fact of solidarity obtains, there is pervasive 
opportunity for social power (and its abuse). This power is compounded by the 
existence of a moderate scarcity of resources—particularly on my broad conception 
of resources, which includes time, the Rawlsian primary goods, and any other scarce, 
valuable resource. These involve what social power will typically abuse: one’s time, 
social self-respect, income, etc. Limited human understanding will of course 
exacerbate these issues. In fact, if we imagine a society in which we could all 
understand any abuses of power whenever we saw them, it seems that society would 
be better positioned for stopping and preventing such power abuses, and have little to 
no need for principles of justice.  
     It appears then that in instances where my account of the circumstances of justice 
obtains, my description of the circumstances is compatible with a subject of justice 
that is in turn compatible with Rawlsian and other Constructivists’ accounts of the 
subject of justice—social power.26 Furthermore, social power has strong intuitive 
appeal as the subject of justice insofar as it supports the notion that any form of 
coercion requires justification to the individual being coerced. This value has been a 
cornerstone of liberal political philosophy since Hobbes. Indeed, any political theory 
that requires voluntarily submitting to obligations of justice, or having duties because 
of some benefit received by the individual, can be seen as attempting to capture the 
                                                
     26 For instance, social power seems equally compatible with a Scanlonian account 
of justice.  
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intuition that coercion requires justification. There is room to accommodate this 
intuition in any account that leaves open the possibility of social power as a subject of 
justice. Minimally, this supports the alternative account of the circumstances by 
allowing an appealing subject of justice. 
      Having isolated at least one possible subject matter of justice that is compatible 
with the alternative formulation of the circumstances of justice by considering 
features that merit inclusion, we now turn to exclusive cases. Here we will ask, is 
social power still a feature? After answering this, we ask whether this matters and 
begin to see the limits of defining the scope of justice with the subject of justice 
instead of the circumstances of justice. Looking at the two examples of exclusion 
above, it seems that in at least one case, social power is present. In case 4, when the 
famine-stuck nation redistributes farmers’ food stores to feed starving people, there is 
clearly an exercise of social power. The government is exerting its power to re-
appropriate goods. In this case there may be a need for justice, but no possibility of 
justice. Whether or not case 5 contains any practices involving social power is less 
clear. Certainly Sam’s family is a social group, undoubtedly marked by practices, and 
the government who assists her is exhibiting social power by redistributing taxes paid 
by others to Sam’s family for her benefit. The presence of social power in this case 
depends on how precisely we define social power. As it is not the point of this 
discussion to defend social power as the only possible subject of justice, or to 
complete a full taxonomy of power, I will not explain social power as anything 
beyond a display of power (types of which are listed above) in a social practice.27 Sam 
does seem to be subject to a number of kinds of social power. Regardless, I maintain 
that Sam still does not fall within the scope of justice.28 As noted above, my reasoning 
is that the circumstances of justice must obtain for human coordination to be both 
necessary and possible.  
     We are now in a position to ask whether it hurts my account of the circumstances 
of justice if instances of power in social practices fall outside the scope of justice? Does 
                                                
     27 For more complete accounts of power including social and collective power, see 
James, "Power in Social Organization as the Subject of Justice."; Alvin I. Goldman, 
"Toward a Theory of Social Power," Philosophical Studies 23 (1972), 221-268.  
     28 NB James would disagree with me here; he seems to think all power in social 
organizations should be considered the subject(s) of justice. 
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this indicate that I have been unduly exclusive with my alternative rendering of the 
circumstances of justice? My response is that I have not. It is important to keep in 
mind that my purpose here is merely diagnostic. I think my alternative account fits 
very well with a notion of the subject matter of justice that is intuitively appealing for 
Constructivists about justice. That an appealing subject matter fits with my view of 
the circumstances of justice lends it plausibility, but the account does not hinge on 
this being the subject matter of justice. Neither does it hinge on there being an 
identifiable subject of justice. In sum, it does not matter for my account if the 
plausible subject matter of justice exists outside of circumstances in which human 
coordination is possible and necessary, which in turn defines when justice has 
application. It only matters for the plausibility of my account that the subject is 
present in all cases of inclusion. 
     To illustrate why exclusionary cases will sometimes have social power present, but 
should not be accommodated within the scope of justice, consider the following 
example regarding social practices of etiquette. If in a particular time and culture, 
men always open the door for their female counterparts and, just once, a man fails to 
do so, it seems the female counterpart may be justified in asking why he did not. She 
may even feel disrespected or rebuffed for having been forced to open the door 
herself. However, she has no grounds to claim the right not to be made to open doors 
for herself against him. Etiquette, of course, is not the only example of a social 
practice involving social power that does not accommodate the application of justice. 
This is simply an obvious case, intended to illustrate that not all social practices 
involving power should be included within the scope of justice.  
     If my analysis so far is correct, if there are practices of social power outside the 
scope of justice, then it follows that even when the subject of justice exists, this is not 
enough for justice to be applicable. The argument for the subject of justice approach 
to the scope of justice goes something like this: the subject matter indicates a strong 
need for justice and whenever the subject of justice exists, questions of justice will 
arise. This is not enough. Justice only has application—its duties and rights are 
obligatory—when the circumstances of justice exist. Theorists must first appeal to 
some circumstances of justice and work out a theory from there. Rawls, for instance, 
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does this, and merely constrains his circumstances of justice with his subject of justice 
because he is concerned with a smaller subset of justice, not all of justice.  
     An objection one might make here is that my diagnosis is wrong, social power is 
not the subject of justice, and therefore my argument that social power exists outside 
the circumstances will not show that the subject of justice approach is inadequate to 
illuminate when questions of justice arise. My response is simply that until some 
definitive explanation of a subject of justice exists, this will be impossible to prove. I 
have argued that social power in practices is a plausible subject of justice, but it is 
outside the scope of this project to show it is the subject of justice. I have shown only 
that even an extremely appealing and somewhat popular subject matter of justice 
cannot adequately outline when questions of justice are applicable. This does not 
make the search for a subject of justice useless; it merely separates it from the task of 
the circumstances of justice, which is to identify when justice has normative 
application. 
     Another objection to my position on the necessity of the circumstances of justice 
in defining the scope of justice is that this approach, and the subject of justice 
approach, come from methods of political philosophy that are at odds with one 
another. To some extent this is true. Certainly, Constructivists need circumstances of 
justice to distinguish justice duties from other duties (e.g., moral or prudential duties). 
Those Constructivists that add a subject of justice, such as Rawls, rely on the 
circumstances of justice to set out the scope of distributive justice, and then constrain 
it with their subject of justice to delimit the scope of their particular theory of justice, 
rather than all of distributive justice. It is, however, still the circumstances of justice 
that actually define the scope of distributive justice. In contrast, those who use a more 
fundamental principle approach, such as Cohen (as discussed in chapter 1), must 
constrain that fundamental principle somehow. For instance, if—like Cohen—one 
were to maintain that justice applies to (that is, the subject of justice is) the choices 
individuals make within legally coercive structures, the same criticism discussed 
above—over inclusiveness—applies. Cohen explains that he thinks justice applies to 
the choices left open by rules of legally coercive structures, “because [such choices 
are] neither enjoined nor forbidden by them.”29 Such a broadly inclusive account of 
                                                
     29 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p.116. 
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when principles of justice apply risks categorizing choices about subjects wholly 
irrelevant to justice as within its scope. Cohen justifies this inclusiveness on grounds 
that principles of justice cannot be applied to practices without also being applied to 
the actions that constitute those practices. Particular actions, however, can—and 
sometimes should—be assessed according to different kinds of moral principles. An 
example would be principles that tell individuals how to act given that a just or unjust 
practice is in place, principles such as Rawls’s natural duty of justice, which is a moral 
principle to further just practices.30 
     In this section, I have established that there is a straightforward diagnostic of what 
unites the cases that appear within the scope of justice. This diagnostic is in line with 
a popular intuition that justice concerns social practices, and the exercise of power 
within and between them. I have shown that where the circumstances of justice 
obtain, this subject of justice will also obtain. However, it seems that this particular 
subject of justice will also obtain in a number of cases which lie outside the 
circumstances of justice. Even though this particular subject of justice seems 
plausible, the preceding discussion demonstrates that the subject of justice is still 
dependent on the scope set out by the circumstances of justice. 
Conclusion 
     In this chapter I have addressed the tension between inclusion and exclusion in 
the circumstances of justice. I analyzed cases that are included on my alternative 
account, showing why their inclusion is intuitively appealing. Next, I explained why 
some cases that seem to be within the scope of justice are, in fact, not. I then argued 
that there is one key feature that all of the inclusive accounts have in common: social 
practices that involve power. This is a plausible subject of justice; Rawls, Hume, 
Hobbes, and others have proposed similar subjects of justice. I explained that an 
attractive subject of justice lends plausibility to my description of the circumstances of 
justice, though the circumstances are by no means tied to this subject of justice. I 
then demonstrated that this subject of justice applies to situations outside any 
reasonable ambit of justice (e.g. practices of etiquette), allowing us to conclude that 
those accounts of justice which attempt to establish justice based on a subject of 
                                                
     30 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 258. NB James also argues along a similar line, but 
emphasizes differences in kinds responsibility rather than simply different kinds of 
moral duties, (i.e., moral vs. just). 
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justice alone will be too inclusive. There may be reasons to continue to seek out a 
subject of justice. For instance, a subject of justice may help explain the kinds of 
problems the circumstances of justice are concerned with or it may help in 
establishing the content of a conception of justice that meets the requirements of 
stability and publicity. However, this project argues that any subject of justice will be 
constrained by the kind of coordination necessary for justice being both necessary 


































     Do questions of justice apply to intergenerational relations? The problem of 
anthropogenic climate change has incited prolific debate on the question of what we 
owe future generations. The question is particularly interesting for philosophers 
because two of the dominant approaches to normative theory seem to predict wholly 
unintuitive and unappealing solutions. According to straightforward accounts of 
consequentialism, the greater number of people that will exist in the future, coupled 
with the fact we could do much now to improve their future welfare, suggests we 
should invest nearly everything we produce in future people’s well-being. The 
consequence of this is the unappealing prospect that we ought to neglect our own 
sustenance needs to do so. This over demanding position stands in stark contrast to 
constructivist theories, which at their most conservative, imply we owe nothing to 
future generations as there is no mutually beneficial reciprocity possible between 
current and future people. For the Constructivists, the problem is one of scope, as it is 
difficult to imagine contingent people having legitimate claims of justice against us. In 
this chapter, I explore how serious the problem of intergenerational duties is, and 
how it should impact our theories of justice.  
     I will focus on constructivist problems in dealing with duties of justice toward 
future people, though non-constructivist theories will also be addressed. I proceed by 
first examining whether the intergenerational problem can fit into my own account 
of the circumstances of justice. A negative response to this, however, does not rule 
out the state having duties to future people. To show this, I examine the reasons 
people have wanted to include intergenerational problems in the scope of justice, 
namely the person-affecting reasons including harms and urgency. This discussion 
will reveal that even the most successful attempts to include intergenerational 
problems within the scope of justice fail. Drawing on the perfect/imperfect duty 
distinction, I will show that exclusion from the scope of justice does not exclude 
 149 
intergenerational concerns from the scope of moral and juridical duties. I explain 
how the resistance to classifying intergenerational problems as moral problems rests 
on false assumptions about the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. The 
consequence of this is that, while I am committed to the claim that there is no such a 
thing as intergenerational justice—as traditionally conceived—I can still countenance a 
certain kind of moral duty legitimately held and enforceable by the state, that can 
perform the function that led us to search for intergenerational justice in the first 
place. 
I. The Nature of the Problem 
     In chapter 1, I introduced the necessity of Requirement N (i.e., for a conception of 
justice to be normative it must offer a solution to a corresponding, recognized 
practical concept.) A concept corresponds to some task that justice needs to solve and 
the conception is some way of solving it. In political constructivism, if the rules of 
justice do not respond to the task, they are not normative. Hence, it is important that 
we are clear on the problem that needs to be solved so that we can consider whether 
or not possible solutions might fit into the scope of justice.  
     The intergenerational problem of anthropocentric climate change is unique 
because it is not a question of simply coordinating savings or benefits and burdens 
between relatively close generations. Climate change is caused by greenhouse gas 
emissions now, the most serious effects of which will not be felt for another century. 
Because of the delay in the effects of rising CO2 levels in the atmosphere, various 
tipping points that accelerate the climate change process will not occur for some 
time. Emissions now slowly warm the atmospheric temperature and begin to melt 
surface ice. Ice melting releases more green house gasses which in turn causes the 
earth to reflect less heat back into the atmosphere, so the earth warms even more. As 
tipping points are reached, the warming accelerates exponentially, along with the 
impact on ecosystems and species that depend upon them. The only way to avoid 
these outcomes is to act now, before these tipping points are reached. In short, to 
avoid the negative effects that current emissions will have on the surface of the earth, 
the costs of carbon abatement must be incurred now. This makes the problem an 
intergenerational coordination problem about the earth’s finite resources, which 
include an atmosphere compatible with human life that does not inflict significant 
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amounts of suffering and death as a result of the destabilization of the earth’s living 
conditions. This necessarily involves coordination either with or regarding people 
who will not exist until long after we are dead, and with or regarding all individuals 
that will exist during our lives. 
II. The Circumstance of Intergenerational Justice? 
     In the previous two chapters I have stated, explained, and defended my 
reformulated account of the circumstances of justice. I argued that the circumstances 
of justice are: the fact of solidarity in the world, moderate scarcity of resources, and 
limited human knowledge. I now ask whether problems of intergenerational 
distribution of resources can be addressed within this view of the circumstances of 
justice. To show that they cannot, as this is no small bullet to bite, I will examine 
reasons why it may seem that intergenerational problems fit within the purview of my 
account. I ultimately argue that they cannot. This analysis will prove useful later in 
understanding the unique kind of moral problem that I argue the intergenerational 
problem really is.  
     Regarding issues of international distribution, the circumstance of limited human 
knowledge is easily met. There is no reason to assume any substantive change in 
human cognition or understanding over time such that this condition would not be 
met, so I lay it aside.  
     The moderate scarcity of resources condition poses an interesting challenge for 
the intergenerational problem. In chapter 4, I explained that this condition satisfies 
the necessary and possible nature of the circumstances of justice because individuals 
want more goods and know they can obtain more goods via cooperation. On my 
interpretation of this condition, resources extend beyond property or material goods, 
as described in traditional accounts of the circumstances of justice, to include any 
finite resource which is or could be scarce. Finite resources include something like 
Rawls’s primary resources as well as time, energy, etc.  
     On the standard view of the circumstances of justice, this circumstance has ruled 
out intergenerational justice on the grounds that if we do not conserve now, there will 
not be sufficient resources for future people. Justice, therefore, will not be possible 
with many future people. We are not in a relation of justice, and we do not owe 
distant future people obligations of justice. It may seem that my expanded account of 
 151 
resources could get around this problem. Even if there are insufficient physical 
resources in the distant future, if people exist they will have sufficient resources of 
time, energy, and the social bases of self-respect, together with Rawls’s other primary 
goods, such that they will be capable of justice. This at least leaves open the 
possibility of having a justice relationship with them. However, if we consider the 
reason that this circumstance makes human cooperation both possible and necessary 
(that individuals want more goods and know that if they cooperate, they can obtain 
them), it seems that cooperation is impossible. Future people can never cooperate 
with current people to ensure or even attempt to ensure a greater share of resources 
than they would otherwise have. In short, we can see that future people will likely still 
meet the circumstance of moderate scarcity of resources among themselves; however, 
they will not meet the necessary and possible constraint insofar as coordination of 
resources across distant points in time is impossible. This means that in relation to 
present day people, people in the distant future do not meet this circumstance of 
justice. Thus, they cannot stand in a relation of justice to us.  
     Even though the moderate scarcity of resources condition rules out the possibility 
of justice applying to our relation with future people, it is still worth considering just 
how the fact of solidarity condition affects this relation. In chapter 3, I explained that 
solidarity is constituted by four conditions, so one might take this condition to involve 
the capacities for (1) mutual trust, (2) identification with the group,  (3) a disposition 
to empathy, and (4) a shared joint interest. Recall that it is the fact of this condition, 
not a preexisting solidary bond that is necessary for justice to apply. Justice depends 
on individuals being capable of being in solidarity with others and this capacity is 
pervasive in humanity.  
     Can we reasonably claim that future people posses the capacity to be in solidary 
relationships? At first glance, it seems that the fact of solidarity will apply to future 
people. Given the ubiquity of solidarity in humanity at present and in all past 
societies, it is reasonable to assume that future people will be similar enough to us, 
whatever the changes in the world, that they will still be marked by the fact of 
solidarity. On consideration, however, this seems unsatisfactory. In the examples I 
offered in chapter 5 as instances inclusive of solidarity, there was an implicit similarity 
in the cases. The fact of solidarity always existed in contexts in which questions of 
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justice arose in a common time period. When this element is removed and we are 
concerned with a set of people, some of whom will never actually be able to be in 
solidarity with one another, is the fact that most people are capable of solidarity 
sufficient for justice? Disappointingly, the answer is unclear. Though it will be the 
case that the fact of solidarity will obtain for future people, it is unclear that it could 
serve its purpose of ensuring that individuals are capable of claim-making and 
obligation fulfilling with one another across time. For individuals at any given time, 
the condition will be met. However, if individuals exist at drastically different times, 
they will never be able to make claims upon, and owe reciprocal duties to, one 
another. In fact, it seems that only expressional solidarity could exist across 
generations and, while this motivates many people to act on the climate change 
problem even now, it is not the robust kind of solidarity necessary for a system of 
duties and claim-making to be in place. This rift between distant generations, all of 
whom—in their own time period—are capable of solidarity and share justice 
relations with other generations living at that time, is sufficient to cast doubt on the 
existence of the circumstances of justice. If it is unclear that justice could be applied 
to the situation, it seems doubtful the situation will generate duties and claims of 
justice for its parties. For reasons generated by the moderate scarcity of resources 
condition, in conjunction with the fact that solidarity may not be able to ensure the 
existence of justice between distant generations, we may conclude that 
intergenerational problems of distribution are not justice problems. I will address 
ways they could become problems of justice near the end of the chapter. 
     Before moving on, it is worth mentioning that intergenerational coordination 
problems do not fit into the scope of the standard accounts of the circumstances of 
justice either. On Hobbes’s account there would be insufficient equality since future 
people can never be in a state of nature (or war) with present-day people. Hence, 
there would be no need to coordinate regarding intergenerational problems. Those 
needing to coordinate will always be the present generation and will never be affected 
by the powers of future people. In Rawls’s early approach there exists the same 
Hobbesian equality problem, as well as the same moderate scarcity of resources 
problem as in my own account. The latter problem also plagues Rawls’s later work. 
Rawls tries to get around these issues via a motivational chain, but ultimately meets 
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with very little (or no) success.1 On Hume’s approach to the circumstances of justice it 
would be impossible for future people to ever make their resentment felt regarding 
past/current people. In conclusion, intergenerational justice is a problem for all of 
the accounts of the circumstances of justice, and hence for most political 
Constructivists. 
     Each of these accounts contains further impediments to including 
intergenerational problems within the scope of justice. However, I put aside 
additional impediments. The discussion presented thus far is sufficient to conclude 
that there is no account of the circumstances of justice, including my own, that can 
count intergenerational issues as within the circumstances of justice. I will 
demonstrate, via discussion of various attempts to circumvent the problems of non-
identity and non-reciprocity, that Constructivists are in good company, as there is no 
clear way to formulate the climate change problem as a problem of justice. To 
consider whether this is an issue for constructivist approaches of justice, or simply a 
revelation that some of our intuitions about justice are wrong, we must next ask, 
What are the reasons in favor of considering intergenerational resource coordination 
problems as problems of justice?   
III. Considerations for Intergenerational Justice 
     Brian Barry, in his article “Circumstances of Justice and Future Generations,” 
cites two reasons that theorists have been tempted to consider intergenerational 
coordination problems as within the purview of justice.2 The first is that most 
theorists understand duties of justice to have higher priority than duties of humanity. 
Intergenerational problems are the kind of problems that need this high priority. 
They involve not only the quality of future people’s lives, but also potentially 
numerous lives lost, and a variety of other harms involved as the earth’s climate 
begins to shift drastically. So, intergenerational problems are often considered to be 
problems of justice because of their urgency and priority. 
                                                
     1 Rawls has a supplemental, rarely acknowledged approach to intergenerational 
justice involving “natural duties” that will be addressed later.  
     2 Brian Barry, "Circumstances of Justice and Future Generations," in Obligations to 
Future Generations, ed. Richard I. Sikora and Brian M. Barry (Temple University Press, 
1978). 
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     The second reason that theorists are inclined to treat intergenerational problems 
as justice problems is because justice is often associated with the notion of dues or 
reparations. There is a real sense among theorists, activists, and the general populace 
that we are harming future people by bringing them into a world in which their lives 
will be worse off than they may otherwise have been.3 Different versions of a harm 
principle have been formulated to make sense of the particular harm being done to 
future people. Some of these will be addressed shortly.  
     The consequence of the priority and harm arguments has been an extremely 
popular movement in climate ethics in the past decades, which aims to develop a 
theory that has the political implication of direct policy change by appealing to the 
direct obligations we owe future people. These theories have met with varying 
degrees of success. Each of these attempts to explain direct obligations toward future 
people stands to be rejected for independent reasons. Exploring these arguments may 
seem contradictory to my position that the circumstances of justice are a necessary 
foundation of justice. However, as my larger project aims to find an account of the 
circumstances of justice that meets many of our intuitions about when justice applies, 
and to help guide us when it is unclear whether justice applies, it is worth considering 
if any of the more popular approaches to intergenerational justice are defensible. If 
they are not, it will lend plausibility to my own theory of the scope of justice insofar 
as no existing account of justice can be seen to accommodate intergenerational 
problems. In this respect, my account of the scope of justice would not be worse off 
than others; in the next sections, I seek to establish this. I begin by addressing the 
defenses of intergenerational justice that stem from the notion that we are harming 
future people. I then move on to the related non-reciprocity problem, which can be 
seen as an attempt to give rights to future people because of the urgency of the 
problem.  
IV. The Non-Identity Problem 
     My aim in this section is to highlight the problems inherent in attempts to explain 
intergenerational justice as intergenerational harms. This discussion starts with an 
explanation of the non-identity problem, and shows why it cannot be ignored. I next 
consider the seemingly more successful threshold harm principle attempt to avoid the 
                                                
     3 I lay aside reasons stemming directly from relationships with nature. 
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non-identity problem, but show that this too is insufficient to establish that current 
people have normative duties of justice toward future people.  
     The non-identity problem, though not first formulated by Parfit, was given this 
name by him and popularized by his thorough treatment of the problem.4 It simply 
refers to the fact that a person’s identity is contingent on actions that contribute to 
that person’s biological conception. This will include a myriad of circumstances 
throughout the course of history and is not limited, as we may be tempted to 
imagine, to the events of a person’s parents and grandparents alone. It follows from 
this that the decisions a generation makes that affect these circumstances, and hence 
who will be conceived, cannot harm the individuals later conceived, because had 
those exact choices not been made, those particular people would never have come 
to exist.  
      In short, it is logically and metaphysically impossible for future people to be 
worse-off people who could have been better-off people.5 For example, if Connie 
represents a person born into a world where we chose conservation policies, she 
would be a better-off person. If Dennis represents a person born into a world where 
we chose to destroy the environment, he would be worse-off. But it could never be 
the case that Dennis could have been Connie, because the policies that led to 
Dennis’s and Connie’s relative states of well-being also led to their existence. Hence, 
Dennis has no claim against past generations that they choose a conservation policy. 
      This applies as well to the number of people present in any given generation. 
Parfit’s repugnant conclusion illustrates that population size is also dependent on the 
circumstances that brought that generation into existence; therefore, no generation 
can claim against earlier generations that they ought to have reduced the population. 
This is the “No-Difference View” introduced by Parfit, which argues that it makes no 
difference how we act toward future generations, given that the size and composition 
                                                
     4 The nonidentity problem was discussed first in T. Schwartz, "Obligations to 
Posterity," in Obligations to Future Generations, ed. Richard I. Sikora and Brian Barry 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978): 3-14.; Robert Merrihew Adams, 
"Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil," Nous 13 (1979): 53-65.; Gregory S. 
Kavka, "The Paradox of Future Individuals," Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (1982): 
93-112. 
     5 David Heyd, Genethics : Moral Issues in the Creation of People (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992), p.63. 
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of any future generation depends on our policies now. So, we cannot be said to harm 
them with our choices.6  
     This view poses a major challenge to our second reason for including 
intergenerational problems within the scope of justice. While we may have the 
intuition that future people are harmed by our ineffective climate policies, it is not 
clearly the case that this is so. There have been a number of attempts to circumvent 
this challenge; some of the most successful include careful consideration of what is 
meant by harm. Other discussions involve exploring different notions of having a 
right, which will be addressed in the following section.  
     The first method of avoiding the non-identity problem suggests that we identify a 
notion of harm that does not require that future people whose well-being is in need of 
protection actually have interests and a well-being to protect, for it makes no sense to 
grant rights to protect contingent well-being. A more successful version of this 
approach has advocated a threshold conception of harm. The idea here is that an 
action harms a person if it is a consequence of that action that some person falls 
below a normatively defined threshold.7 Ideally, this kind of harm principle would be 
unaffected by the non-identity problem because the harm does not require 
comparing the less well-off state (e.g., Dennis from above) with the state of well-being 
of a more well-off hypothetical person (e.g., Connie). The threshold notion of harm 
will apply to any individual’s actions if they contribute to making some other person 
unable to realize a certain level of well-being. (I lay aside attempts to define that 
normative threshold as it is outside the scope of this discussion.) Meyer and Roser 
have recently defended a strong sufficientarian account of the current generation’s 
duties to future people, and future people’s corresponding rights (as opposed to a 
                                                
     6 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp.351-79. 
     7 Lukas H. Meyer, "Past and Future: The Case for a Threshold Notion of Harm," 
in Rights, Culture, and the Law : Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz, 
ed. Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson, and Thomas Winfried Menko Pogge 
(Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.148. Also see Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, "Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance 
of Harm," Legal Theory 5 (1999): 117-148.; Jeff McMahan, "Wrongful Life: Paradoxes 
in the Morality of Causing People to Exist," in Rational Commitment and Social Justice: 
Essays for Gregory Kavka, ed. Jules Coleman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998): 208-248, pp.223-29. and to some extent an early version of this thinking can 
be found in Kavka, “The Paradox of Future Individuals,” p.105, though he rejects it. 
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weaker version that is closer to prioritarianism). At its core is a subjunctive-threshold 
notion of harm, which purports to avoid the non-identity problem. Instead of 
defining harm via actions, the subjunctive-threshold conception of harm simply relies 
on our being able to positively define a level of well-being, such that a person’s right 
to a supra-threshold state is violated by our refraining from acting now to ensure it is 
not violated. 
     At first glance this seems like a plausible way around the problem of future people 
not having rights claims against us due to the non-identity problem. If future 
individuals have welfare rights to a certain state of affairs, even though these are 
personal rights, it may seem we have a way of attributing rights to future people and 
our corresponding duties. But this is not as straightforward as it appears. In my 
previous non-identity example of Dennis and Connie, Dennis exists below the 
threshold of harm; Connie exists above the threshold of harm. In a world in which 
we have chosen the environmental destruction policy and Dennis comes into 
existence, it is not clear he has a claim right against people of the past (our current 
generation) that he exist in or above a threshold of harm. Had we (his predecessors) 
not chosen the policy of destruction, he still would have never come to exist. We, 
therefore, return to the non-identity problem, that he would have no claim against us 
not to have been harmed. This reveals that while Meyer and Roser may be right, to 
some extent, that we have a duty not to bring individuals into existence in a state of 
well-being below some normatively defined threshold, it does not follow from this, 
however, that we have this duty because we have harmed future people by bringing 
them into such an existence. This point is central to my criticism. I do not deny the 
wrong that they attribute to bringing people into sub-threshold states. I only deny 
that these people, once they exist, then have corresponding claims against us for 
having brought them into existence in this state.8 
     An example of the kind of duty we have toward such future people would, instead, 
look something like my duty not to cause unnecessary stress to people I interact 
with—if I can avoid doing so at little cost. Instances of this kind of duty would be 
                                                
     8 An argument similar to my own against the threshold conception of harm can be 
found in: Makoto Usami, "The Non-Identity Problem, Collective Rights, and the 
Threshold Conception of Harm," Tokyo Institute of Technology Department of Social 
Engineering Discussion Paper.   
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giving correct directions when asked, being kind and gentle with young children, 
being polite in everyday interactions. These kinds of duties are general duties of 
goodness. As long as they do not fall below a threshold of respect, they do not 
constitute a harm that generates some right to be held against us. It seems that these 
are duties we ought to perform if at all possible. According to Meyer and Roser’s 
account, we may plausibly have some duty of goodness not to intentionally bring 
people into existence in a sub-threshold state. It does not follow from this argument, 
however, that we have duties to these individuals because of their corresponding right 
that we not bring them into such existence. In conclusion, even the threshold notion 
of harm seems not to get around the non-identity problem, or closely linked 
repugnant conclusion.  
V. The Non-Reciprocity Problem 
     The non-identity problem is closely related to the non-reciprocity problem. The 
non-reciprocity problem is simply that the intergenerational relationship necessary 
for the coordination problem of climate change precludes any kind of meaningful 
reciprocity on which duties and rights of justice could be founded, or the right kind of 
coordination achieved. The core idea is that some contribution is required for 
individuals to be part of a justice relationship, as contribution helps define the scope 
and content of justice benefits and restrictions: hence, justice as mutual advantage. 
Such theories generally seek to ground reciprocity on considerations of self-interest 
(e.g., Gauthier, Hobbes) or fairness (e.g., Rawls). The former is bargaining style justice 
while the latter is usually constituted by both direct and indirect reciprocity, though 
on some interpretations it includes generalized reciprocity. I will clarify these 
categories now before addressing specific attempts to get around the problem of 
reciprocity.  
Kinds of Reciprocity 
     In chapter 4, I offered analysis, as well as a number of accounts of rights and 
theories of justice, that supports the idea that reciprocity is central to justice. I did 
not, however, expand on what kind of reciprocity justice might require. I will do so 
now. Direct reciprocity is found explicitly in the works of Gauthier, Hobbes, and 
Rawls among others. I understand it to be uncontestable that justice accommodates 
direct reciprocity. An example of direct reciprocity is: Smith has a claim on Jones 
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that Jones φ iff Jones has an obligation to Smith to φ. This is exactly the structure of 
the Hohfeldian Incident of a claim, which is echoed by Feinberg, Hart, and others.9 
We might state this more formally as: A is obligated to B to φ iff B has a claim against 
A to φ. Direct reciprocity involves clear conditions of what fulfilling the duty will 
involve. Both the act and the person to whom it is owed are definite. Finally, direct 
reciprocity is marked by the fact that A and B each have the standing that the 
relationship of claims and duties could be reversed. If A has the standing to claim 
some act against B, then B has the standing to claim some act against A. 
     Indirect reciprocity is a strong candidate for justice. This is a form of reciprocity 
that may be compatible with intergenerational climate change duties. Heath, for 
instance, proposes that this kind of reciprocity is within the circumstances of 
constructivist justice (discussed below).10 An example of indirect reciprocity would be: 
Jones has a duty to pay taxes to fund benefits for others iff others also pay taxes to 
fund benefits from which Jones will benefit in turn. In chapter 4, I mentioned that 
Darwall claims that rights are reciprocal. Before any claims can be made or privileges 
taken, grounds must already exist that give individuals standing to legitimately make 
these reciprocal claims against one another. Regardless of whether this standing is 
the result of membership in a state, community, participation in a trust relation, or 
something else, the structure is the same.11 Many instances of large-scale community 
reciprocity represent indirect reciprocity. Such reciprocity captures the mutual 
advantage aspect of justice. That is, a person ought to undergo some definable 
burden in exchange for receiving a reciprocal, roughly proportional benefit in the 
future. More formally (for later reference), indirect reciprocity would look like this: A 
is obligated to X (some specific person or members of a group of which A is also a 
member) to φ iff X benefits A by φ-ing. In indirect reciprocity, the beneficiary of the 
obligation is a member of some group or scheme with the standing to benefit A and 
whom A also benefits. It does not matter who specifically receives the benefits of A’s 
obligation, only that it is someone who is benefiting A in the defined manner. The 
                                                
      9 Feinberg and Narveson, “The Nature and Value of Rights”:243-260; Hart, The 
Concept of Law . 
     10 Joseph Heath, "The Structure of Intergenerational Cooperation," Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 41 (2013): 31-66. 
     11 Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability, p.19. 
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duty is discharged only when some fair allocation of taxes has been paid or pensions 
paid into a scheme, or whatever is required. Many accounts of constructivism appear 
to allow this kind of reciprocity to be sufficient for justice to obtain. Here, indirect 
reciprocity will be considered adequate to meet the reciprocity requirement of justice 
duties. 
     The final form of reciprocity that is sometimes considered a contender for justice 
is generalized reciprocity. Page and Arneson both think this is a promising model for 
intergenerational justice.12 An example of this kind of reciprocity is offered by 
Schumaker; “a stranger does a favor for a traveler on journey. The traveler laments 
that because she will never see the stranger again, she will not be able to repay the 
debt. The stranger replies, ‘just do the same for someone else; others have done the 
same for me.’”13 the idea here is that generalized reciprocity is a network of favors 
and counter-favors in the context of voluntary cooperation. More formally, 
generalized reciprocity may look like this: A has an obligation to Y (some non-specific 
person) to perform some beneficial act iff X (some other non-specific person who is 
not Y) has benefited A by some act. Note that generalized reciprocity is owed to non-
specific people because one is the recipient of a non-specific person’s beneficial act. It 
is left undefined what one must do to discharge such a debt. Even if it should be 
discharged to some person in particular, it would not be a matter of tit-for-tat, but 
would simply require some effort to benefit some other person. There is not 
necessarily mutual advantage in this sort of exchange, though there are, of course, 
advantages. These duties look like imperfect moral duties or social norms, as the lack 
of clarity regarding the content, extent, and even beneficiary is not compatible with 
the mutual advantage which reciprocity in justice is intended to capture. I will seek to 
underwrite this idea below when I discuss perfect and imperfect duties. 
      For reference, the structures of the three kinds of reciprocity which are sometimes 
put forward as contenders for the kind of reciprocity relevant to the intergenerational 
justice debate are as follows:  
                                                
     12 Edward Page, Climate Change, Justice and Future Generations (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2006), p.103. 
     13 Millard Schumaker, Sharing without Reckoning : Imperfect Right and the Norms of 
Reciprocity, Editions Sr V. 14 (Waterloo, Ont., Canada: Published for the Canadian 
Corporation for Studies in Religion/Corporation Canadienne des Sciences 
Religieuses by Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1992), p.27. 
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DIRECT RECIPROCITY: A is obligated to B to φ iff B has a claim against A to φ. 
INDIRECT RECIPROCITY: A is obligated to X (some specific person or members of a    
     group in which A is a member) to φ iff X benefits A by φ-ing. 
GENERALIZED RECIPROCITY: A has an obligation to Y (some non-specific person) to  
     perform some beneficial act iff X (some other non-specific person who is not Y)  
     has benefited A by some act. 
Escaping the Non-Reciprocity Problem 
     If we understand reciprocity as direct reciprocity, then the climate change 
problem will fall outside the scope of justice. This is because it cannot be the case that 
contingent people are in a position to either make claims or fulfill duties toward us, 
particularly not in the strictly tit-for-tat manner involved in direct reciprocity. The 
relationship must always be unequal, as present day people can directly affect future 
people but the reverse is not true. This rules out mutual advantage qua direct 
reciprocity, because current people could not receive direct advantages in exchange 
for their sacrifices. In this section, I will explore four attempts to circumvent this 
problem. 
     One response to this problem is to endorse a non-reciprocal theory of justice, 
something like the subject-centered views I argued against in the previous chapter. 
The idea supporting these theories is that, rather than relying on a contribution of 
some kind, subject-centered theories identify some particular state in defining the 
scope of justice. When that state obtains, these theories presume that justice obtains. 
This state will be some property of the individuals in question, or the state in which 
they exist—for instance, needs, capacities, or even social relationships.14 The appeal 
of this approach for intergenerational justice is that reciprocity is not the core, but it 
can still be let in through the back door, so to speak, by allowing principles of fairness 
and reciprocity to shape the rules of justice that fall within the scope defined by the 
subject-centered theory. Subject-centered theories can also contend that reciprocal 
dispositions are the social glue that guarantees compliance, but maintain that this 
grants reciprocity itself instrumental value, at best.15 So long as future people will 
                                                
     14 In the previous chapter I discussed the appealing theory of social power as the 
subject of justice as an appealing stepping-stone to rejecting subject-centered 
approaches to justice. 
     15 Page, Climate Change, Justice and Future Generations, p.111. 
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have human interests, they can be viewed on some of these theories as having 
entitlements to resources.16 To some extent this may be true; however, we have good 
reason to ask why we should consider such dues justice rather than common duties of 
morality. The structure of these duties models a unidirectional moral duty such as I 
outlined in chapter 4.17 I will return to this explicitly in the following sections. For 
now it is sufficient to note that, in addition to advocating a justice duty that has the 
structure of a moral duty, this approach seems to reopen the criticism against subject-
centered views that I discussed in the last chapter—that subject centered views do not 
define instances of when justice ought to be excluded. I have shown that even rules of 
etiquette may be construed as appropriate rules of justice according to at least one 
plausible subject centered view of justice. These discussions aimed to establish that 
subject-centered theories of justice are overly inclusive, and extend the scope of 
justice beyond its normative limitations. The intergenerational problem is another 
example of overextension. 
     Another attempt to circumvent the non-reciprocity problem is the stewardship 
model. This approach says that the current generation has a duty to protect the 
environment for successors, in return for having it entrusted to them by their 
predecessors. Roughly, this broad theory of intergenerational justice hinges on there 
being generalized duties and benefits between generations. For instance, generation F 
was benefited by generation A by being left viable resources, so generation F owes 
generation X to preserve and pass on those resources. This is a theory of generalized 
reciprocity, which I understand to generate moral duties but not duties of justice. 
More specifically, the problems with this model in general are (1) it is not clear that 
the benefits given by past generations were contingent on benefiting future people, (2) 
it is not clear that unintentional benefits are something for which we owe reparations 
to others, and (3) even if the benefits were intentional, as Nozick argues, “One 
                                                
     16 The property of human interests being attributable to an individual is what 
motivates a number of theories of climate change duties. For instance, theories that 
future people have a right to resources simply because they will exist is one such a 
notion, because that right is granted qua human interests and status. Hence, my 
criticisms here are against more than just those explicitly subject-centered theories.  
     17 An example of a moral duty might be that Anne has a duty to give to charity. 
The structure is: A has a duty to φ. There is no clear beneficiary or explanation of 
what discharging φ involves as it does not hinge on others’ duties.  
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cannot, whatever one’s purposes, just act so as to give people benefits and then 
demand (or seize) payment.”18 Page points out that not everyone agrees with Nozick, 
but it seems fair to say that many do.19 Sufficiently many that the burden is on the 
Stewardship theorists to show that there are cases in which involuntary benefits can 
give rise to obligations toward people who did not ask for the benefits. Hence, it 
seems that advocates of this model have a heavy burden of proof still to meet.  
     Another altogether different approach to dealing with the non-reciprocity 
problem argues that indirect reciprocity does exist with future people insofar as we 
have mutually beneficial schemes of cooperation with them and could have more. 
Joseph Heath in “The Structure of Intergenerational Cooperation,” argues that the 
circumstances of justice—which he interprets as mutual advantage alone—do 
include intergenerational cooperation.20 He explains that if we alter the classic, 
iterated prisoner’s dilemma model of cooperation just slightly, we can have 
cooperation that extends across generations. Heath stipulates a multiplayer prisoner’s 
dilemma with eight players who are reshuffled for each game. The trigger strategy 
prescribes cooperation unless a player defects, then it prescribes that everyone 
subsequently matched with that player defects. This strategy is an equilibrium: 
players refrain from defecting so others will not defect on them in subsequent rounds. 
This equilibrium of selfish cooperation can be sustained by indirect reciprocity so 
long as actions are made sufficiently public.  
     Heath then offers a version of this game to illustrate how it will apply to 
intergenerational cooperation. The eight players are instructed to either pay $5 into 
the account of the person on their left or to place $2 into their own accounts each 
move. At the end of each round the amount of each player’s account is noted and the 
game repeated. The cooperative strategy in this game is to pass $5 into the account 
of the player on one’s left. If everyone does so, everyone gets $5 and the group has 
$40 at the end of each round. Keeping $2 is defection; if everyone defects, the group 
gets just $16. However, if only you defect, you get $7 that round and the person to 
your left gets nothing. The trigger strategy prescribes cooperation unless a player 
defects, and then prescribes always defecting against that player; thus the cooperative 
                                                
     18 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p.95. 
     19 Incidentally, Rawls and most liberal theorists make similar arguments. 
     20 Heath, “The Structure of Intergenerational Cooperation,” p.44.  
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equilibrium is sustained. This game, Heath notes, features an absence of mutuality 
between the players.21   
     To relate this game to the intergenerational problem Heath asks that we next 
suppose that, at the end of each round, the person at the end of the circle (the eighth 
position) is asked to leave the game. We call this dying. If the other players then move 
a chair toward the end, this is aging. When we introduce a new person to fill the now 
vacant chair, this is being born. The difference in this version of the game is that the 
oldest player cannot be motivated to cooperate and so will defect. But the 
expectation of defection does not threaten equilibrium because the player in the 
seventh position has nothing to gain by defecting (because if she does so she will only 
get $2 the next round). The person in position one has nothing to gain by defecting 
either since no one will cooperate with him later if he does not cooperate now. 
Cooperation now achieves a lower level of total payment for the group at $37 per 
round.22 
     Heath claims that such a system of cooperation is sustained by indirect reciprocity 
between overlapping generations. The system ties together all possible players—not 
just contemporaries—in a single cooperative system. This is because cooperation 
depends on the expectation players have that all future people will cooperate. This is 
illustrated by the fact that if, in a given round, it is found out that the game will end, 
all the players would chose defection that round to get $2 instead of nothing. Hence, 
cooperation in the game is sustained not only by the participation of contemporaries, 
but also by the expectations of future generations.23 Heath later points out that this is 
actually the structure of a number of money based schemes right now—in particular, 
pay-as-you-go pension schemes. These schemes generally involve paying in a 
percentage of one’s income every month; that money goes to older generations that 
have paid into the same scheme. The system works only because of the expectation 
that younger generations will continue to pay in when they have the option to join 
due to the expected pay-off in retirement money. Heath argues that like the game 
above, such schemes are a system of cooperation with a defect strategy to not opt-in, 
and risk saving for one’s own retirement (with a possible consequence of over- or 
                                                
     21 Heath, “The Structure of Intergenerational Cooperation,” pp. 45-46.  
     22 Heath, “The Structure of Intergenerational Cooperation,” p.46.  
     23 Heath, “The Structure of Intergenerational Cooperation,” p.48.  
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under-saving). Further, the cooperative arrangement could not be sustained if there 
were a closing-off point. It must run indefinitely, otherwise younger generations 
would not pay in. Because there is no closing point, Heath says that “the total set of 
cooperators must include future generations, including those yet unborn, and this 
means, in turn, that the ‘circumstances of justice’ obtain between us and them.”24 
     Heath is right that such cooperative schemes do use indirect reciprocity across 
generations. This demonstrates that it is possible that a coordination system of 
mutual advantage could obtain between future generations and ourselves. However, 
his argument does not show that this system of mutual advantages could in fact 
obtain now regarding the problem of climate change for two reasons. First, I 
previously defined the structure of indirect reciprocity as: A is obligated to X (some 
specific person or members of a group in which A is also a member) to φ iff X 
benefits A by φ-ing. Heath’s example of a pay-as-you-go pension plan fits this 
structure perfectly: A is obligated to pay 5% of her income to X (who is some set of 
older people no longer working) if and only if Y (some younger set of people) will 
benefit A (and those of her retirement age) by paying 5% of their income toward 
sustaining her when she no longer works. Cooperation as a dominant strategy 
depends, of course, not only on the trigger strategy, but also on there being a 
cooperative system in place. No one has an obligation generated by the cooperative 
system to opt-in. Importantly, in Heath’s examples of both the pension scheme and 
the initial eight-player intergenerational game, the players are able to claim benefits 
(either a pension or greater wealth accumulation) at some later point because they 
already undertook the duty of paying into the system. This is where Heath’s 
argument comes apart from the unique problem of climate change.  
     Heath has shown us, quite persuasively, that some intergenerational cooperation 
for mutually advantageous reasons (e.g., reasons not motivated from fellow feeling or 
generosity alone) is possible, and can achieve a stable equilibrium of cooperation. 
However, his analysis only extends to cases in which there are some advantages 
received for having cooperated. The problem of climate change is one such that 
advantages cannot not be received by the current (older) generation in the scheme, so 
                                                
     24 Heath, "The Structure of Intergenerational Cooperation,", p.51. 
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there is no self-interested reason for them to opt-in to such a cooperative system in 
their lifetime. 
     Here, one may object that the current generation has already received benefits or 
advantages because emissions have been a market externality; that is, we have not 
paid the fair market cost of emitting. In fact, Heath doesn’t explain exactly how he 
sees this example of indirect reciprocity fitting into a system of mutual advantages. 
His discussion of pensions and currency (where money is treated as an exchange for 
goods at a date later than it was earned) suggest that his response to the older 
generations’ unwillingness to curb emissions would be for the younger generations to 
stop exchanging money for goods with them, and stop pension or other benefit 
payouts. In short, if older generations don’t curb emissions, younger generations 
should withhold advantages that the younger generations make possible for them. 
This would be a system of indirect reciprocity that extends across generations. 
     This approach, however, faces a significant problem. The second reason that this 
type of indirect reciprocity cannot at present be applied to the problem of climate 
change is its injustice. It would be decidedly unjust to threaten older generations’ 
pension benefits—plans they had previously paid into under an agreement that they 
would receive benefits later in life—based on their non-cooperative behavior 
(defection) in another arena, the environment, which was never part of the original 
pension agreement. A related concern arises regarding whether it is morally 
permissible to penalize (defect on) players or generations who emitted most before 
the dangers of emissions were known. After all, to hold someone responsible for a 
harm which they had no idea they were causing is questionable at best. Even if there 
were some way around these two moral problems, it would certainly be socially and 
politically difficult to impose a system of indirect reciprocity which would require 
such important sacrifices by current generations—loss of premiums paid into the 
pension system, loss of future retirement benefits, and great sacrifices in ways of 
living. In fact, this would inflict such an onus on current people that the coercion 
necessary by the state to impose and enforce such a system would likely be beyond 
the reasonable limits of coercion allowed in any liberal state.  
      In this section I have cast doubt on the likelihood of the right kind of reciprocity 
existing in our relationship with future people. However, an appealing feature of 
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political constructivism is that it tends to limit these reciprocal duties of justice to a 
subset of morality that in no way denies or undermines other kinds of principles of 
morality. Rawls addresses this in A Theory of Justice. Outside of his motivational chain 
account of justice toward future people, Rawls outlines a compelling independent 
argument for intergenerational considerations in his discussion of distribution 
between generations. His idea is that current people have “a natural duty to uphold 
and to further just institutions and for this the improvement of civilization up to a 
certain level is required.”25 Human actions that predictably result in these institutions 
being threatened, or civilization dropping below a certain threshold of well-being, 
would be wrong because they violate our duty to maintain the circumstances of 
justice such that social justice is possible and necessary.26 Rawls begins the 
explanation of these natural duties by contrasting them with obligations. Natural 
duties include: a duty of mutual aid; a duty to not be cruel; and a duty to help one 
another with or without a personal commitment to these actions. Natural duties hold 
between individuals regardless of their institutional relationships. Another natural 
duty is justice: not its rules and obligations, but simply to be just. Rawls is very clear 
that natural duties are not what he calls obligations, but duties which hold 
unconditionally. Looking at Rawls’s list of natural duties, we see that these are moral 
duties, not duties of justice. In fact, each of Rawls’s examples of natural duties, and 
the corresponding contrast to obligations of justice based on direct reciprocity, 
corresponds to the perfect/imperfect moral duties distinction. In the next section I 
offer an explanation of why Rawls’s distinction of natural duties and obligations 
corresponds to some views of perfect/imperfect duties, and advocate viewing our 
duties to future people as natural duties or imperfect moral duties. In addition, I 
explain why looking at the intergenerational problem in this light has been criticized 
in the past and why that criticism has missed its mark. 
VI. Perfect vs. Imperfect Duties 
    Imperfect duties are acts owed to others even when others lack a corresponding 
right to demand those acts. Conversely, perfect duties necessarily involve individuals 
with standing to demand that the duty be performed. The perfect/imperfect 
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distinction has been upheld differently by a variety of thinkers since the Stoics. I look 
to this distinction because I will argue throughout the rest of this chapter that duties 
toward future people are not perfect duties (or duties of justice), but imperfect duties 
(of morality more broadly construed). To articulate what I understand the distinction 
to be, I look to Mill and Kant and their influential explanations. Mill offers an 
extremely straightforward distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations, 
which I mention not only because it so clearly corresponds to my own analysis of the 
structure of duties, but also because it will provide a useful framework from which to 
view Kant’s more complicated approach.  
     For Mill, “duties of perfect obligation are those duties in virtue of which a 
correlative right resides in some person or persons; duties of imperfect obligation are 
those moral obligations which do not give birth to any right.”27 For Mill, as well as 
myself, justice is marked by the reciprocal duty-right form of a perfect duty.28 Mill 
thinks that the rest of morality consists of imperfect duties. However, the fact that 
Mill assigns all other moral rules to the category of imperfect duties does not make 
these the kinds of duties that can be neglected or ignored. Mill explains that “it is a 
part of the notion of Duty in every one of its forms, that a person may rightfully be 
compelled to fulfill it. Duty is a thing that may be exacted from a person, as a person 
exacts a debt. Unless we think that it might be exacted from him, we do not call this a 
duty.”29 Mill here is speaking of moral duties and justice duties. The burdens of 
imperfect duties are as serious as the burdens of perfect duties, though there may be 
instances when these duties cannot be fulfilled and no one can claim this against the 
duty bearer. Perhaps most telling of all Mill’s discussion on this distinction is his 
comment introducing the distinction as two “ill-chosen expressions.”30 They are ill-
chosen precisely because they carry with their labels the idea that duties of an 
imperfect nature are optional or less than binding, whereas duties of a perfect sort are 
                                                
     27 Mill, Utilitarianism, p.94. 
     28 It is unclear in Mill whether he considers only direct reciprocity as a contender 
for justice or would also include indirect reciprocity. However, given my structural 
analysis above that indirect reciprocity does generate clear rights and duties, it seems 
fair to treat  indirect reciprocity as sufficient for justice duties and perfect duties on 
Mills account. 
     29 Mill, Utilitarianism, p.93. 
     30 Ibid., p.94. 
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always binding. This, however, is false. For our uses of this distinction—as applied to 
the intergenerational problem—it is interesting to note that Mill cautions against all 
the duties of justice being duties of law, as expediency and prudence sometimes 
contradict this. He likewise holds that “the idea of a penal sanction, which is the 
essence of law, enters not only into the conception of injustice, but into that of any 
kind of wrong.”31 This conception of wrong includes the wrong of not fulfilling 
imperfect duties. Hence, it appears that Mill thinks that legal duties are informed by 
both perfect and sometimes imperfect duties.32  
     Kant’s discussion of perfect and imperfect duties is somewhat piecemeal 
compared to Mill’s, though it does generally correspond to Mill’s account. Kant 
typically characterizes perfect duties as negative duties owed to someone and 
imperfect duties as positive, meritorious duties.33 Hence, perfect duties prohibit acting 
on certain maxims or performing certain vices. In particular, violating a perfect duty 
comes from a maxim that is inconsistent with universalizability. When a perfect duty 
is violated, someone is wronged. Perfect duties, for Kant, are subject to external 
law.34 Imperfect duties, however, demand that one support certain rationally 
obligatory ends, for instance one’s own perfection or others’ happiness. These duties 
of virtue are not subject to external law on Kant’s view, because they pertain to an 
end, and it is having that end which is an internal act of the mind. Further, the 
violation of an imperfect duty contradicts no external right. Imperfect duties do not 
tell us how and when they ought to be fulfilled, and hence there is some room for 
exception.35   
     Kant explains the content of imperfect duties as involving either the “end of men” 
or the “end of humanity in our own person.”36 For our own purposes, it is the former 
category that we are interested in. Kant clarifies this duty to promote the end of 
                                                
     31 Ibid., p.93. 
     32 In my discussion of structure in chapter 4, I argued the same. 
     33 Lara Denis, "Freedom, Primacy, and Perfect Duties to Oneself," in Kant's 
Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide, ed. Lara Denis (Cambridge University Press), 
p.174.  
     34 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary J. Gregor, Texts in 
German Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.64. 
     35 Ibid., p.64. 
     36 Ibid., p.65. 
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humanity by pointing out that all human beings seek their own perfect happiness. He 
continues:  
Now, the human race might indeed exist if everybody contributed nothing to the 
happiness of others but at the same time refrained from deliberately impairing it. 
This harmonizing with humanity as an end in itself would, however, be merely 
negative and not positive, unless everyone also endeavours, as far as he can, to 
further the ends of others. For the ends of any person who is an end in himself 
must, if this idea is to have its full effect in me, be also, as far as possible, my ends.37 
The duties that arise from this notion of humanity’s end, though contingent, are not 
to be taken lightly. They are not optional, though they do allow some latitude in how 
and when one must act to fulfill these ends, which are duties that we are to treat as 
our own. Even so, Kant explains that “a wide [imperfect] duty is not to be taken as 
permission to make exceptions to the maxim of actions, but only as permission to 
limit one maxim of duty by another.”38 Imperfect duties in Kant, as in Mill, are 
obligatory; they are not optional and they are not to be taken more lightly than 
perfect duties. They simply are not owed to particular individuals and so there are 
not rights holders to demand them. Consequently, the beneficiaries of these duties of 
virtue are left somewhat to chance and circumstance. That does not, however, make 
them any less required or less important morally.  
     Imperfect duties as described by Kant and Mill seem to fit perfectly with the 
intergenerational problem of climate change. Imperfect duties capture the element of 
urgency that motivates individuals to think the intergenerational problem of climate 
change is a justice problem insofar as imperfect duties are no less urgent than perfect 
duties for Kant and Mill. Imperfect duties avoid reliance on person-affecting 
principles, and thus escape the non-reciprocity problem and the non-identity 
problem. Imperfect duties explain why we have the intuition that we harm future 
people by not choosing policies of environmental conservation—because we fail to 
promote future people’s ends. This reveals that we morally wrong them, not that we 
violate their rights by not choosing policies of conservation. That is, we wrong future 
people in the same way that we wrong the global poor by not giving to charity; we do 
not harm future people by violating duties to conserve which they can claim against 
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     38 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, p.194. 
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us. Further, we should not expect such moral duties to be constructed from the 
circumstances of justice. By treating duties to future people as imperfect moral duties 
and not as justice duties, we avoid the non-identity and non-reciprocity problems. 
      Recall Rawls’s argument (cited at the close of the previous section) that current 
people have “a natural duty to uphold and to further just institutions and for this the 
improvement of civilization up to a certain level is required.”39 Insofar as Rawls’s 
natural duties are also unidirectional imperfect duties, and that these duties are 
relevant to humanity’s end of furthering just institutions and a decent civilization, we 
are in agreement. Our duties to distant future people are imperfect duties: they are 
moral duties, not duties of justice. However, because intergenerational problems are 
problems that refer to the ends of humanity (or any theorist’s equivalent), these are 
still problems that we can legislate solutions to. So, it is in no way detrimental to 
future people or harmful to the environment that intergenerational coordination 
problems are not problems of justice. Practically speaking, imperfect moral duties can 
have the same impact as perfect justice duties.40  
     It seems then that using imperfect duties is a plausible way of thinking about 
obligations to future people that avoids the non-identity and non-reciprocity 
problems. I will discuss this later in more detail after I have explained what a possible 
account of imperfect duties toward future people might look like. I have suggested 
that imperfect duties are the way around some of the problems that plague 
traditional approaches to the problem of intergenerational justice. While it is outside 
the scope of this project to articulate a comprehensive theory of imperfect duties of 
intergenerational morality regarding climate change, I will offer a few suggestions for 
developing such a theory with the aim of showing that such a position is plausible.  
     An imperfect duty that needs to be discharged is not defined by a set amount of 
burden. An imperfect duty is unidirectional. It is owed to people, but not to specific 
persons. The people we owe an imperfect duty to may owe that same duty to us as 
well. Crucially, however, it is not because we owe them some duty that they owe it to 
us in return. Like Kant, I understand an imperfect duty to be one that a person 
cannot always be fulfilling and in which there is some leniency as to how one fulfills 
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     40 I will further develop this claim later in this chapter. 
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it. Following both Kant and Mill, imperfect duties must be discharged. The imprecise 
terms of what is involved in fulfilling an imperfect duty do not weaken its import. 
Imperfect duties generally serve an end. Kant identified this end as perfect happiness. As 
this is quite a vague conception, I will provide a more useful interpretation of this end 
later in this discussion. What matters at present is that we are looking for an end that 
can warrant the changes in current practices necessary to justify the adoption of 
policies of conservation regarding climate change.  
     I have advocated eschewing justice and turning to morality for a solution to the 
climate change dilemma. One approach that can offer guidance in how to address 
the climate change problem as an imperfect duty is the useful (and constructivist) 
Kantian notion of a kingdom of ends, as formulated by Thomas Hill. Hill argues that 
the Kantian kingdom of ends could parallel the decision procedure of the original 
position for moral (not justice) problems. Hill’s discussion illustrates that imperfect 
duties can be well-founded and weighty. Though Hill promotes the Kantian 
kingdom of ends formula as a useful device for working out moral principles, Hill is 
clear that Kant does not think that the kingdom of ends is the best approach to 
making everyday moral decisions. Rather, Kant thinks of it as a heuristic to model 
the appropriate moral attitude for “deliberating from basic moral values to 
moderately specific principles.”41 Like Rawls’s original position, Hill thinks that 
normative conclusions derived from the kingdom model follow from hypothetical 
choices. Specifically, “one should act according to the ‘laws’ one would adopt if one 
were legislating in the kingdom.”42 If we follow Hill’s advice on the kingdom of ends, 
we should be able to derive constructivist imperfect duties regarding climate change. 
     Kant, like Rawls, recommends that in thinking about the kingdom, “we abstract 
from the differences” between agents as well as from their particular ends. Hence the 
kingdom is at least somewhat objective. In Kant, rational agents value because they 
are autonomous. This allows Hill to insist that the decision procedure for Kant’s 
kingdom can be found in Kant’s idea that members of the kingdom are ends with 
dignity above all else. In calling the legislators in the kingdom “ends in themselves,” 
Hill argues that Kant means three things: “‘dignity’ is an unconditional value,” this 
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     42 Ibid.  
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dignity has no equivalent (i.e., people can’t be treated like means), and regarding 
other rational agents as ends in themselves implies commitment to furthering their 
contingent ends, because one cannot ignore the projects and concerns of the agents 
one respects. 43 These aspects, plus the impartiality and the decision procedure based 
on agents valuing autonomy, as well as the rather modest moral viewpoint this last 
feature constitutes, makes the kingdom of ends well-suited for deliberation about 
moral problems. In fact, Hill maintains that the “moral commitments implicit in the 
Kantian conception lead rather directly to general moral guidelines that may be used 
in deliberations about more specific policies when historical circumstances are taken 
into account.”44 We might now take up this Kantian moral point of view and ask, 
what laws would a legislator adopt? It seems that laws that entail strict respect for 
persons and their dignity will be favored along with those that allow (or even 
promote) humanity in general—in all generations—to pursue its contingent projects 
and ends.  
     Where climate change is concerned there is of course much uncertainty. But it 
seems evident that if the current generation does not abate emissions now, then the 
current legislators are not treating future legislators as ends in themselves, and with 
the dignity that that implies. Furthermore, through their inaction, they will rule out 
the possibility of future people pursuing their contingent ends. It is not important, for 
this position, that these future ends in themselves do not yet exist because the duty in 
question is not owed to the individuals but to all of humanity, all generations. Hence, 
it is possible that the intergenerational duties we have to future people are imperfect 
moral duties to all of humanity that each of its members (whoever they will be) has 
the opportunity to live a dignified life, and pursue his or her own ends. We may 
express this as the Rawlsian natural duty to promote a decent civilization.45 
Alternatively, we may simply say that these imperfect duties are duties of strict 
respect, and the furtherance of the dignity and projects of all of humanity in its past, 
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     45 Earlier in this section I cited Rawls’s natural duty to promote the institutions of 
justice and a decent civilization. I omit the institutions of justice here because I am 
arguing against climate change as an institution of justice. However, it would be 
reasonable for legislators in the kingdom of ends to promote such a duty if they were 
deliberating on problems of justice. 
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present, and future forms. In light of historical information about climate change, 
these more abstract duties pragmatically entail curbing emissions, promoting policies 
of conservation, supporting additional climate change research, etc. The bases of 
these imperfect duties are the Kantian notions of autonomy and dignity and the 
respect that these require. The nature of these duties, or at least one way we might 
understand them, is by thinking about them as though we were legislators in a 
kingdom of ends. Operating without knowing the specifics about our circumstances, 
but committed to treating others with respect, we would legislate principles that 
would promote dignity, and the protection of future generations.  
     This Kantian constructivist model of how we might derive imperfect duties of 
conservation from more general moral principles of respect and dignity is only one 
way that we might circumvent the problem of perfect intergenerational duties. Some 
different principles, or a different decision procedure, may result in better-fitting 
principles to inform us of our imperfect duties with regard to future people. However, 
my purpose here is not to defend an account of our duties, but to show that it is 
possible to identify imperfect duties regarding climate change that will involve 
choosing policies of conservation. The ultimate point is that it is possible to avoid the 
problems of perfect duties toward future people and still acknowledge stringent 
imperfect duties toward future people regarding climate change.  
     Addressing the problem of climate change as a duty of imperfect morality 
dissolves the non-identity problem, as it no longer requires that we look for a justice 
relationship with future people. It does not matter that our decisions do not harm 
future people, because our duties have nothing to do with their individual state of 
living. Dennis (from the discussion of the non-identity problem) cannot claim we 
harmed him by choosing the destructive environmental policy. This is still true, but 
now irrelevant with the imperfect duties approach. The imperfect duties we have are 
duties of strict respect to all humanity and the promotion of the dignity and projects 
of all members of humanity. This is a duty because we are all autonomous, rational 
beings, not because Dennis has a claim against us not to be born worse-off than some 
other environmental policy choice would have entailed. This is a duty because we are 
morally obliged to promote the ends of humanity and treat individuals as ends. 
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Further, these duties are justified with no reference to future people’s rights or harms 
against them.  
     The non-reciprocity problem is similarly avoided on this approach to the 
intergenerational problem of climate change because it demands no relationship 
between the living and future generations. It does not require that future people have 
rights, only that current people have duties. The theories that have attempted to 
negotiate some way around the non-reciprocity problem, and met with any degree of 
success, actually seem to rely on either imperfect, unidirectional duties (subject-
centered theories) or generalized reciprocity (the stewardship model), both of which 
are moral duties, not the perfect duties of a reciprocal nature—either direct or 
indirect—that mark rights and justice.  
     One might now ask why philosophy has been resistant to this solution before. 
Why did we not immediately recognize that the intergenerational problem is an ideal 
instance of an imperfect duty, and not attempt to make it fit into models of 
justice/perfect duties with which it is incompatible? My suspicion is that the urgency 
of the issue has turned people against this route. Ernest Partridge, in “On the Rights 
of Future Generations,” rejects the attempt to assign our duties to future people to 
the category of “unreciprocal, (i.e., imperfect) duties to the future,” as a way to get 
around what he calls the “rights problem.” 46 He argues instead that we do have 
positive, perfect Kantian duties stemming from future people having rights. Of 
interest here is Partridge’s reason for dismissing imperfect duties.  
     Partridge argues that choosing perfect duties over imperfect duties may make a 
significant moral difference because “rights have a stringency and urgency that 
benefactions do not.”47 He develops this further by explaining that if future people 
have rights claims against us, “they will have no cause to be grateful to us for 
preserving a viable ecosystem, for they will have received their due.”48 (Partridge 
barely responds to the non-identity problem.49) He maintains that perfect duties have 
                                                
     46 Ernest Partridge, "The Rights of Future Generations," in Upstream/Downstream : 
Issues in Environmental Ethics, ed. Donald Scherer (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1990), p.40. 
     47 Ibid., p.43. 
     48 Ibid., p.44 
     49 Partridge’s response is largely to set aside the non-identity problem by claiming 
that some collective of future people will exist and we are obligated to improve their 
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more weight than imperfect duties, thus the interests of future people will be better 
served if we can show they have rights claims against current generations. Partridge 
claims to be following the Kantian distinction of perfect/imperfect duties. He gives 
the same argument for perfect duties that Barry cites as a popular reason for 
intergenerational justice—urgency. However, this is only a reason to include the 
intergenerational problem within the ambit of justice if exclusion would deny urgent, 
immediate, policy-driven outcomes. This is not the case. Partridge wants to argue à 
la Feinberg that to respect a person is to think of that person as a potential claim 
maker. He insists that this respect is lacking in imperfect duties as they ignore these 
rights claims.50 This is wrong, especially on the Kantian distinction of the 
perfect/imperfect divide Partridge has adopted. Kant’s notion of imperfect duties 
focuses on both the notions of respect for the ends of others, and the aim of 
promoting their interests. Further, both Mill and Kant, as illustrated above, do not 
consider imperfect duties to be optional or any less obligatory than perfect duties. It is 
regrettable that, as Mill notes, some people have understood imperfect duties to 
mean optional duties. Partridge seems to have made this error. 
     It may seem that Partridge has some grounds for his criticism of imperfect duties 
insofar as it is easier to implement a policy of duties at the state level if we can see 
that there is some person or set of people with claims against us. While Partridge is 
correct that this would make it easier to implement policy, it is not the only way 
policy can be implemented. We need not go so far as to invent harms against future 
people when we are perfectly able to achieve Partridge’s aim of treating future people 
with standards of respect due to individuals on an imperfect duty account of our 
dues. Recall that, according to Mill, legal duties are compatible with imperfect duties. 
That is, though we have some latitude in how and when we fulfill the duties, Mill 
appears to find it legitimate for a juridical system to impose coercive rules on 
individuals to compel them to fulfill their imperfect duties.51 Kant rejects this, 
explaining that imperfect duties cannot be subject to juridical duties because they 
pertain to an end, the having of which is a duty. However, “no external lawgiving 
                                                                                                                                     
life prospects, but this will only be the case if we have perfect duties not to bring 
future people into a sub-threshold state (which fails for reasons given above).  
     50 Partridge, “The Rights of Future Generations,” p.44.  
     51 Mill, Utilitarianism, p.93. 
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can bring about someone’s setting an end for himself (because this is an internal act 
of the mind), although it may prescribe external actions that lead to an end without 
the subject making it his end.”52 While Kant is not saying that imperfect duties can be 
juridical duties, he does imply that it is at least possible for external actions to 
contribute to an end (in this case the end of humanity). And while such actions, if not 
from a good will would not be good actions for Kant, there is no reason to think that 
legal duties require specific motives for compliance. Even if one reduces carbon 
emissions because of a legal duty to do so, one is still fulfilling the legal and moral 
duty—for those less demanding than Kant—to conserve. 
     In chapter 4, I offered examples of legitimate duties of a state that have the 
unidirectional nature of a duty of beneficence (i.e., imperfect duty, duty of humanity, 
or duty of virtue). One of these duties is a duty of foreign aid. These are extremely 
common in times of disease and natural disasters. Previously, I gave the example of 
nations offering relief to Haiti after an earthquake, other disaster relief examples 
include: tsunami relief in different parts of Asia in the last decade; emergency shelter 
and supplies provided after hurricanes, earthquakes, droughts, and floods around the 
world; and current aid efforts in Syria. Non-disaster relief examples also abound, 
including Western nations helping fight AIDS in Africa; family planning projects in 
underdeveloped nations; clean water projects throughout Asia and Africa; 
developmental projects and agencies such as the US Peace Corps (which is funded by 
governmental taxes and promotes health, education, nutrition, agricultural, and 
other projects throughout the underdeveloped world). These are all non-correlative, 
imperfect duties that governments fulfill largely with the endorsement of their 
constituents, and usually with funds raised via taxes or donations from said 
constituents. While these comments may not be sufficient to establish that taxing 
citizens to fulfill imperfect duties is legitimate (that would be out of the scope of this 
project), they suffice to establish that such actions are popularly supported and 
accepted as legitimate. Specifically, legal rules (e.g., taxes) are utilized by the state to 
enforce the fulfillment of imperfect duties toward distant others. I have argued—in 
my prior assertion that the international problem is inclusive of justice—that the 
destitute in these examples may have standing to make claims against us. However, 
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in the cases listed here that is not why aid is given. Aid is given to promote a certain 
state of well-being for people who may not otherwise have access to that standard. 
These are exactly the kind of reasons that we might have for imposing legitimate 
juridical rules regarding the well-being of future sets of people. Further, there is no 
reason to think the intergenerational case has any morally relevant differences from 
the international case of providing benefits to the worse-off people of the earth.  
     We have extremely good reason to suspect that, without change in our current 
policies and practices regarding the earth’s resources, future generations will exist in 
conditions that parallel the conditions of the current generation’s worst-off people. 
Because we have imperfect duties to promote all people’s dignity and ability to 
pursue their contingent ends (or on the Rawlsian formula, to promote the 
circumstances that allow for a particular state of well-being), our current 
governments can legitimately legislate such measures. The caveat, of course, is that 
they cannot legislate such extreme measures that they significantly lower the life 
prospects of current people. This corresponds precisely with Kant’s reasoning that 
imperfect duties cannot “be raised to the universality of a law of nature, because such 
a will would contradict itself.”53 That is, to have duties so stringent that the current 
generation’s perfect happiness is blighted would contradict the aim which guides 
imperfect duties—the promotion of humanity’s perfect happiness. On my kingdom 
of ends model, this would mean that if duties toward future generations were perfect 
duties, we would sacrifice the current generation’s dignity and ability to pursue 
contingent projects. Such a risk would defeat the purpose of the duties we have 
toward future people. Up until the point where humanity’s end is threatened, 
however, it seems that governments could be authorized to impose legislation.54 It is 
difficult to understand how the breadth and extent of possible legal rules made 
legitimate in this framework could be interpreted as not efficacious enough for those 
who insist, for reasons of urgency, that the intergenerational problem must involve 
perfect duties or justice. Imperfect duties do involve some leniency in fulfillment 
                                                
     53 Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 424. 
     54 While this is not explicitly endorsed in either Kant or Mill, it is mentioned by 
both that descriptively this is sometimes the case and (possibly) it also ought to 
sometimes be the case. As above in Mill, Utilitarianism, p.93.;Kant, The Metaphysics of 
Morals, p.64. 
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(hence we need not eliminate all emissions at present), but they do require fulfillment, 
so possible policies might include carbon taxes, incentives to lower emissions, etc. I 
have attempted to show only that imperfect duties stand against the critique that they 
do not warrant enough action to solve the intergenerational problem. This discussion 
has shown that that critique is misguided.  
     At this point, one might still reject my solution to the intergenerational problem 
by asking what is left for justice. If imperfect rights are sufficient for a problem like 
climate change, have I not narrowed justice too far? My response is twofold. First, it 
is precisely because of the nature of the problem of climate change—the time lag in 
the dispersion of harms, the lack of clear culprits, and the lack of clarity regarding 
what reparations entail—that it is impossible to fit it into a model of direct or indirect 
reciprocity. Further, the problem involves such urgency that only limited leniency is 
acceptable in fulfilling this imperfect moral duty. Hence, it is uniquely situated to 
generate legitimate juridical duties to avoid over-leniency in its fulfillment. It also 
escapes the problem that Consequentialists have faced of requiring that we do more 
than is possible right now. If climate change were a duty of justice, the extent to 
which the current generation would need to sacrifice now to avoid significant impact 
on future individuals would be astronomical. But juridical duties can stop the current 
trend of doing little to nothing in the face of such extreme sacrifice, by allowing a bit 
of leniency in how much we have to do to fulfill this imperfect duty (e.g., a sliding 
scale, dependent on amount of emissions, for paying carbon taxes), and at the same 
time ensure that the duty is fulfilled as fully as possible. Hence, it is unique to the 
climate problem that it would be more successfully dealt with as a moral duty than as 
a justice duty. My second response is that in other areas where genuine coordination 
is possible, a justice relationship is still best able to deal with and adjudicate problems. 
Accepting that one particularly urgent problem is not a justice problem does not 
threaten the entire system of justice, nor does it imply that the scope of justice is 
overly narrow.  
     A final objection Constructivists could raise to my project may be that I have 
closed the door too soon on constructivist theories of justice. If I am willing to let 
indirect reciprocity be sufficient for the scarcity of resources condition, why not try to 
find a way to motivate a system of coordination such as the one suggested by Heath? 
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My initial response is that as long as such coordination lacks the fact of solidarity 
between distant generations, it will not be possible. This response may just look like a 
reason to reject my account of the circumstances of justice. However, there is an 
option left open to the Constructivists. It is possible that if the current generation’s 
duties toward future people become juridical duties and future people benefit from 
the fulfillment of these duties, starting a system of coordination between generations 
such as the one Heath describes could become just. This is because the duties of 
future generations would be less extreme once emissions have begun to be curbed. 
Furthermore, being within a shared, functioning legal system would ensure that 
individuals fulfill these duties, and that the punishment for defection involves legal 
retribution in proportion to the wrong in a way that seems more appropriate to the 
crime (e.g., paying fines for emitting instead of losing pension or currency benefits 
already paid for). This system will be fair only if the disadvantages are appropriate 
such that cooperation is mutually beneficial.  
     It is in much the same way, I imagine, that systems of health care and education 
come into existence. Initially, meeting needs for health care and education are moral 
duties, not justice duties. Such moral duties only become duties of justice when they 
exist in a system regulated to ensure indirect reciprocity—usually a state system. The 
initial impetus to include such duties in a system of justice develops from the moral 
duties to promote others’ well-being and health, not because some individuals are 
owed these considerations in exchange for other, unrelated benefits. Applying this 
reasoning to the controversy surrounding the Affordable Care Act in the United 
States, we could explain the resistance to public health care not as a denial of a moral 
duty to promote the health and well-being of others. Rather, the resistance is to 
including the promotion of other’s health and well-being in a system that would, by 
means of indirect reciprocity, render moral duties into duties of justice. In sum, 
justice toward future people could be possible if we can create institutions which 
translate imperfect moral duties into indirect reciprocal duties. However, lacking the 
relevant institutions to do so, our duties to future people remain imperfect moral 
duties.  
      Could this kind of coordination open the door for some form of attenuated 
solidarity between generations through the overlapping way that generations actually 
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interact with one another? I am not certain, but allow for the possibility since more 
expressional solidarity is certainly likely. Another option for Constructivists is to 
simply point out that in restricting their scope to justice, they in no way rule out the 
possibility of imperfect moral duties. Hence, it could be consistent with their larger 
system of moral duties that the intergenerational climate change problem be treated 
as an imperfect moral duty. According at least to Rawls’s constructivist approach to 
justice, it is a moral duty that one promote justice. Thus, the imperfect duties 
approach to the intergenerational problem is not tantamount to dismissing the issue: 
only dismissing it from the scope of constructivism about justice.  
Conclusion 
     In this chapter I first argued that intergenerational coordination problems do not 
fit into my own or the standard account of the circumstances of justice. The rest of 
the chapter may be seen as an attempt to show that this is not a problem for my view 
of the circumstances of justice, as all of the best attempts to incorporate the 
intergenerational problem into the scope of justice have failed. I introduced two 
reasons that theorists have been inclined to account for intergenerational problems 
within the scope of justice, both of which are person-affecting reasons. In one case, 
that of harms we inflict on future people, we saw that there is no good way around 
the non-identity problem. In the second case, the claim was that future people have a 
right to our protecting the environment because of the urgency of the matter. This 
case also has no solid theoretical foundation as it raises the non-reciprocity problem. 
I then proposed that the unidirectional duties we find in some attempts to circumvent 
the non-reciprocity problem are actually imperfect moral duties. These duties not 
only fit the structure of the intergenerational problem, but also avoid the non-
reciprocity and non-identity problems. Furthermore, this model is able to capture the 
issue of urgency by warranting legal sanctions in the same way a perfect duty might. 
Hence, imperfect moral duties might result in the same kinds of policy change that 
would result from considering the intergenerational problem a problem of justice.  
     This chapter has offered a new analysis of some old ways of characterizing duties 
in an attempt to respond to the intergenerational coordination problem. My 
conclusion is that because there is a sense of urgency, and a sense that we are 
harming future people, the intuition that we have duties of justice toward future 
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people seems plausible, but actually is wrong. We have only imperfect moral duties 
toward future people. The reason we have rejected the idea of having imperfect 
duties toward future people is that modern treatment of imperfect duties suggests that 
imperfect duties are not as demanding as perfect duties, and so would be less effective 
in dealing with the problems of climate change. The idea that only perfect duties can 
deal with the harms and urgency of climate change is misguided. Imperfect duties 
can also deal with urgent, harmful situations—as they do in disaster relief and 




























     This thesis is a defense of a new formulation of the circumstances of justice. It 
proposes a new scope of justice and, in doing so, offers new insight into the nature of 
justice from a constructivist perspective. In particular, it advocates a particular 
relationship between solidarity and justice, one in which the capability of 
participating in a particular kind of mutual trust generated by solidarity, is a 
necessary condition for justice to have application. The project is comprised of four 
broad tasks.  
     The first was to explain the importance of the circumstances of justice for all 
political Constructivists and to evaluate the standard accounts of the circumstances of 
justice. This task was the focus of the first two chapters. In the first chapter I showed 
that constructivism is an appealing method of political philosophy and that it is 
characterized, among other things, by principles derived from certain relevant facts 
about the world and human nature. This means that a theory of justice is constrained 
by the facts that make its principles appropriate. These facts—whatever precisely 
they may be—are the circumstances of justice. In the second chapter, I argued that the 
circumstances of justice should be interpreted normatively as the facts that must be 
true for human cooperation and hence, justice to be needed and possible. In 
addition, I argued for the importance of mutual trust in the circumstances of justice. 
     The second task was to explain what solidarity is, and offer a description of its 
normative aspects. To this end, in chapter 3, I offered a reconciliatory account of 
solidarity. In my view, solidarity is constituted by four jointly necessary conditions: a 
shared joint interest, identification with the group, a disposition to empathy, and 
mutual trust. The bidirectional or unidirectional structure of these conditions 
determines whether the solidarity in question generates obligations or motivations.  
     The third task was to develop and defend my own account of the circumstances of 
justice. This task was the subject of chapters 4 and 5. In chapter 4, I proposed an 
alternative formulation of the circumstances of justice. I argued that the 
circumstances of justice are: the fact of solidarity, moderate scarcity of resources, and 
limited human understanding. While there can be no test as to whether my account 
of the circumstances is the definitive account of the circumstances of justice, I 
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contend that my account is more plausible than the standard accounts. Chapter 5 
aimed to provide a bulwark against anticipated criticisms of my new account of the 
circumstances of justice. I did this largely by addressing the tension between inclusion 
and exclusion in the circumstances of justice.  
     The final aim of this project was to apply my analysis of the circumstances of 
justice—and justice itself—to the intergenerational coordination problem of climate 
change, and ask whether this problem falls within the scope of justice. This was the 
goal of chapter 6. There I argued that intergenerational coordination problems do 
not fit into either my own or the standard account of the circumstances of justice. 
The rest of the chapter may be seen as an attempt to demonstrate that 
Constructivists do have a response left open to them regarding the problem of 
climate change. Constructivists could take the position that we have weighty duties 
toward future people; however, they simply do not understand these duties to be 
duties of justice. In chapter 6, I have shown why this constructivist understanding of 
these duties is not a problem. 
     While I believe my endeavor to formulate a new account of the circumstances of 
justice is complete, I recognize that the project itself has raised a number of related 
issues that may merit exploration in the future. The chapter on solidarity posited a 
somewhat contentious position: that even involuntary solidary groups generate 
obligations. The consequence of this view is that individuals may have somewhat less 
volition in choosing values and obligations than the liberal tradition commonly 
insists.  
     Chapter 6 raises a number of issues for any Constructivist who may wish to take 
the imperfect duty explanation of what we owe to future people. The first is the 
challenge of specifying the content of the imperfect duties we have toward future 
people. Another is to work out what happens when perfect and imperfect duties 
conflict? Does one kind of duty trump another? Does perceived conflict only reveal 
that one of the duties in question isn’t really a duty—or does it reveal perhaps some 
altogether different answer? I think answers to these questions will be necessary, 
partiularly to convince those resistant to calling our duties to future people imperfect 
duties that we are right to do so. 
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     Another issue which this project raises is the structural relationship between 
principles of justice and moral principles. I have outlined the rudiments of my view in 
chapters 4 and 6, but said very little to defend my position on the unidirectional vs. 
reciprocal structure of the kinds of duties. This project reveals the importance of 
understanding the relationship between justice and morality before we can get clear 
on what justice is, and what it aims to do. 
     Perhaps the most important implications of the project, however, are what it 
reveals about the ways that we think about justice. If my analysis is plausible and my 
examples from chapter 5 correct, then mutual trust, solidarity, and perhaps other 
social groups play a much more significant role in questions and theories of justice 
than we have been giving them credit for. That is not to say that liberalism ought to 
be abandoned for communitarianism. Rather liberal political theory may do well to 
reevaluate its near-exclusive emphasis on individual agency over social agency. After 
all, we only become agents capable of justice—capable of claim-making and rights-
bearing—by being social agents first. 
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